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Is Jewish religion at all intelligible without theology? This question 
relates to both universal and particular aspects. A student of 
religions will ask: can we explain the religion phenomenon 
without theology? Is there any meaning to religion, at least in 
its monotheistic version, without God as its central, constitutive 
concept? From a particularistic perspective, can we understand 
the lebenswelt of Jewish religion if God is no longer its central 
element? These questions are not merely theoretical, but follow 
from the situation of the modern person living after the “death of 
God,” after losing the primary innocence that is purportedly the 
foundation of the religious world. Modern individuals, who make 
their own lives the center of their being but nevertheless wish to 
remain loyal to a religious commitment, must face the problem of 
creating a religious life within this set of basic assumptions.
 Since “the death of God,” these questions have indeed become 
basic problems not only for the study of the religious phenomenon 
but also, and mainly, for believers. They fi nd themselves at the eye 
of the storm, facing a cultural-religious legacy with a transcendent 
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God and a duty of obedience at its center confronting a modernist 
refl ective experience where the protagonist is the individual.
 This book offers an account of attempts to deal with this 
question in contemporary Jewish thought. It points to a post-
theological trend that shifts the focus of the discussion from 
metaphysics to praxis and examines the possibilities of estab-
lishing a religious life centered on immanent-practical existence, 
with various chapters presenting different aspects of this shift.
 First, I trace the manifestations of this shift in the work 
of contemporary Jewish thinkers who discussed it directly — 
Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Eliezer Goldman, Joseph B. Soloveitchik, 
and David Hartman. Each one offers a set of unique options for 
an immanent religious experience, centered on praxis and on 
a way of life rather than on a transcendent God. In this sense, this 
book continues and complements my Tradition vs. Traditionalism: 
Contemporary Perspectives in Jewish Thought.* Second, I reconsider 
basic issues of religious life through this perspective such as, for 
instance, the conditions for the development of a pluralistic world 
view within the context of a religious commitment in Chapter 
One, and the attitude to a fl awed human reality in Chapter 
Seven. These chapters examine the borders of fl exibility in 
Jewish religious life and lead to the conclusion that Halakhah, as 
a normative system perceived as conservative, allows for greater 
openness than the metaphysical theological perspective.
 Although some of the chapters of the book have been 
published as separate articles and deal with specifi c issues, 
they are also part of a general argument presenting clearly and 
comprehensively the option of immanence in Jewish religious 
* Tradition vs. Traditionalism: Contemporary Perspectives in Jewish Thought, 
trans. Batya Stein (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2008). Both these 
books appeared in one volume in Hebrew entitled A Challenge: 
Returning to Tradition (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2003). 
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life. This book will obviously fail to exhaust the subject. Indeed, 
it is only the beginning or, more precisely, it is an invitation to re-
examine an option that has been neglected due to an overstated 
concern with theology and metaphysics. My general starting 
point is the approach developed by Wittgenstein, who is the 
book’s latent hero. According to this view, we must focus 
on a given culture’s actual “forms of life” and prefer them to 
theoretical statements, of which metaphysics and theology are 
only one part.
 This book could not have been written without the enriching 
dialogue that I have been conducting for decades with my 
colleagues and my students at the Shalom Hartman Institute in 
Jerusalem and at Bar-Ilan University. I am deeply appreciative 
of the opportunity for our sustained discourse. Thanks to Dov 
Schwartz, who occupies the Nathalie and Isidore Friedman Chair 
for the Teaching of Rav Soloveitchik’s Thought, for his help in 
funding the translation. As ever, I am grateful to my dear friend 
Batya Stein for her accomplished rendition of the text from 
Hebrew. Batya has been my longstanding partner, and her subtle 
and critical reading of my work resonates in her translation.
 I have been greatly privileged to enjoy close contacts with 
three of this book’s protagonists: Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Eliezer 
Goldman, and David Hartman. My encounter with them afforded 
me a glimpse into a complex world of commitment as it attains 
realization, above all, in real life, and their readiness to share this 
has been a moment of grace for me. I remember with longing 
my conversations with Eliezer Goldman, whose philosophy is 
only now becoming more widely available. Eliezer, who taught 
at the Department of Philosophy of Bar-Ilan University and 
was a member of Kibbutz Sdeh-Eliyahu, drew the connection 
be tween Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Joseph Soloveitchik, who 
was his teacher. David Hartman, who began as my teacher and 
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became my friend, taught me about commitment to values and 
beliefs accompanied by critical thought and a willing readiness to 
engage in their re-examination.
 This book is devoted with love and appreciation, which 
did not blind my criticism, to the three thinkers I have known 
personally: Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Eliezer Goldman, and David 
Hartman, grateful for the privilege of our encounter and in deep 
appreciation of their contribution to my life.
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JEWISH religion holds certain beliefs about the world that it 
takes to be true, including theoretical assumptions and practical 
obligations. The theoretical assumptions include premises about 
the Torah’s divine origin and the explicit duty of observance 
incumbent on every Jew. Practical halakhic obligations extend 
to most if not all spheres of life and, by dint of the theoretical 
assumptions, compel all members of the Jewish collective. Given 
these circumstances, can Jewish religion endorse notions of 
toleration and pluralism toward Jews who do not observe the 
Torah and the commandments without losing its fundamental 
meaning?
 Two preliminary remarks are in place here. First, a clear 
distinction is required between my concerns in this book and 
displays of toleration, or even pluralism, in Halakhah. The 
saying “these and these are words of the living God” (BT Eruvin 
13b), for instance, is often used as proof of Halakhah’s support 
for tolerant or pluralistic attitudes. But this is not necessarily 
the case, since Jewish religion acknowledges multiplicity only 
within the system. Halakhah and Jewish religion do not rest on 
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theoretical or empirical uniformity, and a diversifi ed spectrum of 
thought and praxis indeed constitute Jewish religion as a culture 
of dispute.1 Whatever is not part of the system, however, is not 
considered “words of the living God” but rather a deviation that 
the halakhic system will not necessarily tolerate and will certainly 
not approach in pluralistic terms.
 The possibility of developing a tolerant and perhaps even 
pluralistic attitude toward non-Jews posed a fascinating challenge 
to Jewish tradition, but the diffi culties raised by these questions 
are not comparable to the challenges posed by the attempt to 
apply these ideas to members of the Jewish collective. Gentiles 
are not compelled to observe the Torah and the commandments, 
whereas Jews are bound by these obligations by the very fact 
that they are Jews. In Tolerance and the Jewish Tradition, Alexander 
Altman reports the fi ndings of a study on toleration and Jewish 
tradition and sums them up as ambivalent: “On the one hand, 
strictness in enforcing the religious discipline of the community, 
and on the other, a considerable measure of toleration towards 
the Gentiles.”2 When the other is wholly other, entirely beyond 
the borders of the Jewish community and Jewish culture, the 
potential threat to the core of identity is minimal. But when 
the other is inside a given society and culture, his or her very 
existence is a menace. No wonder, then, that Jewish tradition was 
tolerant of strangers.
 Can Jewish believers adopt a tolerant or even a pluralistic 
stance toward non-observant members of the Jewish collective? 
Can Jewish tradition accept the other within itself, or must it 
reject these ideas? This is a vital issue, since it also determines the 
answer to the fundamental question: to what extent can Jewish 
believers open up to the outside world? Or, to what extent can 
they participate in a Western community that endorses notions of 
toleration and pluralism?
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 The following discussion will focus on the links between 
Jewish religion and ideas of toleration and pluralism, and less 
on the historical question of whether Jewish religion, as an actual 
historical-cultural phenomenon, displayed toleration toward de-
viants from halakhic norms or enabled pluralism. A preliminary 
conceptual analysis of toleration and pluralism is required here 
because in everyday language, and sometimes in philosophical 
terminology as well, these concepts appear as similar and some-
times as identical, although they actually represent different ideas.
Toleration and Pluralism
Toleration—Many scholars have pointed out that toleration 
is a paradoxical concept,3 since it implies that we are willing 
to bear what we actually reject. Toleration, then, is built on 
a combination of two opposite trends. We oppose and reject 
the tolerated approach, but we also enable its existence. In Jay 
Newman’s terms, this is a “split heart” stance.4 This “paradoxical 
conclusion” of rejection and acceptance called toleration rests on 
several necessary and mutually related assumptions that explain 
one another.
 First, the tolerated stance deviates from what is purportedly 
the right way. We will not say of a stance we consider worthy 
that we tolerate it, since we would not reject it in the fi rst place.5 
The tolerant person, then, is neither a relativist nor a skeptic. 
Relativism and skepticism do not assume a truth-deviance 
relationship, since they do not support any outlook and thus 
cannot justify its rejection either.6 Neither one refl ects the paradox 
of tolerance or the split heart.7
 Evidence of the essential role of the truth-deviation relati-
onship within the toleration idea is the historical context that 
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fostered the growth of toleration. The idea of toleration was born 
in a culture that assumed an objective truth and a monopolistic 
perception of values, and was neither skeptical nor relativistic. 
The conceptual meaning of the term “toleration” also refl ects 
this assumption, since toleration is not agreement but rather 
readiness to bear or suffer what is wrong, despite disagreement.8 
John Locke, whose Letters Concerning Toleration are among the 
most signifi cant expressions of the toleration idea, illustrates the 
link between adherence to a stance and readiness to bear what is 
perceived as mistaken.9
 Similarly, speaking of tolerating something we do not care 
about is pointless. Toleration is predicated on the negative 
value assigned to the tolerated stance, but not on indifference or 
obliviousness to it.10 The right to be called tolerant applies only 
when the tolerated attitude conveys deviation from something 
that tolerant individuals consider worthy. Otherwise, they would 
not need to exercise discretion to refrain from acting against 
the tolerated attitude, which is meaningless to them and hence 
unworthy of their concern.
 Second, tolerant individuals can adduce good reasons to sub-
stantiate their objection to the tolerated position. Their oppo sition 
is not the product of a capricious whim. If tolerant individuals 
lack justifi ed reasons for opposing the tolerated view, in what 
sense are they tolerant? Their opposition must have a rational 
basis.11 In everyday language, the concept of toleration is used 
in a broader sense to include not only opposition based on 
rational grounds but also on feelings. We say that X is tolerant of 
her children’s dress code or of their favorite music. We expand 
the use of the concept of toleration to include everything that is 
unbearable, regardless of the rational grounds that justify this 
opposition.12 This use of the term refl ects what could be called 
“descriptive toleration,” which is a psychological portrayal of 
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the kindness typical of the person called tolerant. From this de-
scription, however, we can hardly draw conclusions about the 
value of toleration and decide whether it deserves praise or 
contempt. Descriptive toleration often refl ects what Newman 
calls “moral weakness.”13 A father unable to deal with his children 
allows them to do whatever they want. Toleration would hardly 
be a moral quality or a praiseworthy ethical stance if objection 
to the tolerated stance were simply a matter of personal taste 
without any rational grounds.
 Third, the tolerant person has good reasons not only to oppose 
the tolerated stance but also to act against it. This assumption 
does not follow directly from the previous one, since the right 
to act against the tolerated view cannot be derived from the 
existence of rational grounds for opposing it. To justify this right, 
tolerant individuals require additional assumptions. For instance, 
a tolerant person could claim a right to act against deviants in 
order to help them fi nd truth, or to prevent them from harming 
other members of the community, and so forth. Without believing 
in the existence of this right, abstention and self-restraint do not 
denote toleration, because refraining from action could simply 
follow from the absence of a right to take steps against the 
tolerated position in the fi rst place.14
 Fourth, tolerant individuals have counterarguments to 
substantiate their self-restraint. Without entering into a detailed 
analysis of the range of reasons that have been suggested in 
history for the idea of toleration, reasons for toleration can in 
principle be classifi ed under two main rubrics: utilitarian and 
value-based. One instance of a value-based consideration could 
be respect for the other person’s autonomy as a free entity. As 
for utilitarian considerations, their range is extremely broad and 
spans, inter alia, claims about lack of power to coerce the truth, 
unsatisfactory results from this coercion, or acknowledgement 
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of the tolerated view’s instrumental value, which helps to justify 
the tolerant person’s self-perception as such. Thus, for instance, 
one argument for tolerating Jews adopted in Christian tradition 
from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas was that Jews should not 
be forced to convert since their inferior status attests to the truth 
of Christianity.15 The value-based consideration assigns great 
importance to the dignity of the individual as a person able to 
choose, who cannot be deprived from this essential characteristic 
even in the name of truth.
 All these grounds for toleration share one common deno-
minator: they rule out the possibility of the tolerated position 
having any intrinsic value. Tolerant individuals claim that they 
have the truth but, for various reasons, endorse self-restraint. 
At times, they do not acknowledge even instrumental value 
in the tolerated position but refrain from acting against it for 
utilitarian reasons; at times, they view the tolerated stance as 
a means to their own ends.
 Even when respecting the other and allowing him freedom 
of thought and action, one need not acknowledge any intrinsic 
value in his position. One may respect the person’s freedom and 
agree to practice self-restraint without necessarily respecting the 
tolerated position per se.
 Utilitarian and value-based reasons for supporting toleration 
differ in the level of commitment they command. Utilitarians, for 
instance, might renounce their commitment to toleration if they 
believed it useful to oppose the tolerated position.16 Toleration 
advocates who rely on the idea of human dignity would fi nd it 
hard or probably impossible to relinquish their commitment to 
toleration since no other consideration could possibly override 
this idea. If we ascribe moral value to toleration and we praise 
tolerant individuals, we probably intend the kind of toleration 
that rests on the idea of human freedom. People who are tolerant 
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for utilitarian reasons would not warrant moral acclaim for 
displays of self-restraint given that, in other circumstances, they 
might not refrain from intolerant attitudes.
 This analysis enables us to separate a prima facie tolerant 
stance from one of genuine toleration, a distinction that will prove 
crucial. Individuals often refrain from opposing the other’s stance 
due to paternalistic considerations. Paternalists ascribe features 
to the tolerated position that enable them to view it as different 
from what it actually is. For instance, paternalists may claim 
that, although the tolerated position is founded on a mistake, 
the people who support it are not responsible for it—they are 
coerced and are not epistemically liable. At times, paternalists 
offer an alternative interpretation of the tolerated stance and claim 
it actually represents their own truth, or at least does not contradict 
it, even if its supporters are unaware of it. Viewing supporters of 
the tolerated position in this light enables paternalists to justify 
their abstention from action. The common denominator of all these 
paternalistic claims is that they dismiss the “paradox of tolerance” 
because they do not view the opposite stance as genuine. Pater-
nalists will use analysis to refrain from punishing their opponents, 
but will not be truly ready to bear the tolerated stance as presented 
by its supporters. Refraining from punishment is not evidence of 
a tolerant position because this abstention could be motivated, as 
noted, by the collapse of the “paradox of tolerance.”
 Once toleration is characterized through these parameters, the 
question is: what is its object? What exactly is the tolerant person 
willing to bear? Ostensibly, toleration could relate to three different 
objects: views, deeds, and people. Since the tolerant person does 
not ascribe intrinsic value to either the views or the deeds of the 
tolerated person, however, it might be more correct to claim that 
people are the true object of toleration. The tolerant person is ready 
to tolerate specifi c people, despite their ideas or deeds.
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 The discussion has so far focused on the necessary conditions 
for making the concept of toleration meaningful. This analysis, 
however, does not deal with the degree of toleration: How 
tolerant am I? What is it that I can or may do and I do not? Types 
of toleration can be classifi ed according to the type of reaction 
that tolerant people could implement if they were not tolerant, 
or according to the type of self-restraint they actually practice. 
The latter leads to a distinction between various levels of weak or 
strong toleration.17 Weak toleration implies that tolerant people 
do not impose their views on the tolerated person and refrain, for 
instance, from applying physical force or direct coercion. It could 
also be broader and include absence of indirect coercion, implying 
that the tolerant person does not resort to rejection mechanisms 
that might lead others to change their views. This type of toleration 
is obviously stronger than lack of physical coercion, since it 
requires greater restraint. In both these displays of toleration, the 
tolerant person does not deny the other’s freedom of action.
 But supporters of this type of toleration have other means 
of conveying their negation of the other’s position while still 
expressing lesser willingness to tolerate the other. Non-use of 
these means, which requires great restraint, refl ects strong types 
of toleration. At the fi rst level, tolerant individuals go beyond 
lack of coercion to argue they are waiving their right to prohibit 
the social and political expression of the tolerated stance. This 
type of toleration is evident mainly at the declarative level, in the 
abstention of proclaiming this prohibition. The three expressions 
of toleration I have examined so far share a behavioral dimension. 
The strongest level of toleration, requiring the greatest form 
of self-restraint, is toleration as a disposition or an attitude of 
the mind. In this type of toleration, not only does the tolerant 
individual refrain from banning public displays of the tolerated 
stance but also avoids deriding it, condemning it, or developing 
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negative attitudes toward it. Developing this disposition is easier 
when toleration is value-based rather than utilitarian, relying on 
considerations of human dignity and liberty and viewing human 
beings as free agents whose mistakes should not be scorned.
 Another classifi cation distinguishes between various types 
of toleration according to the public means enabling the tolerant 
position to exist. In this context, the distinction is between negative 
and positive toleration. Negative toleration does not interfere 
with the deeds of others, and neither forbids views nor forces its 
own. This is not an appropriate refl ection of the idea of toleration, 
since non-interference could simply refl ect weakness. Powerless 
to negate the tolerated stance or coerce others to accept their 
own, tolerant individuals are deterred from action. In practical 
terms, this consideration is only temporary and could change 
with changing circumstances. By contrast, positive toleration 
represents a view stating that non-interference is insuffi cient, and 
imposes obligations on the tolerant person to ensure continued 
protection of the tolerated position by means of legislation or 
through other ways.18
Pluralism—Since toleration assumes that the tolerated stance 
is wrong and unjustifi ed, it must contend with the paradox of 
pluralism and answer the question: why not act against it or, 
at least, develop a negative disposition toward it? Note that, 
historically, the idea of toleration played an important role in 
such cultures as Christianity, which assumed total certainty about 
its own truth and denied any value to tolerated positions. At fi rst, 
the idea of toleration refl ected the position of the majority vis-à-
vis the minority and, from the seventeenth century onward, it 
also came to include deviant individuals.19
 The idea of pluralism is radically different, both in its historical 
and sociological contexts, in that it is part of a cultural liberal 
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framework that affi rms free thought and free action without en-
suring the majority view a preferable status. One of the main 
historical differences is that a tolerant culture is basically a mono-
polistic religious culture, whereas a pluralistic culture pre vails in 
a liberal-secular environment where religions may even compete 
with one another. “The pluralistic situation” is one of unbridled 
competition, without any preferences or advantages.20 As Berger 
describes it: “The pluralistic situation is, above all, a market situa-
tion,” in which religion is sold as any of the other goods available 
in the market.21 The transition from a tolerant to a plu ralistic cul-
ture is not sharp and all-inclusive. A pluralistic cul ture may also 
include islands of toleration or even of intole rance, indicating it 
does not accept the market situation in some areas. A prominent 
instance is the change in the attitude to homosexuality in plura-
listic cultures, shifting from intolerance to toleration and from 
toleration to indifference. This type of relationship is never found 
in a market situation. A conceptual analysis of pluralism will 
further understanding of this historical-sociological reality.
 Conceptually, pluralism does not refl ect a paradox of oppo-
sition and acceptance. Pluralists do not “tolerate” different views 
because they are, as it were, ready to tolerate the people expressing 
them. Rather, a pluralist considers the other’s view valuable and, 
therefore, respects the person who represents it. Pluralists have 
views and values to which they attach certainty, and pluralism 
is not synonymous with an absolute skepticism incapable of 
substantiating anything. When no stance can be substantiated, 
“anything goes” and shifting positions is a matter of whim rather 
than discretion. This state of affairs does not refl ect pluralism but 
lack of care. No stance is preferable to another and, therefore, all 
positions are irrelevant.22
 In this sense, a distinction is required between descriptive 
pluralism, which merely states that people hold different posi-
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tions, and normative pluralism, which is part of a wider, usually 
liberal, value system. Descriptive pluralism neither justifi es nor 
rejects anything. It describes the factual datum of a multicultural 
society, which enables this multiplicity out of indifference. By 
contrast, normative pluralism is not a substitute for rational value 
allegiance to specifi c attitudes but refl ects a certain commitment 
that is also rationally substantiated and hence affi rms or rejects 
specifi c positions. Normative pluralists believe in their own 
attitudes and preferences and think them well substantiated. 
They do not agree with the views of others because, logically, 
their views differ.23
 Pluralists still differ from tolerant people, however, in that 
they are not committed to refrain from acting against others 
since pluralists do not assume any grounds justifying such action 
in the fi rst place. A pluralist does not view the other’s stance as 
deviant, shameful, or evil, and demanding a reaction. Value 
preferences do not lead a pluralist to negate the other’s views. 
Unlike tolerant people, pluralists assign to other views the same 
value they assign to their own, as evident in their respect for the 
views and the deeds of the other24 rather than only for the other’s 
basic human freedom. In other words, value-based toleration may 
lead a tolerant person to respect someone upholding the tolerated 
stance, but never its contents. Pluralists, however, respect also 
the contents of the contrary views. They engage in a genuine 
discourse with opposite views, not only because they consent to 
tolerate people and allow their freedom but because they are truly 
interested in the other’s stand and consider it valuable.
 Given that pluralists do have value preferences, however, why 
do they ascribe intrinsic value to other positions? This is the litmus 
test for distinguishing between two main versions of pluralism, 
to which I will refer as “weak” and “strong” pluralism. Weak 
pluralism does not entirely renounce the assumption of one truth 
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and the need to fi nd it, but rests on a skeptical position and argues 
that this truth can only emerge through constant confrontation 
with contrary views. John Stuart Mill advances this view, as 
does Karl Popper, who relies on Voltaire. Their shared basic 
assumption is that human beings are fallible creatures.25 Hence, 
the only way of avoiding mistakes is to contend with contrary 
views. An open market of attitudes and actions is the best course 
for human beings, whose cognition is so fragile, to reach truth. 
Both Mill and Popper reject skepticism and relativism. Mill states: 
“As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which are no 
longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase.”26 
Mill views the development of humanity as a ceaseless process of 
rejecting mistaken attitudes and as a “gradual narrowing of the 
bounds of diversity of opinion.”27 Pluralism, then, is temporary by 
defi nition. In an infi nite time perspective, it will disappear once 
truth is revealed. Popper’s formulation is not as radical, but he too 
painstakingly emphasizes the distinction between “fallibilism” 
and relativism. Human fallibility assumes:
There is such a thing as truth . . . Fallibilism certainly implies 
that truth and goodness are often hard to come by, and that we 
should always be prepared to fi nd that we have made a mistake. 
On the other hand, fallibilism implies that we can get nearer to 
the truth or to a good society.28
 Skepticism, then, is a temporary situation rooted in human 
reality rather than a metaphysical stance compelling relativism.
 This analysis enables us to sharpen the distinction between the 
weak pluralist and the tolerant person. Tolerant individuals are 
likely to approach mistaken views as a means for reaching the truth 
but assume, according to the common defi nition, that truth has 
already been found and that they have it, whereas other views are 
only of instrumental, pedagogical, or epistemic value. By contrast, 
ARE TOLERATION AND PLURALISM POSSIBLE IN JEWISH RELIGION?  
15
pluralists do not assume the absolute preference of their views 
over those of the other, since their own views could turn out to be 
mistaken. Tolerant individuals do not accept the idea of fallibility 
and, therefore, cannot relate to other views as they relate to their 
own, whereas pluralists, even when they do have a preferred 
view, do not claim it is absolutely preferable. In Hare’s words, 
“the best that he has so far discovered.”29 In Popper’s terms, the 
preferability of the pluralist’s position means it has so far not been 
refuted. The other’s position, however, is important for pluralists 
precisely because they are conscious of human fallibility.
 Contrary to weak pluralism, strong pluralism does not 
assume the existence of one truth, not even ideally. Whereas weak 
pluralism views the confrontation between opposite views as 
a means to approximate truth, strong pluralism does not ascribe 
any instrumental value to contrary positions and considers every 
stance in the open market of ideas intrinsically valuable, beyond 
the temporary.
 If Voltaire provided the foundation for weak pluralism, 
Rousseau adopted the strong version of pluralism. The multi-
plicity of ideas expresses human difference and the value of 
individuality.30 Prominent modern champions of this version are 
Mill, in Chapter Three of On Liberty, Robert Nozick, and Joseph 
Raz. Whereas in Chapter Two of On Liberty Mill emphasizes 
the instrumental value of contrary views, in Chapter Three he 
sharply reverses his position. The basis for pluralism is now 
an acknowledgement of the value of individuality as embodied 
in human differences: “It is not by wearing down into uniformity 
all that is individual in themselves . . . that human beings become 
a noble and beautiful object of contemplation.”31 Human diffe-
rences thus create variety and a diversity of lifestyles. Nozick 
too relies on this justifi cation of pluralism, arguing that we 
do not know any specifi c lifestyle equally good for everyone, 
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and a utopian society is one that enables all human beings to 
realize themselves as long as they respect the rights of others.32 
The recognition of human variety is a descriptive but also 
a prescriptive statement, which assumes the value of individuality 
and claims it can only be preserved in a pluralistic worldview.33
 Joseph Raz proposes another version of strong pluralism. In 
his view, pluralism is a necessary condition of human autonomy. 
Autonomous individuals shape their lives and control their 
own destiny as far as possible, as evident in their choices. But 
freedom of choice, claims Raz, is not suffi cient for autonomy and 
individuals must be able to choose between contrary options. 
Autonomy is an empty notion in the absence of options, but the 
choice must not be only between good and evil and must also 
involve choice between various possibilities of the good.34
 Contrary to toleration, then, the common denominator 
of all versions of pluralism is their adoption of some form of 
relativism. Weak pluralism is committed mainly to epistemic and 
hypothetical pluralism, meaning that the truths assumed by the 
pluralist may emerge as false. Strong pluralism is committed to 
a particular form of value relativism, meaning there is no one 
absolute right for an individual, or even for all human beings. 
But this relativism is limited, since it acknowledges the existence 
of various forms of the good but also discerns the existence of 
various forms of evil. Some things are illegitimate and entirely 
lacking in value.35 This conclusion is entirely compatible with 
the formal characterization of pluralism as a stance within 
a normative system that distinguishes between forbidden and 
allowed, worthy and despicable.36 The difference between the two 
versions of pluralism is that, at least in principle, weak pluralism 
ascribes equal value to legitimate views as an expression of 
epistemic limitations, whereas strong pluralism ascribes intrinsic 
value to various versions of the good.
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Jewish Religion and Toleration
Since toleration developed in a system that assumed value 
certainty, tolerant individuals had to justify their abstention from 
action in ways appropriate to their certainties. Indeed, this is how 
toleration developed. What might be the arguments favoring 
religious toleration? As noted, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
justifi ed their toleration of the Jews as a conclusion ensuing from 
Christian certainty. An interesting and highly infl uential version 
of the idea of toleration rests on a voluntariness argument, which 
also draws on religion.
 The fi rst one to propose this argument was Sebastian 
Castellion (1515–1563), who argued that conversion is voluntary 
by defi nition and, therefore, cannot be coerced. Jesus never 
forced anyone to join Christianity, which is essentially endorsed 
voluntarily.37 Castellion was a liberal Protestant thinker who 
began his career as a friend of Calvin. An elaborate and refi ned 
version of this argument was lucidly formulated by Locke in his 
Letters Concerning Toleration. Locke’s argument, as Castellion’s 
before him, rests on the Protestant approach,38 suggesting a clear 
division between church and state.
 The state was founded only for one purpose: “The com-
monwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only 
for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil 
interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolence of 
body.”39 A church, however, is different: “A church, then, I take 
to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of 
their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in 
such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the 
salvation of their souls.”40
 Given this distinction between church and state, Locke argues 
that both must endorse religious toleration. As for the state, Locke 
raises three arguments: First,
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The care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate . . . It is 
not committed unto him, I say, by God, because it appears not 
that God has ever given any such authority to one man over 
another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such 
power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, 
because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation 
as blindly to leave to the choice of any other, whether prince 
or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall 
embrace. (17)
 Second, a state can coerce “but true and saving religion 
consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which 
nothing can be acceptable to God” (19). In other words, an act 
performed under coercion has no religious meaning.
 Third:
For there being but one truth, one way to heaven, what hope 
is there that more men would be led into it if they had no rule 
but the religion of the court and were put under the necessity to 
quit the light of their own reason, to oppose the dictates of their 
own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the will 
of their governors. (21)
 Locke points out that, given that the princes of the world 
have many views on religion, the way to heaven is extremely 
narrow (21). Should we wish to widen it, on the assumption that 
it is improper for God to bestow his grace on so few, the basis for 
attaining redemption for all human beings must be their reason 
and their conscience rather than a political doctrine.
 After divesting political rulers of the power to enforce their 
authority on matters of faith, Locke shows that the church 
does not have such power either. As a voluntary association by 
defi nition, the church cannot, in his view, rely on coercion.
ARE TOLERATION AND PLURALISM POSSIBLE IN JEWISH RELIGION?  
19
 Locke does not doubt the truth of Anglican Christianity, nor 
is his view based on skepticism or relativism. Both Locke and 
Castellion before him thought that toleration rested on religion 
and on religious truths: Locke traced a clear link between 
salvation and voluntarism.
 The voluntariness argument substantiates only a weak version 
of toleration—it simply forbids coercion, and this is indeed all 
that Locke concluded from it. Furthermore, since the source of 
Locke’s argument is his religious approach, all he is endorsing is 
negative toleration: one should not interfere to deprive deviants 
from their freedom, but it does not thereby follow that, within the 
political framework, one should seek to ensure additional rights 
for them beyond this minimum requirement.41
 Can Jewish tradition adopt a tolerant attitude toward non-
observant Jews? If so, can it adopt only the weak version that 
refrains from coercion or can it endorse stronger versions of 
toleration? Furthermore, can it embrace only negative toleration 
or can it also support positive toleration?
 Historically, several sources can be pointed out supporting 
Locke’s argument of voluntariness in one way or another. Moses 
Mendelssohn, who endorses a version of Locke’s argument,42 
draws a distinction between the inter-subjective and the religious 
realms:
The relations between man and man require action as such . . . 
An action benefi cial to the public does not cease to be benefi cial, 
even if it is brought about by coercion, whereas a religious 
action is religious only to the degree to which it is performed 
voluntarily and with proper intent.43
 Incipient signs of a measure of support for the claim of volun-
tariness appear also in halakhic literature.44 Thus, for instance, 
Solomon Kluger writes about coerced observance:
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Concerning matters that the Torah does not command us to 
impose, we have proof that the Torah wanted observance 
to be voluntary and never coerced. Hence, if the court did 
coerce someone, he is not considered to have complied with 
the commandment, since he did so under duress rather than 
willingly.45
 But Kluger does not claim that the Torah forbids coercion 
altogether or that, in principle, a commandment fulfi lled under 
duress has no value. Instead, he claims that no coercion should be 
applied on matters that the Torah does not coerce because the very 
fact that the Torah did not require coercion shows that the value 
of this particular commandment depends on the individual’s will. 
No general conclusions about coercion follow from this.
 The validity of the argument of voluntariness depends on 
the meaning ascribed to the religious act. Intolerant positions 
claim that the religious act is intrinsically valuable, regardless of 
the performer’s will, so there is logic to its coercion. By contrast, 
tolerant positions argue that the value of the commandment is 
contingent on the performer’s intention, so that an act performed 
under duress has no religious signifi cance.46
 The argument seems to fi t a religion such as Protestantism, 
which makes voluntarism a cornerstone of its self-perception. It 
is less relevant, though still possible to some extent, in Judaism, 
where religious obligations have traditionally been compelled 
upon all members of the collective.
 An alternative basis for weak toleration in Jewish religion 
assumes its reliance on considerations of result. Coercion is 
pointless if it does not lead to observance of the commandment 
or if it violates the conditions required for the performance of the 
religious act. Meir Simha Hacohen of Dwinsk appears to support 
this view. Maimonides rules that a man who is legally compelled 
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to divorce his wife is coerced to do so until he says, “I consent.” 
Maimonides does know that a coerced divorce is invalid, and 
thus presumes:
Inasmuch as he desires to be of the Israelites, to abide by all the 
commandments and to keep away from transgressions—it 
is only his inclination that has overwhelmed him—once he is 
lashed until his inclination is weakened and he says “I consent,” 
it is the same as if he had given the get voluntarily.47
This source seemingly argues that coercion is allowed only 
when we know for sure that this person wants to belong to the 
Jewish collective and resists only because he is overwhelmed by 
his inclination. Meir Simha Hacohen of Dwinsk indeed claims: 
“If the court knew for sure that he defi nitely does not want to 
[grant a divorce], and it is obvious to them as it is to Heaven that 
coercing him will be useless and he is willing to die for it, they 
would forbid laying a hand on him.”48
 Prima facie, refraining from coercion in this case means 
applying a consideration of result.49 Yet, the scope for drawing 
inferences from this source is extremely limited, since we have no 
proof that considerations of result can be used to justify a wider 
thesis of weak toleration. Meir Simha Hacohen is drawing a legal 
inference related to the specifi c conditions for divorce. A coerced 
divorce is halakhically invalid, and divorce requires free consent. 
In this specifi c realm, then, personal intention is crucial. But does 
this consideration apply to all other commandments as well?
 Elsewhere, however, Meir Simha Hacohen relies more 
broadly on a result consideration when he excludes the possibility 
of beating “to death” someone who is unwilling to observe 
a commandment: “What will we gain? The commandment will 
not be observed in any event.”50
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 Although this source is more precise, it only justifi es refraining 
from direct coercion. Are other forms of coercion, besides beating, 
also excluded? Is excommunication also forbidden? Reliance 
on result considerations does not dismiss the option of indirect 
coercion. For instance, removal and excommunication could 
be perceived as conveying the collective’s attitude toward the 
deviant. These means may appear necessary so as to deter others, 
to prevent the damaging effects of deviance on other members of 
the collective, or to express scorn and revulsion. Abstaining from 
action in a given situation due to result considerations justifi es 
limited toleration, which could change with the circumstances or 
due to other result considerations.
 Historically, the Jewish collective did not refrain from using 
a range of means (not necessarily direct coercion) to combat 
deviance, repeatedly resorting to exclusion and excommunication. 
Jews sometimes abstained from these measures, not so much out 
of a desire to refrain from interference in the others’ lives but 
rather due to their fear of the consequence—the irrevocable 
expulsion of the Jewish deviant from the Jewish people. 
Sometimes, however, they did impose such sanctions when the 
consequences were clear. Thus, for instance, Radbaz argues that 
dispensing with punishment for fear of its effects on the deviant 
should be dismissed in favor of attention to the potential damage 
to the community: “Should we fear this [that the person could 
abandon the Jewish collective], the Torah may have to be repealed 
since all will know that, due to this fear, we overlook the wrongs 
of the wicked.”51
 Signs of weak toleration are nevertheless present in Jewish 
tradition and a tolerant approach is conceptually compatible 
with full commitment to the tradition. This is not true of 
the strong version of toleration, which refrains from openly 
forbidding the deviant act. The voluntariness aspect is irrelevant 
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here, and we must look for a kind of result consideration. 
The general talmudic principle “better that they should sin in 
ignorance than deliberately” (BT Betsah 30a and others), designed 
to avoid damage to the individual, could serve to justify the 
strong version—the deviant stance should not be forbidden 
so as not to turn the deviant into a deliberate transgressor. But 
whether conclusions drawn from this halakhic principle could 
be relevant to all prohibitions and in all situations is question-
able. Many halakhic sages pointed to the limitations that qualify 
the implementation of this principle. Some emphasized that this 
principle applies only when individuals transgress unwittingly. 
When they wantonly transgress a prohibition, however, “you 
will rebuke them, curse them, reprimand them, and dismiss 
them . . . and even if they do not listen, you will have saved your 
soul.”52 Other sages pointed out that this principle does not apply 
to explicit Torah injunctions.53
 But even according to sages who assumed that this principle 
applies to wanton transgressions of Torah injunctions as well, 
this view denotes indifference to evil rather than its toleration. 
In the formulation of Moses of Coucy: “A man should not say 
something that will go unheeded, as is written, ‘Do not reprove 
a scorner, lest he hate thee’ [Proverbs 9:8].”54 According to this 
approach, what appears as strong toleration is a classic case of 
turning the deviant into an evil wrongdoer for whom society 
is no longer responsible. The halakhic principle relevant to this 
approach is “stuff the wicked until he dies.” The wrongdoer’s 
freedom to act as he pleases and the failure to rebuke him for his 
transgression denote his removal from the Jewish collective rather 
than a readiness to tolerate him.55
 Beyond these caveats, this principle obviously applies only 
when all members of the collective are committed to the Torah but 
transgress a specifi c commandment, be it wantonly or mistakenly. 
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When large sections of the collective do not acknowledge the 
validity of Halakhah, however, its applicability becomes question-
able. In these circumstances, this principle could also entail a heavy 
religious price: abstaining from declaring certain matters forbidden 
could have serious implications for members of the religious 
collective, who will conclude that these matters are permitted and 
will become transgressors.56 Hence, although this principle could 
conceptually be used to justify strong toleration, turning it into 
a general rule applicable in all circumstances without a more basic 
transformation of Jewish religion seems unreasonable.
 Could Jewish religion adopt the idea of toleration as a mental 
disposition? I noted above that toleration as a mental disposition 
is generally based on the value of human freedom. People who 
err should not be scorned, because their freedom could also lead 
them to make mistakes. Can someone who is religiously tolerant 
endorse this view? Can someone for whom religious truth is 
cardinal prefer the value of human autonomy instead? Religious 
individuals also believe in the importance of choice, since this 
is one of the basic assumptions of their religious activity, but 
the value of choice per se can hardly justify the endorsement of 
toleration as a disposition.
 Believers fi nd it easier to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward 
deviants, thus precluding feelings of disdain and scorn for them. 
Much of what passes for “toleration” in the writings of Abraham 
Yitzhak Kook57 is merely a form of paternalism that does not 
address the deviant stance as genuine. This paternalism emerges 
in two forms: ascribing cognitive irresponsibility to deviants, and 
attempting to understand their “disease.” The fi rst is manifest, 
for instance, in the following statement about the zeitgeist 
“seducing our young with its many wiles to follow its shameless 
ways. . . . They are defi nitely acting under duress, and we should 
not, Heaven forbid, judge coercion as we would free will.”58
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 Although this approach makes it easier not to despise or scorn 
others, it also precludes genuine respect for them since it neither 
recognizes them as cognitively responsible individuals nor does it 
acknowledge the deviation as a true position. Paternalism, then, 
although not affected by the paradox of toleration, is by nature 
limited. Deviants cannot forever be viewed as coerced, unless it is 
assumed they are cognitively handicapped.
 The second form of “toleration” leads Kook to an attempt to 
understand “the disease of the generation.”59 According to this 
analysis, the source of deviance is not the denial of religious truth 
but the search for a deeper truth and disaffection with religiosity 
as it is.60 The analysis of the deviants’ motives may enable us to 
avoid despising them and may perhaps lead us to respect them, 
but it rests on the negation of the deviant’s self-interpretation 
of their world and their longings. This negation also refl ects the 
collapse of the paradox of tolerance, since it does not relate to the 
other’s view as genuine.
 This type of paternalistic rhetoric may express a tolerant 
religious approach, which cannot be formulated openly because 
it hinges on the tension between its halakhic foundation and its 
readiness for toleration. For toleration as a mental disposition, 
however, this rhetoric exacts a high price—it does not show 
respect for the others’ freedom and their ability to formulate 
alternative views. This analysis of R. Kook’s view sheds new light 
on the problems hindering believers from developing a tolerant 
disposition toward deviance.
 All potentially acceptable versions of toleration will, at best, 
be confi ned to abstention. Since traditional Jewish religion holds 
itself absolutely true and valid for every member of the Jewish 
collective, its believers will hardly engage in a struggle to protect 
the rights of deviants to realize their ideals. This task can only 
engage those who view freedom as a cardinal value.
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 Tolerant persons are not required to renounce any of their 
beliefs and, conceptually, traditional Jewish religion can therefore 
be tolerant. Can it also endorse a pluralistic outlook without 
becoming self-subversive? Can the believer respect the other as 
a person as well as the other’s views, beliefs, and deeds as having 
equal and also intrinsic value? Given the believers’ perception of 
Jewish truth as divine, can they respect contrary views without 
breaching their own religiosity?61 Are pluralism and religious 
authenticity compatible? Endorsing a pluralistic view requires 
a deep conceptual transformation, a religious revolution enabling 
the believer not to view the other’s stance as deviant. Is such 
a revolution possible? And if possible, is it worthwhile? Given that 
the cradle of pluralism is the secularization process,62 the question 
then is: can Jewish religion internalize the ideas of secularization 
and still remain meaningful to its believers?
Jewish Religion and Pluralism
These questions need to be examined vis-à-vis the two types of 
pluralism I proposed, weak and strong. As noted, supporters of 
weak pluralism assume there is truth and that the stance they 
uphold is one that has been substantiated in the best way or, at 
least, has so far not been refuted. These assumptions might be 
compatible with a religious approach, since religious pluralists 
willingly acknowledge the limitations of human cognition. In 
this sense, weak pluralism does not relinquish its clear preference 
for its own view, and its relativism is mainly cognitive and 
hypothetical rather than normative. Jewish believers, then, can 
be pluralists without renouncing their beliefs, but endorsing 
this view exacts a high price since Jewish beliefs could, at least 
hypothetically, prove false. The religious pluralist cannot continue 
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supporting the belief that, even at a later time, “this Torah will 
not be changed,” as Maimonides states in his Thirteen Principles 
of Faith. Furthermore, even if this price were reasonable, weak 
pluralism is incompatible with halakhic language and halakhic 
deeds. Since this problem is also relevant to strong pluralism, I 
discuss it below.
 Strong pluralism, even though upholding normative relati-
vism, is not necessarily committed to epistemic relativism. The 
pluralist, therefore, is not necessarily committed to the derogation 
of the value system that pluralism supports. Conceptually, one 
may acknowledge the existence of parallel value systems without 
in principle assuming that they cancel each other out. In this 
sense, strong pluralists are not committed to the temporariness of 
their beliefs and their values.
 Yet, to enable this kind of pluralism, a fundamental conceptual 
revolution about the meaning of religious statements is required. 
Believers supporting strong pluralism must renounce a tradi-
tional assumption inconsistent with strong pluralism, namely, 
that religion is true. Renouncing this option seems impossible 
in a religious context, since believers cannot agree with the as-
sumption that religion is false. The renunciation, however, could 
be interpreted to mean that religion is only praxis, and categories 
of truth and false are irrelevant in its regard. Truth claims about 
the world, about God, and about crucial events such as the Sinai 
theophany, are religiously irrelevant. In other words, religion is 
a value system that neither relies upon nor refl ects metaphysical 
assumptions or factual data that could be translated into truth 
claims.63 In John Searle’s terms, religion is a constitutive system,64 
shaping a world of procedures and meanings that do not assume 
their sense from a specifi c state of affairs but from the system itself. 
The religious system formulates norms defi ned as command-
ments, and even formulates beliefs applying to these norms, the 
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central one being the perception of these norms as God’s word at 
Sinai. In religious terms, the historical fact of the Sinai theophany 
is not what validates the normative system. If this historical fact is 
a relevant constitutive rule, it will assume meaning only from the 
system itself and is, in Searles’s terms, an “institutional fact.”65 In 
this light, the religious fact of the Sinai theophany can be viewed as 
a kind of judgment and evaluation of halakhic norms. The believer 
is then commanded to accept that these norms, all or some, are 
God’s word at Sinai, deserving honor and respect as defi ned by 
the system itself. According to this outlook, Jewish religion is 
not founded on statements about the world; rather, like other 
constitutive systems, it shapes a world of meaning and internal 
coherence that is not conditioned by outside facts.
 As part of this revolution, individuals deciding to embrace 
Jewish religion seek to actualize a world of norms and meanings 
articulated by the system, which they consider especially 
valuable. People’s motivations when adopting this system are no 
different from those driving many to embrace a specifi c lifestyle: 
the wish to live within a certain system whose cluster of values 
they consider worthy of realization, to create a better world for 
themselves, and so forth.
 The religious revolution required to enable strong pluralism 
relies on the following claims:
(1) Jewish religion is a value system that does not make truth 
claims about the world or about God but constitutes a value 
system.
(2) The system’s meaning is internal, implying it is not contingent 
on outside facts. Instead, it emerges as a conclusion from 
an analysis of the cluster of norms and values through which 
Jewish religion is constituted.
(3) A person’s commitment to religion results from an autono-
mous decision to realize these particular religious values.
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 This conceptual revolution enables the existence of value 
systems that also have inner value, since none of them formulates 
truth claims that might prove false. This analysis restricts the 
meaning of religious statements, thus making room for other 
value systems that do not make competing truth claims.
 Conceptual-theoretical revolutions in religious tradition in 
general and in Jewish tradition in particular are not new. One 
of the most basic ways in which traditional societies cope with 
new challenges is the conceptual transformation of their world 
of values. This transformation enables the translation of the 
old world of values into a new conceptual language, without 
precluding commitment to these values.66 Jewish intellectual 
history abounds with such examples, and Maimonides seems to 
have prompted the deepest theoretical revolution in traditional 
culture by creating a new language for the biblical-talmudic 
world so as to adapt it to the philosophical challenge.
 Our revolution does differ from that proposed by Maimonides, 
since Jewish religion has now become an individual concern. 
Jewish religion is diverted from the collective-historical context 
to the individual one; it is a matter of choice or preference, as 
Berger noted: “Private religiosity, however ‘real’ it may be to the 
individuals who adopt it, cannot any longer fulfi ll the classical 
task of religion, that of constructing a common world within 
which all of social life receives ultimate meaning binding on 
everybody.”67
 But even if a conceptual religious revolution were possible 
and worthwhile, it is not easily compatible with halakhic 
language and action, which seem to be more rigid. A Jew who 
does not observe the Torah and the commandments is described 
in halakhic language as a transgressor, as ignorant of the law, as 
acting under duress, and so forth. The transgression of certain 
commandments is considered synonymous with the violation of 
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the entire Torah, and breaking the Sabbath in public is particularly 
important in this context.
 The special status of the Sabbath, as Rashi noted, is related 
to its theological meaning: “The Sabbath transgressor denies 
His acts, and falsely attests that the Holy One, blessed be He, 
did not rest on the Sabbath.”68 If this is the status of the Sabbath, 
the conceptual revolution faces a hard challenge because this 
status points to the presence of a deep metaphysical sediment in 
the halakhic realm. No less important, however, is the halakhic 
implication that follows. A mainstream halakhic tradition, 
stretching from Halakhot Gedolot69 through the literature of the 
early authorities70 and up to modern halakhic literature71 speaks 
of Sabbath breakers in public as complete idolaters no longer 
included in the Jewish collective.72 Various sages, however, 
developed a more tolerant attitude toward Sabbath breakers for 
other reasons. Some relied on considerations of result, claiming 
that an approach that views public Sabbath breakers as Gentiles 
would lead them to abandon the Jewish people. Others relied on 
a sociological consideration, arguing that the precondition for 
breaking the Sabbath in public is the existence of a society that 
observes the Sabbath. However:
In our times, they are not called public Sabbath breakers 
because this is what most people do. When most Jews are not 
guilty, the few who dare to transgress are denying the Torah, 
committing an abomination, and excluding themselves from the 
Jewish people. Unfortunately, however, when most Jews are 
transgressors, the individual believes this is not such a serious 
offense and one need not hide.73
The transgressor’s intention is thus a necessary condition for 
determining the seriousness of the offence. In light of secula-
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rization, the Sabbath breaker has no consciousness of being 
a sinner and, therefore, is not in the category of a public Sabbath 
breaker.
 These considerations might, at best, substantiate weak tolera-
tion, but they cannot justify pluralism. Pluralism contradicts 
Halakhah’s basic assumption, which holds that all Jews are 
compelled to observe the Torah and the commandments by 
virtue of the Sinai covenant, making pluralism an extremely 
diffi cult position to sustain in religious terms. First, pluralism 
is committed to a deep religious-conceptual revolution. Second, 
this revolution is not suffi cient either, since Halakhah might 
be compatible with toleration but not with pluralism. In other 
words, the maximum possible is a pluralistic consciousness and 
halakhic toleration.
 Is pluralism then entirely incompatible with Jewish religion? 
Halakhah is indeed hard to integrate with a pluralistic stance, but 
a religious revolution is not a negligible feat even if it cannot be 
directly translated into practice. It creates a new consciousness 
that could be signifi cant in and of itself and, indirectly, could 
also contribute to practical trends. Even if unable to foster 
a pluralistic Halakhah, it might promote tolerant trends that will 
somehow progress toward pluralism. The religious pluralist may 
be doomed to live in permanent tension, fl uctuating between 
a religious and pluralist pole on the one hand and, on the other, 
a halakhic pole that, at best, will be tolerant. This tension is 
a good illustration of the pluralist’s participation in two com-
munities — a Western community that endorses pluralism and 
a halakhic Jewish community unreservedly committed to its 
own directives. Membership in these two communities at times 
leads to a deep value confl ict. Yet, as I have shown elsewhere,74 
affi rming a confl ict between two different value systems is, in 
logical terms, a measure of the deep commitment felt toward 
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both. The confl ict, then, is the quintessential affi rmation of 
membership in both communities.
 Finally, do religious believers have any reason for embracing 
religious pluralism despite the heavy religious price it exacts? 
The answer to this question is highly complex. Good religious 
reasons can be adduced for doing nothing at all, due to the 
religious concessions expected from tradition, to the ultimately 
confl ictual effects of any action, and to its future implications for 
life in general and for religious truths in particular. A believer 
choosing to remain within a traditional framework could hardly 
accept arguments that might lead to its erosion and would have 
no reason to adopt a pluralistic outlook. The question is only 
relevant to a believer leaning toward pluralism—can rational 
justifi cations be found for this inclination? The reasons justifying 
the pluralistic believer’s preferences will not make traditional 
believers change their minds, but are extremely valuable to the 
pluralist. These reasons are a conscious reconstruction of the 
pluralistic believer’s world, an explication of the fi rst datum in the 
pluralist’s consciousness. In other words, these reasons provide 
pluralistic believers a theoretical foundation for the religious 
world they have long inhabited.
 A serious attempt to contend with the questions raised by 
pluralism is to be favored on three counts. First, pluralism poses 
a serious challenge to traditional believers who see themselves 
as members of Western liberal societies by compelling them to 
examine the extent to which they can negate the intrinsic value 
of the other’s world without hindering this membership. Second, 
concerning many public and value-based questions, believers 
who have opened up to the world endorse a pluralistic outlook. 
If they translate this outlook into actual behavior, they have 
to meet the theoretical challenge of formulating a pluralistic 
religious world view. Third, one interesting reaction of modern 
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believers striving to preserve their religious beliefs and values is 
a perception of the religious world as a unique type of religious 
experience. Several scholars have indicated that religiosity in 
the modern world is no longer based on a rational-metaphysical 
cognition but on a personal subjective experience. This experience 
is an autonomous realm that cannot be exhausted or understood 
through any other context, and is thus the starting point of the 
religious domain.75 The crucial role of subjectivity in human 
existence paves the way for a renewed justifi cation of religion 
through the acknowledgement of subjective religious experience, 
which believers view as an autonomous realm out of which 
they relate to and interpret the world.76 Adopting this approach 
compels what Hick called the “intellectual Golden Rule”:77 be-
lievers must allow others what they take for themselves, meaning 
they must recognize the justifi ed value of the experience of others 
who are not like them.78
 In sum, this chapter was an attempt to offer an initial outline 
for a discussion of the possibility of toleration and pluralism 
within a religious outlook. My conclusion is that, conceptually, 
toleration is an easier stance for the believer to accept and might 
be compatible with a traditional world view. Endorsing pluralism 
requires a religious revolution and exacts a heavy religious price, 
and yet, it is pluralism rather than toleration that challenges 
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THE previous chapter dealt with the possibility of pluralism 
within Jewish tradition. Yeshayahu Leibowitz developed a plu-
ralistic position, yet one that epitomizes a perspective of cogni-
tive dissonance described by Peter Berger as typical of many 
representatives of Jewish Orthodoxy.1 According to Berger, the 
lives of Orthodox Jews are marked by dissonance between 
modern values, which they endorse, and the traditional conser-
vative consciousness through which they describe and explain 
their world. Leibowitz’s philosophy indeed lays foundations for 
pluralism, although he explicitly negates this option.
The Value Infrastructure
The fundamental problem that Leibowitz confronts in his thought 
is how to justify religious commitment without basing it on 
factual or metaphysical truths. This problem is far removed from 
the mainstream philosophical tradition of Judaism in general and 
Orthodoxy in particular, which assumes as obvious a series of 
truth claims about the world, about God, and about human reality. 
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The most prominent instance of a factual truth in Jewish tradition 
may be the belief in the Sinai revelation as the foundation of Jewish 
religion. Leibowitz raises a new problem here, which emerges 
from a modern cultural context that is typically characterized by 
secularization, and from the adoption of a stringent empirical 
criterion that leaves little room for metaphysical truths. In such 
a world, classic religious truths, be they factual or metaphysical, 
can no longer justify religious faith. Awareness of this state 
of affairs therefore raises a question concerning the renewed 
justifi cation of religiosity, the key issue occupying Leibowitz. This 
is his contribution to the remapping of these theoretical problems.
 Leibowitz’s pioneering work offers an entirely new solution to 
this problem. The “Copernican revolution” he proposes is a view 
of Judaism as a value-normative system rather than as a system 
of truth claims about the world, about God, and about human 
reality. This defl ection of Judaism to the value-normative realm 
is a radical innovation in Jewish tradition that, historically, had 
seen Judaism not only as a system of norms but also as a system 
of beliefs about the world and about God. Incipient signs in this 
direction had already been evident in the thought of Spinoza and 
Mendelssohn, but neither developed this issue as consistently and 
profoundly as Leibowitz.
 In seemingly commonplace and simplistic language, Leibowitz 
proposes an entirely new philosophy. One is almost tempted 
to say that the simplistic language is a kind of smokescreen 
intended to conceal the depth of his revolution. This technique of 
esoteric writing had also been widespread in medieval thought 
that, inter alia, relied on a special and complex use of language. 
Only the cultural elite knew the secret of language, the key to 
the translation from natural to philosophical language. Only the 
elite, which had long been familiar with concealed philosophical 
contents, knew that natural language using everyday terms about 
God must be translated in entirely different ways. Leibowitz, 
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however, does not resort to this concealment technique. He uses 
natural language in its standard meaning, and this simplifi cation 
is itself the quintessential tool of concealment.
 This difference between the two forms of writing refl ects 
their different purpose. In the Middle Ages, concealment was 
guided by religious and social considerations: the true contents 
of religion had to be hidden from the unprepared masses. In 
Leibowitz’s thought, concealment is part of an entirely different 
trend: it refl ects an attempt to subsume the revolution into the 
continuum of the tradition. Leibowitz, who strives to describe 
historical-empirical Judaism and tries to preserve the continuity of 
tradition in changing times, uses day-to-day rhetoric to integrate 
a philosophical revolution. He is not proposing any changes, 
as it were, but merely acting as the tradition’s “mouthpiece.” 
Leibowitz did not, in my view, adopt this move out of a conscious 
attempt to blur the revolutionary nature of his philosophy and, 
more probably, used this technique in the somewhat naïve belief 
that he was indeed not suggesting any radical innovations. His 
thought, however, blazes a new trail in Jewish philosophy, and 
the following passage from Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of 
Freedom” will serve to illustrate its revolutionary nature:
It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without 
claiming eternal validity for them, and the pluralism of values 
connected with this, is only the late fruit of our declining 
capitalist civilization: an ideal which remote ages and primitive 
societies have not recognized, and one which posterity will 
regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension. 
This may be so; but no sceptical conclusions seem to me to 
follow. Principles are no less sacred because their duration 
cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire for guarantees 
that our values are eternal and secure in some objective heaven 
is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or the 
absolute values of our primitive past. “To realize the relative 
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validity of our convictions,” said an admirable writer of our time, 
“and yet stand for them unfl inchingly, is what distinguishes 
a civilized man from a barbarian.” To demand more than this is 
perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need, but to allow 
it to determine one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, 
and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.2
My analysis of Leibowitz’s philosophy will be conducted in 
light of this statement. Leibowitz’s thought is indeed free from 
metaphysical longings and from the search for objective value 
guarantees. Neither the historical event of the Sinai theophany 
nor any worldly facts constitute a basis for the validity of religious 
(or moral) values, only human decision does. The centrality 
of human decision in Leibowitz’s thought clearly conveys this 
liberation from the metaphysical values baggage. A believer in 
a value system whose accuracy is based on correspondence with 
a particular state of affairs in the physical or metaphysical world 
does not ascribe such decisive meaning to the act of choice. For 
a rational person, aware of facts as they are, a decision to choose 
the correct answer is the clear and even necessary product of this 
rationality. Such a person will not acknowledge any confl ict or 
contradiction between values, claiming that the confl ict is merely 
apparent and refl ects a failure in the exercise of discretion. When 
a decision is based on specifi c circumstances, there is only one 
choice appropriate to the given situation. In other words, this 
person adopts a monistic theory of values.
Toward Pluralism
This emphasis on the act of decision, whatever the normative 
meaning ascribed to it, acknowledges that an accurate description 
of external reality is not a suffi cient condition for the justifi cation 
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of a normative decision. Historically, one of the prominent 
differences between monistic and pluralistic theories of values is 
precisely the question of the status of values: the monist anchors 
values in external circumstances or in cognition, and theories 
that anchor values in natural law or in human rationality are 
prominent examples of such approaches. By contrast, pluralists 
recognize that different values refl ect different perspectives and 
assessments—one good is never valid for all or exclusively 
justifi ed. For various people, or even for one individual, various 
goods (which are not determined by external forces) refl ect 
human diversity,3 and hence the importance of decisions.
 Applying this approach to Judaism is obviously an innovation, 
but this is precisely the move that Leibowitz proposes: turning 
Judaism from a religion based on truth claims into a normative 
religion whose only justifi cation is a value decision—faith as 
a choice.4 To justify this shift, Leibowitz proposes two mutually 
complementary arguments.
 The fi rst, which even if not explicitly formulated is at the 
basis of his theory of values, is that we do not have a common 
measuring unit for values (the incommensurability of values).5 
This argument, which is rather pervasive in value theory, seems 
to refl ect two possible claims: fi rst, values in the normative realm 
cannot be reduced to one common denominator that justifi es and 
ranks all of them—happiness, freedom, or any other. Different 
values express different perspectives that cannot build upon 
one another. Second, different value theories express different 
goods. We have no universal value language, and the meaning 
of different value languages and theories is time and culture-
bound. The claim common to both versions of this argument is 
that we do not have a supreme value enabling us to compare two 
incommensurable value systems and choose between them.
 What is the relationship between value confl icts and the 
incommensurability of values? Obviously, whoever fails to 
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acknowledge value incommensurability will not acknowledge 
the existence of value confl icts either, since values that appear 
to be mutually contradictory in a particular situation are not 
genuinely opposed—only one of them is worthy and the other 
is rejected. Only if we assume that the validity and meaning of 
values is not mutually conditioned and that values cannot build 
upon one another, can we support a view of value confl ict as 
genuine.6 Logically, however, upholding a perception of values 
as incommensurable does not require the assumption that value 
confl icts are genuine. We could claim that, even if we lack a shared 
criterion for comparing different values, another criterion for 
deciding between them could be offered. The opposite, however, 
is indeed true: if we consider value confl icts genuine, we must 
assume that values are incommensurable—if some criterion can 
be used to compare them, the confl ict is not genuine because the 
overriding value can easily be determined.
 The incommensurability argument is a pillar in the value 
stance formulated by Leibowitz, who supports a radical theory 
of value confl ict. According to this theory, the confl ict is not only 
genuine but is also the standard pattern in value action. The 
various value confl icts that Leibowitz suggests between religion 
and morality or even between different value systems—such 
as Eleanor Roosevelt’s glass of milk as opposed to general Tojo’s 
honorable death in the war for the emperor, an example of which 
Leibowitz is particularly fond7—all rely on the notion that values 
are incommensurable.
 Leibowitz uses this argument to illustrate the importance 
of a value decision contradicting rational action on the one 
hand, and the relativity of values on the other. But neither 
conclusion is necessary. The fi rst conclusion will be rejected 
below on the grounds that Leibowitz’s use of the term “rational” 
is uncritical. The second conclusion is also unnecessary, and 
an analysis of different versions of value relativism would show 
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it is not conditioned by the incommensurability argument. Such 
an analysis exceeds the scope of this work, however, and I will 
confi ne myself to one central claim: although relativism is close 
to a theory that recognizes value incommensurability in that 
both reject monism, these two approaches differ clearly on one 
count. The incommensurability argument points out that monism 
is an invalid value theory and that we do not have a general 
criterion for choosing the overriding value, but does not negate 
the claim that values must be justifi ed. By contrast, one of 
relativism’s most prominent versions assumes that values are 
adopted solely on a subjective basis, when the term “subjective” 
refers to random elements that do not constitute a justifi cation.8 
Leibowitz supported the subjectivization of values as part of 
his discarding of the rational element from the value discourse. 
Although neither one of these conclusions is necessary, as noted, 
this is the argument that established for Leibowitz the importance 
of the decision dimension.
 The second argument suggested by Leibowitz draws on the 
Kantian legacy and rests on the idea that the “ought” should not 
be derived from the “is.” Norms should not be derived from the 
actual state of affairs in the world, and Leibowitz expanded the 
concept of “state of affairs in the world” not only beyond physical 
facts but also beyond metaphysical facts. The Sinai revelation, 
therefore, cannot serve as the basis for an obligation to obey God:
Even if notarized evidence were found showing that the 
Shekhinah descended on Mount Sinai and gave the Torah to the 
Jewish people, I could still say: So what! Every single one could 
still react by saying he does not wish to observe the Torah. Can 
notarized evidence be a suffi cient argument for accepting the 
yoke of the Torah and the commandments? . . . After all, this is 
what the sages said . . . that a person can recognize the truth and 




Leibowitz endorsed both these arguments, as noted, and they 
complement the value transformation he proposes: values 
have no factual or metaphysical basis and they refl ect different 
assessments and perceptions; confl icts of values are real and 
hence the crucial importance of an act of decision.
 The thesis about the genuineness of value confl icts in 
Leibowitz’s thought could ostensibly be dismissed on the 
grounds that if, as he claims, every confl ict involves a decision, 
the decision could itself be proof that one value overrides another 
and the confl ict is therefore not genuine. Believers, for instance, 
reject morality by invoking the religious world of values, and 
their decision is unequivocal. What is left, then, of the claim about 
genuine confl ict?
 Many philosophers do indeed claim that only a confl ict that 
is in principle insoluble is genuine. Thus, for instance, McConnell 
argues:
If the situation is genuinely dilemmatic, then one is presented 
with two confl icting ought-claims and no further moral 
consideration is relevant to resolving the confl ict. By contrast, 
a situation is merely apparently dilemmatic if two ought-claims 
confl ict, but there are overriding moral reasons for acting on one 
rather than the other. 10
Sartre also supported this concept of confl ict, and his famous 
example is that of a student who cannot decide between remaining 
with his sick mother and joining the forces fi ghting in the Second 
World War.11
 This view of value confl ict, however, may be too radical. The 
seemingly crucial difference between supporters and opponents of 
the genuine confl ict theory is the opponents’ claim that a principle 
of “overridingness” is at work in any confl ict situation, based 
on a universal and rational scale of values. We will always fi nd 
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a value that is more justifi ed, and hence overrides and dispenses 
with other values or with the obligations that follow from them. By 
contrast, supporters of a genuine confl ict theory, like Leibowitz, 
acknowledge that in every value confl ict, human beings decide. 
Their decision, however, is not the result of a rational-universal 
solution based on one scale of values ranking the order and 
preference of obligations. Above all, the decision is the expression 
of a practical need: every confl ict situation ultimately requires 
some action, and the choice will refl ect an individual or cultural-
traditional value preference.
 What is the difference between advocates of “a correct answer” 
theory and supporters of a genuine confl ict theory? “Correct 
answer” supporters assume that the value to be realized utterly 
rejects the discarded value, which is perceived as mistaken. 
Supporters of genuine confl ict assume that the overriding value 
cannot negate the worth of the rejected one, which could be 
signifi cant to other individuals or societies, and the decision is 
based on a tradition or a culture that cannot undermine the value 
or on another tradition or culture claiming the rejected value is 
preferable.12
 This analysis enables us to point to the option emerging from 
Leibowitz’s thought, an option that Leibowitz rejects: deve lop-
ing a Jewish philosophy committed to the Torah and the com-
mandments without negating the value of alternative world 
views. In other words, my thesis is that Leibowitz offered a model 
of Jewish thought that is both Orthodox and pluralistic.
 The argument about the incommensurability of values, which 
we discussed above, is one of the main justifi cations used in 
pluralistic value theories. Values cannot be compared since they 
represent different goods, and this is the basic predicament of all 
value systems.13
 Supporters of value incommensurability, however, are not 
compelled to adopt a pluralistic world view because they can 
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argue that the choice between incommensurable values will be 
made elsewhere. Acknowledging that values are incommensur-
able, however, does usher in a pluralistic world view. Since 
values are incommensurable, other value systems cannot be 
dismissed as worthless, enabling at least what we could call weak 
pluralism.
 Weak pluralism assumes, as noted, that different value 
systems are of equal value, and cannot be ordered hierarchically. 
Weak pluralism, therefore, confi nes itself to a description of the 
logical relationship between the various systems and pronounces 
them equivalent. Strong pluralism makes a more compelling 
claim: not only are value systems equally worthy, but they also 
have internal or intrinsic value. In this light, the incommen-
surability of values could be said to lead to strong pluralism, 
given that its starting assumption is that values cannot be 
compared. From this assumption, we can move a step further and 
claim that the epistemic problem arises because value systems 
rest on an intrinsic value that cannot be based on something else 
and value systems are therefore incommensurable. This analysis 
is a plausible conclusion from Leibowitz’s assumptions.
 Pluralistic theories, unlike monistic ones, also infuse further 
meaning into the very act of decision making, resembling 
the move endorsed by Leibowitz. Isaiah Berlin, the classic 
representative of the pluralistic stance, points to the typical 
relationship between value incommensurability, the meaning of 
choice, and pluralism:
If I am right in this, and the human condition is such that 
men cannot always avoid choices, they cannot avoid them not 
merely . . . [because] there are many possible courses of actions 
and forms of life worth living, and therefore to choose between 
them is part of being rational or capable of moral judgment; 
they cannot avoid choice for one central reason (which is, in the 
ordinary sense, conceptual, not empirical), namely, that ends 
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collide; that one cannot have everything . . . The need to choose, 
to sacrifi ce some ultimate values to others, turns out to be 
a permanent characteristic of the human predicament.14
Leibowitz the man did not keep step with the options offered by 
his theory. His typical reaction to the pluralistic implication of his 
view is one of struggle between values: confronting a reality of 
value incommensurability, he calls for a struggle to impose his 
values. This approach is not easily compatible with relativism. 
What would be the justifi cation of a struggle seeking to impose 
a value system if the value of all systems is merely relative? 
Relativism is supposed to weaken the struggle and perhaps even 
lead to indifference, as Allan Bloom successfully argued in The 
Closing of the American Mind. A struggle to impose values assumes 
that one value is better and fairer than the other. Again, we learn 
that Leibowitz is not a relativist but he is not a pluralist either 
since, except for exceptional cases touching on the foundations of 
existence, a pluralist recognizes the value of different and diverse 
positions. Only monists would muster their forces and turn the 
struggle into the standard response to other value systems, yet 
Leibowitz drew this conclusion from the pluralistic stance, and 
a striking implementation of this approach is his attitude toward 
non-Orthodox interpretations of Judaism.
 Pluralists, as noted, are not committed to an unrestricted 
version of relativism incapable of denying any values or norms. 
Pluralists too can reject values lacking any worth or meaning and 
deserving condemnation. Concerning certain values, pluralists 
also acknowledge that people who violate them are “moral idiots. 
We sometimes confi ne them in lunatic asylums. They are as much 
outside the frontiers of humanity as creatures who lack some of the 
minimum physical characteristics that constitute human beings.”15
 Berlin, like Kekes after him,16 draws a distinction between 
“primary values” and “secondary values.” Primary values 
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relate to vital needs of human existence, and they are common 
to “all conceptions of a good life.”17 By contrast, secondary 
values diversify and change. Obviously, then, pluralists are not 
committed to the claim that all value systems, including those 
harmful to primary values, are valid.
 But Leibowitz went further, moving from an assumption of 
value incommensurability to the total rejection of all the alterna-
tive values rejected in his own specifi c world view. According 
to the logic at the foundation of Leibowitz’s value system, 
this is simply a mistake. It does not follow from the pluralistic 
predicament or from the individual’s specifi c value decision 
because, according to Leibowitz’s assumptions, a value decision 
neither has nor could have universalistic pretensions. This is 
an individual decision in the sense that it refl ects no more than 
the action of the deciding subject and his or her value system.18
 Moreover, Leibowitz holds that this decision cannot be 
justifi ed in any way, and here too he is mistaken. As Kekes 
shows, this mistake is based on the unnecessary assumption that 
a justifi cation, by its very nature, is universal. In a pluralistic 
approach relying on the recognition of many possible goods, the 
justifi cation neither is nor can be universal, lest it undermine the 
very existence of pluralistic assumptions. Like Leibowitz, other 
scholars also conclude that a decision in a pluralistic context 
will be arbitrary. Kekes points out that many of our value 
justifi cations, albeit personal, are good enough without being 
universal.19 Yet, the radical view claiming arbitrariness actually 
assumes pluralistic latitude even more strongly: since you have 
no justifi cation for your own decisions, how can you possibly 
reject the world of the other?
 Leibowitz could suggest two approaches for dealing with this 
contradiction. The fi rst is to adopt an arbitrary value “theory” 
within which everything is permitted, including an unjustifi ed 
struggle against the other. Leibowitz, however, not only fails 
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to endorse this conclusion but also rejects it in the fundamental 
moral pathos characterizing his thought.
 Another and more sophisticated option is the attempt to 
draw a distinction between the incommensurability of values 
and the development of a pluralistic world view. Typical plu-
ralism acknowledges not only the factual existence of another 
value system but argues, at least minimally, that it is equally 
worthy. The difference between the pluralist and the tolerant 
person, as noted, is that tolerant individuals claim they have 
the truth but, in certain circumstances, are ready to bear the 
other’s mistake. By contrast, pluralists present a different 
picture: their minimalist claim is that the other’s world is not 
only bearable but is at least equally worthy. If so, the claim will 
be that the incommensurability of values does not lead to the 
acknowledgement of the other’s world as equally worthy. We 
can, therefore, support the argument of incommensurability and 
also negate the world of the other.
 This answer, however, is conceptually mistaken. If incommen-
surable values are in a hierarchical relationship and one value 
system is preferable to the other, meaning only one is worthy 
and the other only tolerated, we are not confronting genuine 
incom mensurability. The relationship between something that 
is worthy and something that is worthless and mistaken is the 
relationship between truth and falsehood, or good and evil. 
In these circum stances, the criterion for testing values is their 
closeness to truth. Clearly, if my values are closer to the truth 
or the good, they should be preferred to others. Logically, value 
incommensurability means we have no shared criterion for 
comparison, and this is not the case when confl icting values 
are in a hierarchical relationship. In other words, a genuine 
value confl ict requiring a decision must assume that the values 
involved in the confl ict cannot be ranked. For instance, the confl ict 
between religion and morality is for Leibowitz a genuine confl ict 
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that requires believers to decide, because religion and morality 
have unconditioned internal value and individuals must choose 
between them.20
 The conclusion, then, is that Leibowitz’s approach enables and 
even compels a pluralistic outlook. Leibowitz refused to accept 
this view even when confronted with it. The man who succeeded 
in implementing the idea that a value-religious commitment 
in Judaism does not rely on truth claims about the world was 
reluctant to apply this idea to the disputes within the Jewish 
world. Indirectly, then, he returned to the claim that Judaism in 
its Orthodox interpretation is based on truth claims!
 The richness and innovativeness of Leibowitz’s philosophy 
in its justifi cation of a Jewish pluralism, which is opposed to 
his own assessment of this move, reemerge in the analysis of an 
issue that is crucial in Leibowitz’s thought: his shifting of the 
question about the reason for a religious world from a causal to 
a meaning context.
 This shift is extremely signifi cant and refl ects the closeness 
between Leibowitz and the Wittgenstein tradition. One of Peter 
Winch’s fundamental claims in The Idea of Social Science is that 
we understand social behavior through a meaning rather than 
a causal category. The causal category does not relate to social 
behavior as the ultimate datum, to be understood from within, 
seeking instead justifi cations in truth claims about the world. By 
contrast, according to the category of meaning, a specifi c social 
behavior is the ultimate datum, so that the concepts of a particular 
society, say “primitive society,” can only be interpreted “in the 
context of the way of life of those peoples.”21 In other words, 
the context that constitutes meaning is the socio-cultural context 
rather than any metaphysics or cosmological world picture, which 
constitutes the rational basis of social norms and concepts.22
 Winch is highly critical of trends in anthropology that seek 
to examine the meaning of a given culture by analyzing the 
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congruence between its conceptual world and reality. Winch 
claims that a society’s conceptual terms cannot be understood 
by comparing them to external reality. The conceptual system of 
a given culture converges with its practice, and the concepts can 
therefore be understood only within the context of the culture. 
From the outside, we cannot even determine what is real and 
what is not: “what is real and what is unreal shows itself in the 
sense that language has.”23
 Winch’s approach is an application of Wittgensteinian 
ideas, and shared by such thinkers as Norman Malcolm and 
D. Z. Phillips. In their view, “meaning” is not an essential attri-
bute but a way of confi guring concepts and practices. Thus, for 
instance, the meaning of a chess game is not some attribute 
outside the game but the entirety of the game’s laws and goals. 
Understanding the game means understanding its laws and 
their goals. Similarly, the understanding of a culture grows from 
the understanding of an entire form of life within which and 
from which we will also draw the conceptual system fi tting its 
description. This is a context that allows for compari sons between 
cultures, since they are not seen as competing over the correct 
causal description of the relationship between the world and its 
culture. This theory, traced here in broad outlines, enables the re-
legitimization of myths because, according to this view, myths 
do not compete with science for a correct description of the 
world but provide instead an account about a form of life and of 
meaning within a given culture.
 These thinkers applied their approach to the study of reli gion 
as well. Phillips claimed that “one of the scandals of the phi-
losophy of religion” is that the study of religion begins from 
external speculative philosophical assumptions offering claims 
about the world, an argumentation course Phillips calls founda-
tiona lism.24 These scholars emphasized that the research object of 
religion is a particular religious community, organizing its ways 
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of life in a complex of patterns and concepts. The study of religion 
is a description and decoding of a living historical phenomenon 
rather than of theoretical concepts.
 One obvious conclusion from this approach is that, in prin-
ciple, negating another cultural world becomes impossible within 
the restricting circumstances described above. The digression 
from causality to meaning or the digression from rational justi-
fi cation to the values embodied in the concrete way of life of 
a given culture pre-empts the possibility of a monistic world view 
and paves the way for a pluralistic culture.
 In his description of the halakhic world, Leibowitz resorts to 
the meaning category. His analysis of halakhic obligations relies 
precisely on the attempt to describe the meaning of this world 
through its internal concepts rather than founding it on any 
metaphysical world picture. In his view, the concept that unites 
the totality of the normative-halakhic system is the worship of 
God. This meaning, rather than superimposed from outside, is 
the one Leibowitz sees emerging from an analysis of the halakhic 
system.25
 Leibowitz’s philosophy thus plays out as a variation of Witt-
gensteinian conceptions, although Leibowitz was not infl u enced 
by Wittgenstein’s later work, which endorsed these ideas, or 
by Wittgensteinian tradition. A programmatic article including 
the incipient formulations of theses that were to become the 
backbone of this approach appeared long before the publication 
of Wittgenstein’s later writings or those of his followers. 26 His 
views on this question entail a radical innovation in the study 
of religious phenomena, according to any criterion. In his view, 
Judaism as an “institutional” phenomenon means that the reli-
gious world cannot be understood through its correspondence 
with reality. The world of religion is an internal pattern for 
organizing life, whose meaning is internal. It is impossible and 
even forbidden to compare this pattern and its meaning to others 
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and their meaning, just as a chess game cannot be compared to 
a basketball game—the meaning of these two games is internal 
and derives from their constitutive laws.
The Man against his Thought
The extent to which Leibowitz the man remained far removed 
from the pluralistic options raised by his thought is now clear, 
and this gap has several dimensions. First, the shift from the 
causal to the meaning context reaffi rms the pluralistic stance at 
the foundation of Leibowitz’s philosophy. If the meaning of 
this activity is internal, there is no room for comparison and for 
proposing a shared criterion to examine the worth of other value 
systems. Weak pluralism ascribes equal value to the entire range 
of possible options and strong pluralism also ascribes inner and 
intrinsic value to the other’s position. Leibowitz’s stance enables 
strong pluralism as well. According to his view, concepts such 
as “inner value” or “intrinsic value” can be understood in the 
meaning context described above. The claim that a position has 
inner value means that its meaning is found within it, within the 
world of the practices and the understandings it gives rise to, and 
cannot be based on external elements. For Leibowitz to negate this 
approach, which is the obvious foundation of his value stance, is 
a rather puzzling step.
 Second, Leibowitz accepts the idea that meaning is not 
an attribute but rather an expression of the form assumed 
by cultural practice, and he invests philosophical efforts in 
attempting to understand the form assumed by Jewish religion. 
In his view, the meaning of this form of life is absolute obedience 
to God’s command. When the form is simple, understanding 
its meaning is also simple. Understanding a chess game does 
not pose hard problems, since the form of the game is clear and 
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concisely formulated within the laws of the game itself. We do 
confront hard problems when decoding the meaning of complex 
forms of organization such as Judaism. Does this form have one 
purpose or many? Does God’s command play a central role in the 
understanding of this activity? These basic questions, pointing 
to the crucial interpretive role of the philosophical observer 
in an active value system, can hardly be ignored. Interpretive 
pluralism is thus a rather natural conclusion of renouncing 
speculative criteria.
 Third, if the datum is Judaism as a historical-empirical 
phenomenon, Leibowitz should have acknowledged that histo-
rical cultures are not static. They undergo gradual changes at 
both practical and conceptual levels, and their meaning does 
not remain fi xed and stable. If the measure is practice, different 
practices could have different meanings that might be more or 
less related. In Wittgenstein’s terms, these practices could belong 
to the same family because of their prominent resemblances. They 
are different and still close. Thus, a secular Judaism preserving 
a practice that is close to traditional Judaism offers a form 
that is both similar to, and different from, traditional practice. 
This is probably the most obvious legitimation of a pluralistic 
world view, not only in its interpretation of Jewish religion but 
also in its suggestion of alternative meanings to a dynamic 
historical phenomenon. Judaism, then, is not only a religion but 
also a culture and these forms, even if different, bear a family 
resemblance.
 Leibowitz’s work is thus richer than what Leibowitz the man 
acknowledged and affi rmed. It enables value pluralism, and even 
Jewish pluralism. All Jewish interpretive systems offers different 
assessments and judgments, even concerning the meaning of 
Judaism itself.
 Possibly, the source of this incongruence between the man and 
his thought is a genuine tension between Leibowitz’s innovative 
YESHAYAHU LEIBOVITZ: THE MAN AGAINST HIS THOUGHT  
63
philosophical world and his membership in an Orthodox culture 
that rejects this option outright. The fact that Leibowitz stands 
against his own theory is an expression of the cultural tension 
between new and old, embodied in his life and his thought in the 
duality he formulated. The contradiction between his work and 
his consciousness refl ects, perhaps radically, something about 
the duality characterizing the life of the modern Jewish believer, 
who lives in various value communities and is not always able 
to coordinate between them. But Leibowitz went even further in 
the very presentation of a broad theory that enables believers to 
live as believers, without the affi rmation of their religious world 
requiring them to negate the positions of the other.
 The rejection of the pluralistic view often relies on the 
assumption that you do not truly believe in your values and are 
not fully committed to them unless you reject the other’s world. 
But this need not be the case. Our commitment to our values is not 
measured by the extent of our rejection of the other’s world but by 
the willingness to endorse these values consistently in our life and 
by our unwavering commitment to them. Loyalty to our values 
is related to our disposition toward them and not necessarily 
to their cognitive superiority. This lesson emerges clearly from 
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Bryan R. Wilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 95.
22 See also D. Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968), 24–27.
23 Winch, “Understanding a Primitive Society,” 82.
24 D. Z. Phillips, Faith After Foundationalism (London: Routledge, 1988), 3.
25 The other thinker who developed this insight in profound and 
original directions is Eliezer Goldman. See, in particular, his article 
“The Commandments as the Basic Datum of Religion” (in Hebrew), 
in Expositions and Inquiries: Jewish Thought in Past and Present, ed. Avi 
Sagi and Daniel Statman (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996), 306–315. 
Goldman told me that he lectured the contents of this article at 
a conference and Leibowitz was supposed to speak after him. When 
Goldman concluded, Leibowitz said he had nothing to add!
26 See Leibowitz, “Religious Praxis: The Meaning of Halakhah,” in 
Judaism, 3–29. This article is a translation of “Mitzvot Ma‘asiyyot,” 
a transcription of a lecture he delivered in 1953. 
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THIS chapter draws a comparison between Yeshayahu Leibowitz 
and Albert Camus, who both made the renunciation of meta-
physics the cornerstone of their thought. Any attempt to draw 
comparisons between these two thinkers, ostensibly representing 
two entirely alien worlds, appears “absurd.” Leibowitz’s philo-
sophy is religious, not only because religion is at the center of 
his philosophical concern but also because his thought is that of 
a believer, who relates to God’s command and to the obligation 
to obey it as the supreme value that pushes all others aside. 
By contrast, Camus does not place God at the center of his 
philosophy,1 but human reality. More than that, Camus rejects 
the religious option and considers it “philosophical suicide”: even 
if God exists, he is an irrelevant entity, vexing and obstructing 
human attempts to contend with reality.2 If Leibowitz’s religious 
philosophy is theocentric,3 Camus’ philosophy is anthropocentric. 
This chasm notwithstanding, several shared features do lay the 
ground for a fruitful comparison between them:
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(1) Concrete reality as the only reality
Both recognize con crete empirical reality as the only one relevant 
to the individual. According to Camus, what characterizes the 
absurd individual is precisely the refusal to fi nd a solution to 
the absurd in a turn to the transcendent. The absurd individual 
lives in a world without any hope for transcendent redemption, 
and adopts existent circumstances as the ultimate human reality. 
Hence, adopting a religious or a rational stance that confer absolute 
meanings is, in Camus’ terms, “escape.”4 Camus acknowledges 
that human beings yearn for the transcendent, and recognizes 
the presence of a “nostalgia for unity” and an “appetite for the 
absolute.”5 But to recognize these yearnings is not equivalent to 
affi rming their concrete manifestations as they have emerged 
throughout the history of philosophy. Human beings are doomed 
to live with this yearning, although they acknowledge it cannot 
be realized. They must accept this world,6 with its tension, as the 
ultimate human reality. In Camus’ words, they must recognize 
that “outside it [the world] there is no salvation.”7
 Some hold that Camus’ stance is irrational.8 But the fact that 
Camus rejects a rationalist metaphysical explanation that assumes 
one general principle from which to infer the structure of reality9 
does not mean that Camus rejects rational thought altogether. 
Rather, he bases his refusal to endorse a rationalist world picture 
on critical thought per se:
I do not want to found anything on the incomprehensible. I want 
to know whether I can live with what I know and with that 
alone. I am told again that here the intelligence must sacrifi ce its 
pride and the reason bow down. But if I recognize the limits of 
the reason, I do not therefore negate it, recognizing its relative 
powers. I merely want to remain in this middle path where the 
intelligence can remain clear.10
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 This programmatic passage outlines in detail the rationa-
lity of Camus’ stance. In his view, classic rationalism is “incom-
prehensible,” that is, cognition is incapable of grasping the 
principle or principles of reality or, in sum, cognition cannot 
know reality. But the awareness of cognition’s limitations 
is itself a product of critical thought. In this sense, the very 
acknowledgement of the absurd is a consequence of critical 
thought,11 aware of the fact that the passion for clarity and unity 
cannot be realized with the tools of human cognition and we 
therefore experience the absurd.
 In line with the pattern of removing unsubstantiated trans-
cendence from the human world, Camus determines the bord-
ers of cognition: “It is useless to negate the reason absolutely. 
It has its order in which it is effi cacious. It is properly that 
of human experience.”12 Camus’ ontological approach, then, 
which negates the relevance of the transcendental world, 
overlaps the borders of cognition. In other words, the only 
known and meaningful reality is the reality grasped with the 
tools of human cognition.
 Similarly, Leibowitz argues that Jewish religion offers a 
“realistic” perception of human reality: “It perceives man as he is 
in reality and confronts him with this reality—with the actual 
con di tions of his existence rather than the ‘vision’ of another 
existence.”13 The “anti-illusory,” “anti-visionary” character of the 
halakhic world prevents the “fl ight,” according to Leibowitz — 
Camus’ “escape”—to a different and sublime reality.14 Recog-
nizing the concrete world as the believer’s absolute reality entails 
obvious implications for the organization of religious life. Jewish 
religion is not an “endowing” religion, promising redemption 
and tranqui lity. It is a “demanding reli gion” that imposes duties 
on human beings. Redemption is not concretized in the world 
beyond, nor is it linked to some eschatological event. Human 
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redemption lies in the heroic effort to comply with religious 
obligations in this world.15
 Like Camus, Leibowitz attaches no religious meaning to 
worldly events. Understanding of the world is not based on 
information available from the Torah or from any particular 
religious system: “The great principle—which is also a great 
religious principle—of ’the world follows its course’ applies to 
history as it applies to nature.”16
 Leibowitz, then, acknowledges only a “neutral world,” de-
void of religious meaning, knowable only through rational scien-
tifi c means.17 In sum, neither Camus nor Leibowitz accept the 
ontological assumption about a true reality beyond the empirical 
human reality open to human cognition.
(2) Normative commitment without transcendence
When Camus and Leibowitz assume that concrete reality is the 
ultimate reality, they must confront the problem of normative 
commitment without a transcendent foundation: for Camus — 
ethics without a transcendent basis, and for Leibowitz—religion 
without a transcendent foundation.
 Camus contends with this problematic in his various works: 
The Plague, The Fall, and The Rebel. In a sharp formulation of this 
question, he asks: “It is essential for us to know whether man, 
without the help either of the eternal or of rationalistic thought, 
can unaided create his own values.”18
 Another question, which Camus fi nds no less troublesome, 
concerns the nature and the focus of these values—the individual 
or the society. As for the meaning of this ethic, Camus offers more 
than one answer. The Myth of Sisyphus presents a quantitative, 
solipsistic ethic, striving for awareness of experience in its 
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entirety.19 By contrast, in later works, and particularly in The Rebel, 
he rejects this solipsistic ethic on the grounds that it ultimately 
cancels out the distinction between just and evil acts. In the 
absence of any basic values, “everything is possible and nothing 
has any importance.”20 Contrary to this quantitative ethic, the 
ethic Camus proposes in The Rebel is founded on human solidarity 
as the new metaphysical starting point of human existence. Yet, 
and despite this signifi cant shift, both trends still share a common 
denominator: contrary to the Kantian position, the transcendence 
that has been removed from the metaphysical world cannot 
reenter it through the ethical dimension.
 Leibowitz’s religious-ethical world view is not founded on 
a transcendent basis either. God is the purpose of the religious 
act but not the basis of the obligation. Even the Sinai theophany, 
which Jewish tradition considers constitutive, plays no role for 
him in the religious obligation: “Even if one could be absolutely 
certain that . . . He revealed Himself to them on Mount Sinai, and 
that the Torah was given from Heaven, one may still refuse to 
serve God.”21 Rather than representing a misunderstanding of the 
obligation that this event imposes on human beings, this refusal 
is defi nitely justifi ed given that worldly facts, including the fact 
of revelation, lack any religious meaning. In line with this trend, 
Leibowitz posits a value reversal in Judaism. The foundation of 
the halakhic system is not the Torah, which refl ects revelation, but 
the halakhic system: “The religion of Israel, the world of Halakhah 
and the Oral Law, was not produced from Scripture. Scripture is 
one of the institutions of the religion of Israel.  . . . the Halakhah of 
the Oral Teaching, which is a human product . . . determines the 
content and meaning of Scripture.”22
 Halakhah as a human creation, then, is the very embodiment 
of the religious act. It is meaningful because it is “for the sake of 
Heaven” not because it is “from Heaven.” What makes this value 
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system compelling? If not anchored on a “religious” fact, on the 
divine command, its sole basis is faith: “It is rather an evaluative 
decision that one makes, and, like all evaluations, it does not result 
from any information one has acquired, but is a commitment to 
which one binds himself.”23 The normative system, then, is binding 
because of a human decision, and the status we ascribe to human 
freedom and autonomy is therefore crucial.
(3) The shift to praxis
The problem of normative commitment points to another element 
stressing the closeness between these two thinkers—the shift 
from theory to praxis. Camus and Leibowitz thereby remain in the 
path chosen by many other existentialist thinkers, beginning with 
Kierkegaard, who shifted the focus of the philosophical discussion 
from the question of “what must I know” to that of “what must I 
do.”24 For Camus, accepting the absurd is only the beginning of 
a process, which will end with a concrete act: “The realization 
that life is absurd cannot be an end, but only a beginning . . . It is 
not this discovery that is interesting, but the consequences and 
rules for action that can be drawn from it.”25
 The stress on the practical dimension comes to the fore in the 
way Camus contends with the problem of evil. Evil is a given 
to be fought with action, not with theoretical or metaphysical 
solutions. The plague is a concrete enemy that threatens human 
existence. According to Rieux, the protagonist of The Plague, 
we must fi ght disease and death, but this is not a struggle for 
“salvation.”26 Indeed, theological-metaphysical solutions might 
even hinder action against evil. Evil, after all, has an explanation. 
In this sense, argues Rieux, “mightn’t it be better for God if we 
refuse to believe in Him, and struggle with all our might against 
death?”27
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 For Leibowitz, the shift to praxis is anchored in the very 
fact that at the center of his thought is Halakhah rather than 
theoretical speculation, a digression I called above “the Coper-
nican revolution of Jewish thought.”28 Classic Jewish thought 
had dealt with epistemological and ontological issues, focusing 
on metaphysical speculation and on the concept of God. For 
Leibowitz, however, Halakhah and the religious obligation are 
the central axis for the understanding of the religious world. 
This digression means giving clear preference to praxis as the 
dimension exhausting the meaning of Judaism: “The Mitzvot are 
a norm for the prosaic life that constitutes the true and enduring 
condition of man.”29
 Leibowitz’s view of human reality as the only one possible 
leads him to the claim that “the fi rst mark of the religion of 
Halakhah is its realism,”30 and the way to contend with this 
reality is through action, that is, through the halakhic norm. 
Like Camus, Leibowitz argues that the theodicy problem does 
not have theoretical solutions: “Creation, insofar as it is divine, 
is entirely without meaning; all its occurrences and phenomena 
are absurd.”31 Hence, the question of evil becomes the test of the 
believers’ faith, of their readiness to comply with the religious 
demand and worship God, even barring a metaphysical solution 
to the problem of evil. Leibowitz too, like Camus, saw evil in all its 
aspects as part of reality’s basic givenness, irremovable through 
metaphysical-theological solutions. These parallels in the work of 
these two thinkers refl ect a similar response to the challenge of 
modernity.
 Beyond these similarities, however, these two philosophies 
engage in a fascinating dialogue that at times brings them closer 
and at times draws them apart, culminating in the tension 
between faith and the absurd. Below is a detailed comparison of 
several of their basic theses.
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(4) Human reality as rift and crisis
Leibowitz and Camus propose a similar structure for human 
reality. Both reject the harmonious ontology and endorse one 
of rift and crisis. I open with the philosophy of Leibowitz, who 
proposes several formulations of this predicament in his writings:
 (a) The human being as an entity that transcends natural reality. 
The rift between givenness and subjection to nature as opposed to 
its transcendence is formulated as follows:
Faith is the antithesis of human harmony. From a faith per-
spective, man does not and cannot accept natural reality, al-
though he himself is part of it. He cannot transcend it, whether 
believer or heretic . . . But the religious man differs from one who 
has not assumed the yoke of the heavenly kingdom . . . because 
he does not accept the fact that he is part of the natural reality 
and cannot transcend it. The faith that constitutes his psychic 
experience does not fi t the objective reality of which he is part, 
and never will.32
According to this description, the source of the rift is the basic 
ontological datum of human reality. The human being is an entity 
bound by the natural order on the one hand, but yearns to go 
beyond nature on the other. This deviation, or this trend toward 
transcendence, shows that human beings are not entirely part of 
nature. For Leibowitz, as for Pascal33 and for Camus,34 this trend 
is evident in consciousness and volition, which do not operate by 
virtue of the natural order. Leibowitz, therefore, holds that human 
history is the clear embodiment of human transcendence:
History is an arena for the operation of human consciousness, 
which does not operate in natural reality and is not subject to 
its laws. Natural reality has no consciousness, and functions 
LEIBOWITZ AND CAMUS: BETWEEN FAITH AND THE ABSURD  
77
according to its immanent laws, whereas human history is 
created by human beings . . . in natural reality there is no will 
either, whereas history is an expression of human volition.35
Had Leibowitz remained at the theoretical-phenomenological 
level, this formulation would not have been particularly original. 
In the previous passage, however, Leibowitz raised another claim 
that is not part of human ontological phenomenology and begins 
in the value world of faith. His claim is that non-believers, even if 
they do not accept that they are part of the natural reality, have no 
way of transcending nature. By contrast, the very essence of faith 
as a system of Torah and commandments that is not fi tted to the 
needs of humans as natural creatures succeeds in transcending 
nature. Thus, only faith can fully express basic human ontology; 
only through faith do human beings transcend nature, are not 
bound by its laws, and become free. Without faith, human will 
would be merely natural will.36
 Against the trend that creates a value-religious based hierar-
chy in its very characterization of human reality, however, 
Leibowitz proposes an alternative trend in his later writings. 
This trend is refl ected in the second cited passage. If human 
history realizes the consciousness and the will that cannot be 
derived from natural reality and are an expression of human 
transcendence, believers do not differ from non-believers. Trans-
cendence is realized through the basic human “datum”: will 
and consciousness. Elsewhere, Leibowitz views even scientifi c 
activity, which enables human beings to control nature and sub-
due it for their purposes, as an expression of transcendence from 
nature.37 Leibowitz’s philosophy, then, refl ects a tension between 
phenomenological and value judgments characterizing thinkers 




 (b) Human beings in the world and before God. “Crisis . . . is 
the essence of religious faith, the essence of the fear of God. 
It negates the superstitious belief in the harmony of human 
existence. It exposes the contrast between the standing of man 
in nature—his physical and psychic nature—and his standing 
before God.”38 This is a vague formulation of the rift, since it 
does not clarify the essence of the contrast between the human 
standing in nature and before God. But if we consider this 
passage in the context of the paragraph it is meant to summa rize, 
the opposition is between the values we hold as human creatures 
and the obligation of obedience and renunciation. As creatures, 
human beings have natural feelings, aspirations, and values that 
refl ect their world. Believers are required to renounce all these 
values, because “God, may He be blessed, appears before man 
not as a God for him, but as a God demanding everything from 
him.”39 But why are human values related to “man’s standing 
in nature” and to the essence of his existence as a psycho-
physical creature? Here we return to the fi rst dimension of the 
rift. Leibowitz’s starting assumption is that feelings and values 
originate in the self-perception of human beings as creatures 
bound by the laws of nature. Hence, the demand to renounce 
these values creates the dyadic contrast between “nature and 
God.”40 As opposed to the fi rst meaning of the rift, then, which 
had relied primarily on a phenomenological datum, the rift is 
now identical to faith itself. The non-believer, from whom no 
renunciation is demanded, does not sense a rift.41
 (c) The crisis of “the death of God”—the alienness of the world. 
One meaning of modern consciousness is God’s irrelevance to 
existence. For Leibowitz, this irrelevance has special meaning. 
It does not mean that God is entirely removed from human life, 
since the religious deed is per se is an expression of worship. 
Rather, God’s irrelevance is another facet of his transcen dence—
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since God is a sublime and supreme entity, we cannot expect the 
divine to be present in natural reality.42 Hu man beings, however, 
cannot reconcile themselves to a meaningless world; they cannot 
accept unexplainable suffering: “Job’s suffering is no longer the 
focus of his protest; rather, it is his inability to comprehend the 
meaning of his suffering, which is but one detail within 
an incomprehensible world.”43 What anguishes the suffering 
man, Job, is his sense of alienation from the world which stems 
from his inability to understand it.44 Individuals are ready to 
accept suffering as long as they can understand it as part of 
a world guided by God. They are pre pared to settle for the 
certainty that the order of the world has some kind of meaning, 
that innocent suffering can be explained, even if not justifi ed. But 
this is precisely the nature of faith in a transcendent God that 
does not intervene in the world: “Job held that some hidden 
meaning attaches to the Creation and sought to know it, whereas 
God shows him that Creation, inso far as it is divine, is entirely 
meaningless; all its occurrences and phenomena are absurd.”45
The absurd is now the contrast between the expectation of 
meaning and the failure to fulfi ll it.46 But this use of Camus 
terminology here should not mislead us. The failure to realize 
this expectation is neither a factual matter nor the result of some 
epistemological fl aw, but an expression of God’s transcendence. 
Believers, therefore, do not fi nd themselves within the absurd 
but, through their very faith, decide to live within the absurd. The 
absurd challenges man to decide “whether to commit himself to 
believe in God and serve him in the world as it is.”47 The fact of 
the absurd thus becomes the believer’s test: “Is he ready to believe 
in God, not because of God’s function in creation—his wisdom 
or his justice—but because of his divinity?”48 Alienation from the 
world is thus no longer a fact. The ability to affi rm this alienation 
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and bear this estrangement from the world is the believer’s test, 
and Leibowitz thereby continues Kierkegaard’s tradition.49
 The common denominator of these three aspects of the crisis 
is that they refl ect a relationship unable to balance between two 
elements: between natural givenness and transcendence, between 
nature and God, and between the expectation of meaning and its 
absence. Human ontology amounts to a perception of human 
beings as creatures in the midst of two contradictory elements. 
In this light, Leibowitz justifi ably notes that the crisis is not 
a “special situation or event,”50 and refl ects something essential 
to human reality or faith, according to the various trends in his 
thought.
 Faith also enables human beings to reach conscious transpa-
rency, at least concerning the fi rst dimension of the crisis. Through 
faith, they fully realize the dichotomy of human existence. The 
diagnosis of the crisis as hinting at a relationship between two 
elements, and the identifi cation between endorse ment of the 
absurd and conscious transparency, are also at the basis of the 
Camus’ thesis analyzed below.
 In a move typical of phenomenological-existentialist tradi-
tion, Camus draws a distinction in The Myth of Sisyphus between 
two levels of the absurd: the absurd as a datum of human 
experience and the absurd as a concept, which in the process of its 
conceptualization re-explicates the human experience. Through 
this explication, “the feeling of the absurd becomes clear and 
defi nite.”51
 The basic data of the sense of the absurd are: (1) The loss of 
a sense of continuity in the sequence of daily gestures, which 
acts as a unifying element (2) The experience of real time as 
a sequence of events, leading us to lose our sense of the present.52 
(3) The presence of death. (4) Alienation from the world. The 
world becomes strange and threatening because we cannot truly 
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understand it. Precisely because cognition is “too human,” it 
creates a sense of detachment from the world, since the world 
becomes known to us only through “the images and designs that 
we had attributed to it beforehand.”53
 This cluster of feelings is organized in the concept of the 
absurd, which refl ects their shared structure. In The Myth of 
Sisyphus, Camus suggests various formulations of the term such 
as, for instance: “This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all 
that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of the 
irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in 
the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on the 
world.”54
 Unlike Sartre, Camus argues that the absurd is not founded 
on a specifi c sense—the contingency of existence.55 The 
absurd is based on a comparison56 between what is and what is 
expected. Human beings encounter an incomprehensible world, 
but the absurd emerges because of the yearning for clarity and 
understanding.
 The structure of the rift, then, is the same for both Leibowitz 
and Camus, and derives from the lack of correspondence or from 
the contradiction between opposite elements. Indeed, the fi rst 
and third meaning that Leibowitz ascribes to the rift resemble 
the meanings of the rift in Camus. Our going beyond nature, 
our difference from the world, this is the primary datum giving 
rise to the absurd: “If I were a tree among trees, a cat among 
animals, this life would have a meaning or rather this problem 
would not arise, for I should belong to this world. I should be 
this world.”57
 The third meaning of the rift according to Leibowitz—the 
human estrangement from the world—is also one of the basic 
sources of the absurd for Camus. Beyond it, however, two fun-
damental differences separate these two approaches.
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 Although my analysis so far showed that both Camus 
and Leibowitz consistently support a theory of rift, the fi rst 
difference between them relates to the status of the rift in their 
thought. For Leibowitz, the rift refl ects only human existence, 
or at least the believer’s existence. Camus, however, beside 
the rift that is prominent mainly in The Myth of Sisyphus, offers 
two other patterns presenting a harmonious model of human 
existence. In some of his Mediterranean essays, Camus describes 
an experience of unity with nature. Descriptions and symbols 
of mingling with, and even of communion with the world, 
abound in “Nuptials at Tipasa,” often symbolized by immersion 
in the sea. In another essay, “The Wind at Djemila,” Camus 
writes: “The violent bath of sun and wind drained me of all 
strength.  . . . Soon, scattered to the four corners of the earth, self-
forgetful and self-forgotten, I am the wind and within it . . . And 
never have I felt so deeply and at one and the same time so 
detached from myself and so present in the world.”58 At times, 
Camus also uses the Plotinian model of unity: “What is strange 
about fi nding on earth the unity Plotinus longed for? Unity 
expresses itself here in terms of sea and sky.”59
 After Camus presents the rift that subverts the possibility 
of harmony in the world, he returns in later works, and 
particularly in The Rebel, to present human harmony, solidarity, 
and a sense of basic cooperation that prevails even between 
victim and executor.60 This sense of solidarity does not fi nd the 
unity cognition longs for and, therefore, is not a metaphysical 
harmony. It does, however, pave the way for a human life of 
partnership in the struggle for the shaping of a new society. This 
approach is not a retreat from the achievements of the absurd 
but it does involve new movement—a rebellion in Camus’ 
terminology—and a struggle for a world that is fairer and hence 
ethically harmonious.61
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 This tension between rift and harmony, present in Camus 
and ignored by Leibowitz, marks the second difference between 
them. For Leibowitz, the rift is primarily a characteristic of the 
religious decision. Although Leibowitz’s rift includes, as noted, 
a phenomenological-descriptive element, the main trend of his 
thought conveys the claim that the rift is constituted by faith 
itself. In other words, the very act of the religious decision is what 
shapes the rift as a permanent condition and makes retreat from it 
impossible, since it would imply retreating from faith. Given that 
Leibowitz characterizes human reality in terms he views as the 
essence of faith, no room is left for an alternative description.
 By contrast, the rift for Camus is primarily an explication of 
human reality. The basic datum of human existence is the sense 
of the absurd, which reaches clear formulation in its descriptive 
explication. This sense, as well as its explication, is not a matter 
of a voluntary decision but part of the thrownness of human 
existence, to use Heidegger’s terminology. Since this is a value-
based rather than a phenomenological characterization of human 
reality, others descriptions are also possible. The rift orientation 
could be contradicted by presenting another experience of unity 
with the world. An alternative view suggesting ways of contesting 
with the rift and the absurd could also be offered, and this is the 
approach developed in The Rebel.62
(5) Between faith and acceptance of the absurd
The dialogue between the two thinkers culminates in the parallel 
between faith and a life of faith in Leibowitz’s thought, as opposed 
to the absurd and the acceptance of the absurd in Camus. Faith 
and the acceptance of the absurd express conscious transparency 
and self-affi rmation, and both are based on a decision.
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 First, Leibowitz. The analysis has so far shown that opting for 
faith conveys transcendence beyond nature, refl ecting our actual 
existence as human creatures. At least according to one trend in 
Leibowitz’s thought, as noted, only the believer realizes this 
transcendence, meaning that only the believer’s existence 
embodies conscious transparency. But even according to the 
second trend, whereby transcendence is embodied in conscious-
ness and volition, faith is certainly one of this transcendence’s 
distinct expressions.
 This conscious transparency is also the individual’s self-
affi rmation as a free creature, in several ways. First, the believer 
realizes negative freedom, “freedom from” in Nietzsche’s terms.63 
The believer is liberated, or at least struggles for liberation, from 
the bonds of nature. For Leibowitz, assuming the yoke of the 
Torah and the commandments is the sole embodiment of faith, 
since faith is the decision to assume it. The contents of the Torah, 
according to Leibowitz, neither do nor can correspond to the 
needs and the interests of human beings as natural creatures. If 
this correspondence were a goal of the normative system, it would 
not express the worship of God but the worship of humanity; 
Jewish religion is a “demanding religion,” which imposes a yoke 
on human beings rather than gratifying their needs. Clearly then, 
“by observing the Mitzvot, one in a sense subdues nature and 
frees himself from subjection to it. ‘No one is free except he who 
occupies himself with Torah.’”64
 Second, through the religious decision we activate our 
autonomous will, which Leibowitz does not see as deriving from 
an external source; will is the fi rst and independent element 
through which we concretize our existence as human creatures. 
Hence, faith also embodies positive freedom or, in Nietzschean 
terms, ”freedom to,” meaning the freedom to realize our 
autonomy.
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 Although the religious decision represents an affi rmation of 
our existence as free creatures, freedom is the product rather than 
the purpose of the religious decision:
The religious decision has no other purpose beyond itself, 
and a religion perceived as a means for an end and explained 
through this end is no religion. The religious decision is self-
sustaining but has further implications, not only for the 
believer’s way of life but also for his spiritual and psychic 
existence, and one of them is his freedom. Freedom is a side-
effect of assuming the yoke of the Torah and the command-
ments, but not its reason or its purpose.65
 For Camus too, adopting the absurd means conscious 
explicitness or, in his terms, “lucidity.”66 The negation of the 
absurd and the choice of suicide or of philosophical suicide—
that is religion. In some way, it involves renouncing the epistemic 
clarity of human existence’s very meaning as absurd. Renouncing 
the absurd involves a renunciation of the human consciousness 
that, according to Camus, is the source of the rift and sparks the 
sense of the absurd.67
 The decision required from the individual facing the absurd 
is what Camus calls “metaphysical rebellion.” This concept, 
which Camus uses mainly in The Rebel, appears also in The Myth 
of Sisyphus in another sense. In The Rebel, metaphysical rebellion is 
the refusal to accept the conditions of life: “Metaphysical rebellion 
is the movement by which man protests against his condition 
and against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it 
contests the ends of man and of creation . . . The metaphysical rebel 
declares that he is frustrated by the universe.”68
 The metaphysical rebellion is mainly the rejection of reality. 
Camus indicates that the origin of this refutation is another 
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positive value proposed by the rebel, who demands a non-existent 
“unity” and a “justice” not to be found, expressed above all in 
negation and refutation. By contrast, “metaphysical rebellion” 
in The Myth of Sisyphus implies a rebellion against the vagueness 
of consciousness threatening to overwhelm us. Human beings 
must fi ght for conscious transparency: “One of the only coherent 
positions is thus revolt. It is a constant confrontation between 
man and his own obscurity. It is an insistence upon an impossible 
transparency.”69
 From this perspective, faith in Leibowitz’s sense also con-
veys a kind of “metaphysical rebellion” because, as natural crea-
tures, we are tempted to transform the meaning of faith and 
adapt it to human existence. According to Leibowitz, faith “for 
its own sake,” meaning genuine faith, is a refusal to accept this 
vagueness and is synonymous with self-transcendence. Above 
all, however, this is the denotation of rebellion adopted in The 
Rebel.
 For Camus, as for Leibowitz, the decision process also involves 
corroboration and self-affi rmation, which come to the fore in 
happiness: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”70 Happiness 
is not the purpose of accepting the absurd but, as Leibowitz 
described freedom, its “side effect.” Just as for Leibowitz freedom 
as a product of the religious decision confi rms the existence of 
human beings as transcendent entities, so happiness constitutes 
the absurd person’s self affi rmation.
 What is this happiness? Does it amend the threat and despair 
of life? Does it remove absurdity? Happiness in Camus’ thought 
has indeed been interpreted as an expression of those random 
moments granting an illusion of unity with nature.71 But this 
approach has no support in The Myth of Sisyphus. Indeed, Camus 
explicitly argues: “Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the 
same earth.”72 Rather than replacing the absurd, happiness is 
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a kind of affi rmation of the absurd in the person’s inner existence. 
In John Cruickshank’s elegant formulation:
He defi nes happiness as a simple harmony relating the indi-
vidual to his existence. What more sure basis can there be for 
happiness, then, than recognition by the individual of that 
insoluble paradox which constitutes his position in the world? 
Happiness will follow from a relationship in which the indi-
vidual accepts the eternal antagonism between his desire for 
life and the inevitability of his death.73
 This harmony of human beings with their absurd existence 
refl ects their liberation from hopes and illusions. We become 
aware of the full meaning of our existence as human creatures, 
and this awareness fi ll our hearts with happiness.
 But this happiness is inseparably related to freedom in both 
its negative and positive meanings. One who endorses the absurd 
is free of illusions and expresses “the return to consciousness, the 
escape from everyday sleep.”74 Although this liberation appears 
to be confi ned to the conscious realm, it has the power to generate 
in us a new attitude to our existence because it liberates us to live 
and exhaust the given. We are liberated from the future in favor 
of experiencing the present or, in sum, to realize our existence as 
human creatures. In other words, liberation from illusions enables 
freedom in its positive sense. Happiness as self affi rmation thus 
expresses these two meanings of freedom.
 The chasm between Leibowitz and Camus is now obvious. If 
the purpose of faith is to worship God, the purpose of accepting 
the absurd is conscious transparency of our existence as human 
creatures. This issue is itself related to a more primary question: 
the meaning of the decision.
 According to Leibowitz, the religious decision refl ects the 
absolute human transcendence of natural existence: freedom is 
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an expression of the person’s detachment from all world objects. 
Leibowitz’s anthropology expresses the absolute separation be-
tween the cognitive and conative dimensions.75 Freedom, then, 
neither is nor can be derived from a specifi c datum. It is self-
generated, without any other context. In other words: the religious 
decision is a “leap.”
 For Camus, however, the decision to endorse the absurd 
is not a decision of this kind, and Camus does not accept the 
dichotomy between the cognitive and conative levels. To clarify 
the nature of this decision, I will briefl y consider a riddle 
puzzling Camus scholars. Cruickshank notes that reading The 
Myth of Sisyphus evokes discomfort because “A sudden twist 
in the argument changes the absurd into a solution . . . a kind 
of salvation.”76 The question of how the absurd turned from 
a problem into a solution is related to a deeper problem, 
formulated by Hochberg:
Camus has leaped from the factual premise that the juxta-
position of man and the universe is absurd, to the evaluative 
conclusion that this state ought to be preserved . . . For this 
transition, we have no justifi cation. Without such justifi cation, 
Camus has not . . . made his point. He has simply begged the 
question.77
 These problems arise from the assumption that Camus’ thought 
proceeds from factual hypotheses to value conclusions. But is this 
indeed the direction of this thought? Should it be understood in 
the context of an ethics of obligation? Or is it perhaps closer to the 
Aristotelian tradition that views ethics as a kind of self-realization 
on the one hand, and to the phenomenological tradition that posits 
an explication course on the other? The latter option appears to be 
the one supported by Camus.
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 The starting point of The Myth of Sisyphus is the transition 
from the factual data of the sense of the absurd to its conceptuali-
zation. This transition refl ects, according to Camus, the spirit’s 
immanent passion for clarity and self awareness: “The will is 
only the agent here: it tends to maintain consciousness.”78 In other 
words, the primary situation of consciousness is lack of clarity: 
consciousness is unaware of the structure and meaning of reality. 
The consciousness sunk in its slumber awakens through the sense 
of the absurd, which “inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. 
It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows.”79 This 
awakening of the mind is the mind’s voyage to itself. This is 
a process of self-explication driven by the mind’s immanent 
demand. Camus explicitly describes this process as “the mind 
that studies itself,”80 portraying the explication course in classic 
Husserlian terms: “Up to now we have managed to circumscribe 
the absurd from the outside. One can, however, wonder how 
much is clear in that notion and by direct analysis try to discover 
its meaning on the one hand and, on the other, the consequences 
it involves” (33).
 As in the Husserlian explication, so in the process of accepting 
the absurd, going inwards into the human experience does not 
detract from it; rather, it results in the “profound enrichment of 
experience and the rebirth of the world in its prolixity” (45).
 The ending of the explication process is lucidity and the 
clear acknowledgement that reality is split between fi nality and 
a yearning for absolute clarity. In light of this ending, we face 
a question: do we reject reality or do we endorse it? Contrary 
to Nagel’s claim, however, Camus’ endorsement of reality does 
not follow from a romantic stance,81 but refl ects a readiness to 
accept human existence as is. In other words, this decision is 
not a consequence of the explication but is taken in light of the 
explication. In Camus’ formulation: “Living an experience, 
CHAPTER THREE
90
a particular fate, is accepting it fully. Now, no one will live this 
fate, knowing it to be absurd, unless he does everything to keep 
before him that absurd brought to light by consciousness.”82 In 
this sense, the decision Camus speaks of has only one meaning: 
a readiness to acknowledge the character of human existence 
exposed in the explication.83
 Ostensibly, the difference between Leibowitz and Camus 
refl ects the difference between two alternatives in existentialist 
philosophy, one represented by Kierkegaard and the other by 
Heidegger. According to this interpretation, Leibowitz conti-
nues the Kierkegaardian tradition of the “leap” springing from 
nowhere and refl ecting “direct voluntarism.”84 By contrast, Ca-
mus continues the Heideggerian tradition, whereby the human 
decision is in a process of continuous transition from explication 
to decision. I do not accept this distinction. As I showed in my 
work, Kierkegaard does not detach the decision from the cognitive 
context that serves as its background.85 Leibowitz’s position, 
therefore, refl ects a rare dichotomy and, on this count, he is far 
removed from Camus.
(6) The believer and the absurd person
The focus of the discussion, so far fi xed on faith vis-à-vis the 
absurd, will now shift to the world of the believer as opposed to 
that of the absurd person, concentrating on three aspects: (a) The 
attitude to the transcendent. (b) The meaning of the rebellion. 
(c) The infi nity of the task.
 (a) The attitude to the transcendent. Camus’ philosophy, as 
noted, leaves no room for God. Immanent reality is the absolute 
reality, and individuals cannot return to the transcendent without 
blurring their consciousness as human creatures. Camus is not 
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an atheist, but primarily an anti-theist.86 He is not driven by the 
metaphysical approach claiming that God does not exist, and 
he explicitly emphasizes: “The history of metaphysical rebellion 
cannot be confused with that of atheism.”87 His refusal of the 
transcendent suggests that faith, more than the actual existence of 
an entity called God, enables human beings to escape the absolute 
freedom and responsibility incumbent on them.88
 The assumption about the existence of an active God rewarding 
human beings and promising hope implies a renunciation of the 
present: “If I obstinately refuse all the ‘later on’s’ of this world, 
it is because I have no desire to give up my present wealth.”89 
The absurd individual therefore lives with the “total absence of 
hope,”90 and it is this absence that fully exhausts our existence as 
creatures whose only reality is ourselves.
 Leibowitz’s position is a kind of response to Camus’ chal-
lenge. Leibowitz, as noted, accepts the position that this reality 
is the one absolute and inescapable reality available to human 
beings. In his view, however, this position is not supposed to 
deny the possibility of religious life; quite the contrary, faith and 
Halakhah refl ect this realism, since human reality is the only 
arena for concretizing religion. Believers acknowledge their 
obligation to realize the Torah in this world rather than hope 
for redemption in the next. The value of this reality determines 
the clear advantage of the present over another future in the 
next world. Contrary to Camus’ perception, human redemption 
according to Leibowitz takes place in this world, and is identi-
cal with liberation from the bonds of nature: “Religion as Torah 
and commandments redeems man from the bonds of nature. 
It is not redemption in the Christian sense—where man is 
redeemed through his consciousness of being redeemed—but 




 This conceptual transmutation of redemption to the realm 
of existential being is a radical turning point in Jewish tradi-
tion,92 and refl ects the “inner worldly” digression in Leibowitz’s 
thought.
 What place, then, is left for God in this world? This question 
emerges even more sharply because, from a religious point 
of view, Leibowitz supports God’s absolute transcendence. 
The answer to this question appears in what could be called 
“the subjective digression.” Religious existence is not defi ned 
through the individual’s association with a transcendent God 
but through a subjective decision to accept the Torah and the 
commandments: “The believer . . . makes an effort to direct his 
religious consciousness to himself as recognizing his duty to his 
God.”93
 In The Plague, Tarrou reveals his concern: “What interests 
me is learning how to become a saint . . . Can one be a saint 
without God?”94 In a way, this is another version of the question 
troubling Leibowitz. If God is indeed transcendent, and if no 
worldly fact or event is holy, can one become holy? Or is this 
category doomed to be banned from the world? Leibowitz’s 
answer is that the adjective holy cannot be employed to describe 
anything in this world because doing so would be “utter 
idolatry.”95 Only God is “holy,” human beings are not holy. They 
are “called upon to be holy.”96 The meaning of this holiness is 
the realization of self-transcendence, the liberation from the 
bonds of nature, which takes place here and now in this world. 
Camus is mistaken—Leibowitz would say—if he assumes that 
a life of faith subverts the meaning of human reality, and he is 
mistaken if he holds that religious life is “other worldly.” The 
place for a life of faith is this world, and individuals realize their 
relationship with God in this transcendence. The transcendent 
God is not the basis of values or even of hope, but the object of 
LEIBOWITZ AND CAMUS: BETWEEN FAITH AND THE ABSURD  
93
the religious decision. God is the noematic pole of the religious 
decision, and is not found anywhere else in a religious life.
 (b) The meaning of the rebellion—Camus, as noted, offers 
two models of “metaphysical rebellion.” One rebels against 
lack of clarity, and the other against the conditions of reality. 
Since Leibowitz’s concern is religious praxis, his adoption of the 
metaphysical rebellion endorsed in The Rebel could be expected. 
In Leibowitz’s view, Halakhah is a clear expression of rebellion 
against natural reality, since it neither follows from this reality 
nor is it built to fi t it:
[The world of Halakhah] is man’s rebellion against the rule of 
blind natural elements in his body and his soul. In the shape of 
laws, rulings, and commandments, religion ceases to appear as 
an auxiliary tool for man’s adjustment to life and for fi nding 
happiness within it—which is the essence of idolatry—and 
becomes a rebellion against life’s natural reality.97
Whereas Camus’ metaphysical rebel defi es God,98 for Leibowitz 
rebellion is the meaning of religiosity. For him, as for Kierke-
gaard, religiosity means the victory of the “spirit” over nature 
and the fl esh.99
 For Camus, the metaphysical rebellion mirrors an awareness 
of history as currently devoid of holiness and divine grace.100 
Once history becomes human, the rebellious consciousness is 
redefi ned as a “generous act of complicity” (19) with a “natural 
community” (16). Human beings now strive to reshape the world 
and return the order and justice that have been lost (103–104). 
By contrast, Leibowitz’s rebellion means coping with the natural 
givenness without an alternative utopia.
 Camus, who removed the transcendent from the world, 
discovers that the metaphysical rebellion is a constant search 
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for this transcendence. Instead of the traditional transcendence 
of the divine, human beings strive for a world that will embody 
what this transcendence had represented. For Leibowitz, 
however, rebellion does not assume another positive value. 
It is not a yearning for utopia but a classic expression of the 
human creature as an exceptional entity, whose exceptionalism 
is concretized in the acceptance of the Torah and the com-
mandments.
 (c) The infi nity of the task—the Sisyphean struggle. The idea 
of an infi nite human struggle is a leit-motif of Camus’ thought, 
while changes in his approach are refl ected in the different 
meanings he ascribes to this struggle. In The Myth of Sisyphus, 
the infi nite struggle is the struggle for “lucidity.” This struggle is 
infi nite because of the constantly lurking danger of entrapment 
in the “hope” to escape human destiny. Sisyphus is the human 
hero because, faced with the tragedy of despair and pain, he does 
not surrender to hope; quite the contrary, the very acceptance of 
tragedy is an expression of his lucidity:
If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. 
Where would this torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope 
of succeeding upheld him? . . . Sisyphus . . . knows the whole 
extent of his wretched condition; it is what he thinks of during 
his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the 
same time crowns his victory. 101
The infi nity of the task, then, denotes the intensity of the endless 
temptation compelling us to struggle for lucidity.
 Contrary to this solipsistic stance that makes the “self” and 
the self’s consciousness the focus of the struggle, in his later 
works Camus makes the character and infi nity of the struggle 
contingent on life’s concrete conditions. Tarrou, Rieux’s partner 
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in the fi ght against the plague, says to him: “Your victories will 
never be lasting.” And Rieux answers: “Yes, I know that. But it’s 
no reason for giving up the struggle.”102 The two protagonists 
of the story share an understanding: “Plague is here and we’ve 
got to make a stand” (112). But no “fi nal victory” is possible, and 
he will always have to struggle “against terror and its relentless 
onslaughts” (251–252). The rebel, then, acknowledges the dreadful 
reality as a fait accomplie but refuses to endorse it as absolute, 
as evident in his infi nite metaphysical and historical struggle 
against it:
The rebel, far from making an absolute of history, rejects and 
disputes it, in the name of a concept that he has of his own 
nature. He refuses his condition, and his condition to a large 
extent is historical. Injustice, the transience of time, death—
all are manifest in history. In spurning them, history itself is 
spurned.103
 The refusal of reality is not only a negative position. Its fi rst 
meaning is actually positive, and implies a human struggle to 
reshape it: “But confronted with it [with history], he feels like 
the artist confronted with reality; he spurns it without escaping 
it (290). Camus, like Nietzsche before him, recognizes that the 
deep power of freedom does not lie in its negative denotation—
“freedom from,”104 but in its positive meaning: “freedom to”: 
“Liberty coincides with heroism.”105
 Leibowitz also recognizes that the struggle is infi nite. He 
does not endorse the version of infi nity adopted in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, however, since the purpose of his philosophy is not 
the attainment of lucidity but the clarifi cation of the religious 
obligation. The digression to praxis, then, brings Leibowitz extre-
mely close to the model of The Plague and The Rebel. According 
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to Leibowitz, this infi nity rests on both existential and religious 
grounds. Existentially, the concrete individual lives in a natural 
reality and not in a reality of redemption in the Christian 
sense, since Judaism does not believe in “extricating man from 
the human condition.”106 The believer struggles with reality 
and transcends it by observing the commandments, but this 
transcendence does not imply detachment from natural reality. 
Therefore, “the project it sets for man is permanent and endless. 
No religious attainment may be considered fi nal; the project is 
never completed.”107
 The endless struggle thus refl ects the permanent dichotomy 
between factual givenness and its transcendence, between 
causality and freedom. Since we are dichotomous entities, the 
struggle is infi nite. In other words, the infi nity of the task is not 
necessarily related to the religious dimension but to the dichotomy 
between freedom and the spirit as opposed to reality. Leibowitz’s 
formulation presents this idea in clear terms: “The essence of 
a value attitude to man’s problems . . . is that human beings, facing 
a goal that is not anchored in reality, are still required to strive 
toward it from reality and transcend it, even though the goal is 
infi nite and can never be accomplished.”108 This picture, however, 
is incomplete, since the dichotomy is never between nature and 
spirit, between the human world and the divine demand.109 The 
endlessness of the task refl ects the infi nite gap between human 
and divine:
Performance of the Mitzvoth is man’s path to God, an infi nite 
path, the end of which is never attained and is, in effect, 
unattainable. A man is bound to know that his path never 
terminates. One follows it without advancing beyond the point 
of departure . . . The aim of proximity to God is unattainable. It 
is infi nitely distant, “for God is in heaven and you on the earth” 
[Ecclesiastes 5:1].110
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Whereas the existential dimension emphasizes the gap within 
man, the gap is now between man and God. In this light, the 
Torah is perceived as eternal, not because its instructions cannot 
be changed, but “because it is divine, not human.“111
 The assumption that the task is infi nite turns the effort 
into the actual meaning of the religious act, and Leibowitz 
emphasizes this in many places in his work.112 At one point, he 
traces a pessimistic picture of human reality that emphasizes the 
effort even more strongly:
Man may not be free in the sense of being able to choose 
between good and evil, but he is free to strive for this 
choice . . . The ability to worship God may not be part of man’s 
nature—and is it not the case that “nature” is precisely that 
which cannot be transcended? Nevertheless, it is incumbent on 
man to be “brave as a lion”—to make a supreme effort to do 
what cannot be done . . . The depth of religious faith may indeed 
be fully revealed in man’s acknowledgement of the task that is 
incumbent on him—to worship God—a task he must never 
desist from.113
 In this passage, a far greater heroism is expected from be-
lievers. They are not only required to struggle to realize the 
norms, but they must also engage in a struggle, perhaps a losing 
one, against their own nature. The hopelessness of this struggle 
stresses the power of faith. Making faith the antithesis of the 
possible and the rational brings Leibowitz closer to formulations 
in Christian tradition, from Tertullian to Kierkegaard, stressing 
the overlap between faith and decisions without any rational 
meaning in Tertullian’s perception, or hopeless decisions in 
Kier ke gaard’s perception. The believer is now a Sisyphean hero 
living “a heroic life.”114 The believer’s heroism, however, does not 
invoke human solidarity and is a gesture of faith.
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 What can be learned from the comparison between Camus 
and Leibowitz? Can any conclusions be drawn from it, beyond 
that of Camus’ infl uence on Leibowitz? Even if Leibowitz strongly 
admired Camus,115 it is questionable whether he was infl uenced 
by him. Beyond the personal dimension, the source of this 
admiration is probably related to the similarities in their thinking. 
Thus, two worlds appearing as parallels that cannot meet are 
found to be deeply associated and conceptually close in their 
perceptions about the meaning of human existence. One element 
substantiating this resemblance is the similarity in their responses 
to the modern world and particularly to the status of immanence, 
although one of them removed God from the world and the other 
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IN Der Philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte, Nicholai 
Hartman offered his well-known distinction between “syste matic 
thinking” and “problem thinking”: whereas systematic thinking 
begins from a series of assumptions and proceeds to offer all-
encompassing solutions, problem thinking begins from a problem 
and considers it in depth, without striving for comprehensive 
systems. Problem thinking is dialectical—it appraises the 
boundaries of the problem and the limitations of its solutions. 
According to Hartman, a typical instance of a systematic thinker 
is Spinoza, who founded an inclusive metaphysical system based 
on primary and irrefutable assumptions. A classic example of 
problem thinking is the philosophy of Plato, which is more intent 
on clarifying the predicament than on offering solutions, and 
hence its dialectical character.
 Yeshayahu Leibowitz obviously belonged to the species of 
problem-thinking philosophers. As other distinctions, however, 
Hartman’s too is overstated, and many thinkers focusing on 
problems transcend the dialectical move and go on to create 
a reasonably coherent system. Two renowned instances are Kier-
kegaard and Nietzsche. Both transcended the critical, “negative” 
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stage and offered daring, “positive” solutions to the problematic 
raised by their work. Although these solutions were not articu-
lated systematically, they do develop into extensive and coherent 
philosophies.
 This is also true for Leibowitz, who went beyond problem 
analysis to create an integrated system leading to a profound 
transformation in Jewish thought. In many regards, his trailblazing 
endeavor can be compared to that of Maimonides. In this chapter, 
I analyze the problem raised by Leibowitz and the solution he 
suggested, paying special attention to a comparison between him 
and Wittgenstein. The similarities between them do not necessarily 
refl ect Wittgenstein’s infl uence on Leibowitz. Although Leibowitz 
had high respect for Wittgenstein’s work, his basic theses were 
framed long before the publication of Wittgenstein’s writings.1 
The comparison will thus reveal the extent to which Leibowitz’s 
philosophy is uniquely and radically Jewish.
 One basic question occupied Leibowitz mainly since the 
early 1950s, when he published “Religious Praxis”: Is religious 
commitment possible without metaphysical and theological 
assumptions? As a scientist nurtured in the tradition of Popper, 
Wittgenstein, and logical positivism, he was aware of the 
epistemic diffi culty entailed in all attempts to justify metaphysical 
claims regarding God, the world, or historical events. To say that 
God’s revelation took place at a specifi c historical time, or that 
God functions in a particular fashion, compels us to apply to 
God categories drawn from our concrete experience. The very 
act of using our own experience to describe God, however, is 
invalid and tantamount to idolatry, since God is precisely the 
transcendent entity beyond our cognition:
Faith in God approached from his divine dimension, which 
is ungraspable through the categories of human thought, as 
opposed to faith in God from the dimension of the attributes 
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and functions ascribed to him, which due to the limitations of 
human consciousness necessarily involves objectifi cation. Our 
human consciousness contains no features or functions that are 
not derived from the natural reality known to human beings. 
Hence, whoever ascribes one of these to God . . . sinks into 
idolatrous faith: he worships God in the image of man.2
The everyday language we use in regard to God, then, contradicts 
what we think or can think about God, and believers should direct 
their theological efforts to the removal of natural and ordinary 
meanings from religious language: “If, however, a religious 
person’s thought turns to theological refl ection, he is not at liberty 
to forego analysis and criticism of theological terms and concepts 
and must master their meanings which are necessarily different 
from their meanings when they are used in discoursing of nature 
and man.”3
 Like Maimonides, Leibowitz endorsed a radical theory of 
divine transcendence, based on the character of human cognition 
and warranting the conclusion that “God is not an object of 
religious thought.”4 Similarly, nothing can be said about the world 
as such, neither that it precedes creation nor that it was created, 
because “the concept of ‘creation’ does not resemble anything in 
our own experience, or any concept derived from our perception 
of reality. Hence, this concept too is meaningless to us when used 
to describe reality.”5
 Like Wittgenstein, Leibowitz held that science can help us 
understand processes unfolding in the world but not the essence 
or the very existence of the world. This is a question beyond 
our cognitive powers. He also rejected, like Wittgenstein, the 
possibility of riddles, namely, questions that science cannot 
answer. Wittgenstein wrote: “When the answer cannot be put 
into words, neither can the question be put in words.”6 Likewise, 
Leibowitz wrote: “Science answers every question that can be 
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formulated in the language of scientifi c methodology—and only 
science answers it. No scientifi c question remains as a ’riddle’ in 
science, its solution to be sought elsewhere.”7
 If we are indeed limited and bound by our concrete, day-to-
day experience, we cannot ascribe meanings that transcend our 
cognition to actual historical events. Classic religious concepts 
refl ecting a metaphysical interpretation of historical events, such 
as “providence” or “redemption,” now become unintelligible, 
since they are based on “factual information” that fails to match 
our empirical cognition.
 The tendency of religion to rely on arguments drawn from 
the factual and metaphysical realms had bothered religious 
thinkers such as Pascal and Kierkegaard, who understood that 
religion is thereby made contingent on the validity of these 
arguments. In logical terms, this reliance implies that religious 
truths are contingent rather than necessary. As believers, 
however, they refused to endorse this conclusion. Wittgenstein 
too understood that believers do not approach their religious 
beliefs as they do other factual truths: “Those people who had 
faith didn’t apply the doubt which would ordinarily apply to 
any historical propositions.”8 On these grounds, Wittgenstein 
and other thinkers in his wake concluded that religion does 
not compete with metaphysics or science and offers something 
else altogether—faith. Faith is not contingent on any outside 
factor. It is the primary foundation, not grounded on truth 
claims, through which the believer perceives the world. Faith, 
then, is not the sum of truth claims about the world; rather, in 
the terminology of post-Wittgenstenian philosophy, faith is the 
believer’s absolute disposition toward the world, which shapes 
an entire “form of life.”9
 Leibowitz’s thought strongly resembles that of some of these 
thinkers, but his approach rests on a consideration present in 
an early work of Wittgenstein, the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. 
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According to Leibowitz, the problem with metaphysical and 
factual religious truths is not their logical status, namely, the 
possibility that they might be refuted, but their meaninglessness. 
The key question for Leibowitz, then, is the following: Is 
Judaism based on meaningless claims or can it be championed 
on other grounds? Rejecting metaphysics as meaningless is thus 
an expression of critical thinking, but dismissing metaphysics is 
not enough—Judaism now needs a new justifi cation. Here we 
reach the essence of the Leibowitzian revolution, whereby the 
meaning of Judaism shifts away from the metaphysical-theological 
realm and is perceived as a system of values. My analysis will trace 
in greater detail the two stages of this revolution—the negative, 
entailing the removal of metaphysics from Jewish existence, and 
the positive, establishing Judaism as a system of values.
 The removal of metaphysics from religion is manifest at two 
levels in Leibowitz’s thought: fi rst, in the denial of theology, and 
second, in the denial of “religious facts.” Theology, meaning the 
detailed and precise concern with God’s attributes, is a classic 
area of religious thought. Monotheistic traditions deal at length 
with God as source and creator, as a perfect entity describable 
in terms of one or another attribute. Even ordinary believers, 
who are not interested in God as an object of philosophical 
contemplation, do make theological assumptions in their ways 
of life and in their religious language about God’s goodness 
and concern for his creatures. All propositions regarding God, 
however, are actually committed to assumptions that Leibowitz 
considers epistemologically meaningless and thus religiously 
unacceptable. Leibowitz knows that traditional religious language 
is loaded with theological statements, but does not consider 
this a special problem. He recurrently emphasizes Maimonides’ 
doctrine of “negative attributes” as a unique contribution, key 
to the eradication of positive statements about God. According 
to this theory, all positive statements about God—”wise,” 
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“powerful,” and so forth—are to be understood not as the 
ascription of positive attributes to God but as indicating that these 
attributes are not absent: “wise” means that God is not foolish, 
“omnipotent” means that God is not limited. When dismissing 
these fl aws, human beings do not gain a better understanding of 
God but a perception of God as a supreme entity, different from 
any other known to them. Leibowitz argues that only through 
this theory can religious individuals be released from mistaken 
religious perceptions and worship God, meaning that only by 
endorsing this approach can they accept divine sovereignty and 
not be like ”he who worships God in the image of man.”10
 The removal of theology from Jewish religion does not 
follow only from systematic critical refl ection. Leibowitz argues 
that, at the concrete level of Jewish religion, theology is entirely 
irrelevant: “Religious faith can be pure and profound without the 
believer engaging in theological reasoning.”11 Like Wittgenstein, 
Leibowitz understood that using the word “God” does not 
require a full grasp of what this word represents. Leibowitz 
would certainly agree with Wittgenstein’s statement concerning 
the word God whereby, primarily, we understand “what it didn’t 
mean.”12 For Leibowitz, this understanding is the most believers 
will ever attain and, beyond it, they do not need theology to live 
as believers.
 Similarly, Leibowitz removes “religious facts”—such as 
crea tion, the Sinai revelation, and providence—from the realm 
of religion. Facts are determined only by what takes place in 
reality and can be verifi ed by our standard epistemic tools. 
Although none of the religious facts mentioned is amenable to 
such validation, Leibowitz cannot deny their signifi cant role in 
the prevalent religious language. His contribution, then, is to offer 
a new and daring interpretation of them, guided by the following 
principle: “Historical facts are . . . per se religiously indifferent. No 
historical event assumes religious meaning unless it expresses 
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religious consciousness, namely, unless it refl ects the religious 
consciousness—knowledge and worship of God—of the event’s 
participants.”13
 Although Leibowitz formulated this principle in regard 
to historical facts, he actually applies it to facts in general—
historical, natural, or metaphysical. A “religious fact” derives 
from the religious-normative system—only from and within this 
system does it acquire meaning. “Religious facts” are one type of 
normative claims. The religious meaning of creation can thus be 
summed up in the claim that the “universe (‘Heaven and Earth’) 
is not God—the great refutation of idolatry, pantheism and 
atheism.”14 The Sinai revelation is not the name of yet another 
past event, but one of the institutions that shaped Jewish religion. 
The role of this institution is to endow the halakhic system as 
a whole with the force of a command incumbent on everyone 
or, in Leibowitz’s pointed formulation: “The meaning of Sinai is 
accepting the command we have been commanded.”15 In religious 
language, the concept of “revelation” does not point to a fact 
in the world or to a norm within the system; rather, it indicates 
our judgment of the system in toto. Therefore, revelation makes 
a meta-normative or second order statement, which determines 
the status of the Torah: “It has divine authority.”16
 Prima facie, this approach marks a dramatic revolution in 
the perception of the Sinai revelation. In classic Jewish tradition, 
the Sinai revelation as an incontrovertible historical fact is the 
cornerstone of Jewish faith. The commitment to observe the Torah 
and the commandments derives from the Sinai revelation, which 
took place at a particular place and time. Moreover, after Judah 
Halevi, the overwhelming sense was that this was a demonstrated 
fact because it was witnessed by a multitude and transmitted 
by tradition over many generations: “Those who have handed 
down these laws to us were not a few isolated individuals, 
but a multitude, all learned men who received them from the 
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prophets. And in the absence of prophecy, they received them 
from the bearers of the Torah . . . and the chain beginning with 
Moses has never been interrupted.”17
 For Judah Halevi, the empirical validity of the Sinai revelation 
is far higher than the validity of religious facts in other religions, 
both because it took place in front of a multitude and because 
of the continuity of the tradition. Halevi seems to have refl ected 
a basic religious intuition of Jewish tradition as perceived in his 
time and by believers over many generations up to the present day. 
But is this perception of the Sinai revelation as part of the current 
commitment to Jewish tradition still possible? The traditional 
view of the Sinai theophany as the cornerstone of the obligation 
to assume the yoke of the Torah and the commandments could be 
hindered by several obstacles.
 First, this view involves petitio principii circularity. The 
claim that the Sinai revelation was an event that took place 
before a multitude and was faithfully transmitted through the 
generations is not a consensual fact. Revelation is a fact only if 
we presume that the claim that Jewish tradition is embodied 
in the biblical text is reliable. But the reliability of this tradition 
is precisely the fact that needs to be demonstrated. Without 
independent faith in the biblical text, we cannot rely on it and 
on the Jewish tradition that embraces this text as a factual report 
in order to claim that this was indeed a fact. The “fact” is a fact 
only if we believe in it, but if we believe in it, how can we see it as 
a datum that substantiates faith itself?
 This problem did not trouble medieval philosophers be-
cause all—Jews, Christians, and Moslems—agreed that the 
Sinai revelation had indeed occurred and that the tradition 
relying on it was valid. Within these parameters, Halevi’s 
argument sounds plausible. If all agree on a fact as described, 
its validating power is far stronger than that of “religious” facts 
occurring before a limited audience. But medieval discourse is 
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blocked to us, since what is in question is the actual reliability 
of religious texts, and what was possible in a medieval context 
becomes highly problematic in our times. Eliezer Goldman, who 
continued the Leibowitzian tradition, formulated this claim with 
his proverbial clarity:
Certainty in this form [as refl ected in medieval Jewish tradition] 
is not possible today, for two reasons. One, the prevailing critical 
approach toward the tradition and the literary sources. The 
diffi culty does not lie in the particular circumstances of biblical 
research, of the history of faith, or of Halakhah. The question 
is one of principle: is there room for the critical research of 
Scripture or of halakhic tradition? A negative response cannot 
be based on the reliability of the tradition. This is precisely the 
issue at stake . . . For us, the accepted criteria for determining 
the reliability of traditions are the criteria of critical research. 
The argument that a specifi c tradition is reliable in ways that 
exclude the application of critical criteria must substantiate this 
reliability on a criterion other than the continuity of tradition. 
The epistemic certainty that R. Judah Halevi, for instance, could 
ascribe to the tradition of the Sinai revelation, is no longer 
possible for us.18
 Second, as noted, facts are logically contingent. All that we 
assume as fact could turn out to be a fi ction or a deception. The 
validity of a fact is merely contingent and, in principle, could be 
refuted. The believer’s disposition, however, is entirely different. 
The believer endorses faith unconditionally and is entirely un-
willing to assume the possibility of its refutation. Hence, religious 
commitment could not possibly rely on fact.
 Third, even if do assume a fact’s actual occurrence, how 
does the believer’s obligation to observe the Torah and the 
commandments follow from it? One of the most important 
distinctions in the theory of values is that between “is” and 
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“ought,” and the determination that “is” does not follow from 
“ought”: normative value conclusions cannot be derived from 
factual data. How, then, does the obligation to observe the 
Torah and the commandments follow from the very occurrence 
of the Sinai theophany? A typical response to this problem is 
that, since the commander is the good God, we are obliged to 
obey his commands. This answer, however, does not anchor 
the obligation in the fact of the Sinai commandment but on our 
faith and our judgment about the nature of the commanding 
God. In Jewish tradition, this conclusion has been formulated by 
Simeon Shkop who writes: “The obligation and the imperative 
to worship God and fulfi ll his will, may He be blessed . . . is 
an obligation and a necessity according to the laws of reason.”19 
Several aspects of the distinction between facts and values have 
indeed been questioned in the philosophical literature, but the 
attempt to ground belief in the Sinai revelation on a critique of 
the distinction between facts and values would anchor faith on 
shaky foundations.
 Fourth, theophany as fact assumes that time and place 
categories apply to God: revelation occurred at a particular time 
and place, meaning that God operates in place and time. This 
perception, however, refutes the view of God as transcendent. 
It is also incongruent with the understanding of revelation as 
a subjective experience unfolding in the individual’s personal 
life that William James, for instance, describes as “conversion.”20 
In this description, revelation is not a nomistic experience with 
a universally valid legal system as its object, but an internal 
private experience. This experience unfolds in the depths of 
an individual’s being, its contents are personal, and its object 
are the values, approaches, and existence of the person rather 
than anything beyond it. This concept, however, though 
compatible with Christian—mainly Protestant—approaches, is 
incompatible with Jewish religion.
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 Attempts to contend with these obstacles allow for a range 
of answers. One extreme response is to negate the existence of 
any problems and cling to a simple faith. Another is to dismiss 
Jewish religion as groundless. The fi rst option strives to preserve 
the traditional Jewish intuition that ascribes crucial weight to the 
Sinai revelation. The will to retain the specifi c contents that Jewish 
tradition ascribed to this event deserves respect, and should not 
be scorned because rationally unacceptable, since religion cannot 
be based solely on rational contexts. The price of this outlook, 
however, is obvious. Its supporters must renounce the notion that 
the Sinai revelation serves as a justifi cation for something else. The 
Sinai revelation now becomes an “inner” fact of Jewish religion 
rather than the prooftext of its truth. Although this is a modest 
price for those seeking a share in their ancestors’ tradition, it is still 
quite high, from two perspectives. First, at least in classic Jewish 
philosophy, the Sinai revelation was the datum that substantiated 
the overriding certainty of Jewish religion. Second, preserving the 
traditional outlook that views the Sinai theophany as a religious 
fact still leaves several questions unanswered: In what sense is 
the Sinai revelation a fact? What do we mean when we say it is 
a “religious fact”? What is the meaning of this religious fact?
 The contrary option comes to the conclusion warranted by this 
argument: since the Sinai revelation cannot substantiate Jewish 
religion, Jewish faith should be relinquished. This conclusion is 
indeed possible but not imperative, and alternative interpreta-
tions of the Sinai revelation could also be suggested. Abandoning 
religion would then be the result of endorsing a particular 
interpretation of the Sinai revelation. In other words, the conclu-
sion was chosen a priori, when choosing an interpretation.
 A third and indeed particularly fruitful option rests on a new 
interpretation of the Sinai revelation as a normative rather than 
a factual landmark. The term does not relate to an event that 
occurred in the past but expresses an act of judgment about the 
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Torah. According to this interpretation, the attributes ascribed 
to the historical fact of the Sinai revelation are displaced to 
the judgment of the Torah per se. As a factual event, the Sinai 
revelation marked the Torah’s divine source, in an act of judgment 
that ascribes it transcendent validity. This transcendence is the 
basic paradox of religious life: through an act of judgment that is 
by nature immanent, believers ascribe transcendent status to their 
object of judgment—the Torah. As a factual characteristic, the 
Sinai revelation expresses the fact that the Torah is from heaven, 
that it is not a human product. As a normative characteristic, 
believers accept the Torah unquestioningly and unreservedly. In 
judging the Torah in these terms, believers assume its absolute 
authority and acknowledge its divine source.
 The religious intuitions expressed through the term “Sinai 
revelation” when referring to a factual characteristic are defi nitely 
preserved when it is transformed into a normative characteristic. 
Indeed, it is only through this transformation that revelation 
preserves its “inner” religious meaning. The Sinai revelation 
denotes the believer’s act of acceptance, the decision to assume 
the yoke of the heavenly kingdom; it is no longer a factual event 
that may or may not have taken place in the world. As a factual 
characteristic, the Sinai revelation relates to the distant past; 
as a normative characteristic, the Sinai revelation relates to 
the present and to the believer’s concrete life. In sum, the Sinai 
revelation as a fact relates to the act of giving, whereas the Sinai 
revelation as a normative characteristic expresses the believer’s 
act of acceptance and decision.
 Shifting the center from the divine act of giving the Torah to 
the individual’s act of accepting it can also trace its precedents 
to Jewish sources. Thus, for instance, R. Johanan says: “Whoever 
performs one commandment truly is accounted as though he had 
enacted it from Mount Sinai, for it is said ‘You shall therefore 
keep and do them ‘ (Deuteronomy 26:16). What is the meaning of 
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the words ‘do them’? It means that whoever observes the Torah 
and performs it truly is accounted as though he had enacted it 
from Sinai.”21
 Another text suggesting such a shift is BT Shabbat 88a. The 
Talmud cites a homily by R. Avdimi bar Hama bar Hasa, claiming 
that the Holy One, blessed be He, forced the Jewish people to 
accept the Torah by tilting the mountain and threatening them 
to cover them with it, as though it were an upturned vat. R. Aha 
bar Yaakov was critical of this homily: “This is a powerful protest 
against the Torah.” If the Torah was indeed forced upon the 
people of Israel, they are free not to observe it on a claim of duress. 
Rabba accepts this argument but goes on to say, “Nevertheless, 
they accepted it again in the days of Ahashverosh.” For Rabba, the 
autonomous acceptance of the Torah is the basis for the obligation 
it creates.22 Although these homilies do not signifi cantly transform 
the term “Sinai revelation” from a factual into a normative 
characteristic, they do stress the centrality of human freedom as 
the constitutive validation of the Sinai revelation.23
 In this context, note the use of the term de-oraita [from the 
Torah] in halakhic literature. This term appears to denote a fact: 
a norm defi ned as de-oraita is a norm transmitted at the time of 
the Sinai revelation. But the characterization of norms as either 
de-oraita or as enacted by the sages—de-rabanan—is a bone of 
contention between Maimonides and Nahmanides. Maimonides 
holds that the term de-oraita refers only to what is explicitly 
written in the Torah or what halakhic tradition states was given 
to Moses at Sinai.24 According to this view, most of the talmudic 
literature conveying statements founded on the sages’ discretion 
or on exegeses of the written text is not de-oraita. Indeed, in the 
Second Root of The Book of the Commandments, Maimonides 
writes: “It is not admissible to include in this Classifi cation [de-
oraita] (a commandment) that is derived by any of the Thirteen 
Principles of Exegesis by which the Torah is expounded.”25
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 Nahmanides categorically rejects this stance. In a sharp 
formulation, he states: “This Principle and this Root [Maimonides’ 
Second Root] dismisses and abolishes many roots in the 
Talmud . . . and our principle, the roots of our tradition, are the 
thirteen principles for the exegesis of the Torah, and most of the 
Talmud is based on them.”26 According to Nahmanides, the basic 
assumption of talmudic discourse is that a conclusion reached by 
the sages through the implementation of the thirteen principles 
of exegesis is identical to the text of the Torah “because the 
principles are for them as explicit words of Torah.”27 The reason 
is that the principles of exegesis were given to Moses exactly as 
the Torah itself. Contrary to Maimonides, Nahmanides holds that 
a halakhic norm is defi ned as legislation enacted by the sages only 
if they state so explicitly: “Therefore, the proper understanding 
is the opposite [of Maimonides’ view]: everything expounded 
in the Talmud through one of the thirteen rules of exegesis is de-
oraita, unless they say it is an askmakhta [meaning that the homily 
was used only for illustration].”28 According to Nahmanides, the 
norm is valid because it is based on a rabbinic legislative act and, 
barring such an explicit statement, all halakhic inferences from 
the Torah have de-oraita status.
 The dispute between Maimonides and Nahmanides, then, 
concerns the use of the term de-oraita: Maimonides holds that this 
term denotes the norms explicitly issued at the Sinai revelation, 
be it in the text of the Torah or through the chain of tradition, 
when the sages of Israel attest so explicitly.29 Whatever is not 
part of this corpus, is not part of the revelation event or of the 
Torah per se. Both the place (Sinai) and the actual occurrence play 
a crucial role in the constitution of a norm as part of the Torah. 
By contrast, Nahmanides holds that revelation as it actually took 
place at a particular place lacks this status. The term de-oraita 
indicates, above all, the status of the halakhic norms themselves 
rather than what happened at the revelation. In his critique of 
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Maimonides, Nahmanides adduces strong evidence to support 
his claim. Hanania Kazis, a Maimonides’ advocate who responds 
to this critique, writes as follows:
He [Nahmanides] also cites several commandments that were 
not given at Sinai in an attempt to show that it is not necessarily 
Sinai . . . I hold that the rabbi’s [Maimonides] words below, in 
the Third Root, will suffi ce to answer this objection. And this 
is what he says: “And they indeed meant ‘at Sinai,’ since the 
gist of the Torah was given at Sinai.” The rabbi explicitly says 
“the gist of the Torah,” because rabbinic statements were not 
included in the Torah. Hence, the word Sinai is not meant to 
point to a place but to denote the notion of de-oraita, since the 
gist of the Torah was given at Sinai. He therefore relied on the 
phrase “at Sinai” to allude to the Torah as a whole.30
 In defending Maimonides, Kazis argues that Maimonides too 
accepts the assumption that the term de-oraita does not denote only 
what was given at Sinai. Rather, it denotes the norms enjoying 
the special legal status indicated by the term de-oraita, which are 
legally different from norms enacted through rabbinic legislation. 
For instance, when in doubt concerning a norm de-oraita, the call 
is for greater stringency, but when a rabbinic norm is at stake, 
further leniency is advised. Whether or not Kazis is right in his 
interpretation of Maimonides’ approach, he brings Maimonides’ 
position closer to that of Nahmanides: the term de-oraita does not 
indicate only the norms issued at the actual Sinai revelation.
 This analysis shows that, at least implicitly, Jewish tradition 
assigns greater importance to the determination of the norms’ status 
than to the factual question of what precisely was given at Sinai. 
Although the views of Nahmanides and Kazis are not identical to 
Leibowitz’s, their approaches do convey the original digression 
in the discussion about the Torah, which shifts from the factual 
question to the issue of assessment and judgment. In this sense, 
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Leibowitz’s interpretation of the Sinai revelation as a normative 
characteristic continues a hermeneutical discourse within Jewish 
tradition. It points to a desire to preserve traditional constructs 
as conveyed in specifi c wordings while pouring new meanings 
into the claims expressed through them.31 This hermeneutical 
innovation, then, is a continuation of Jewish tradition rather than 
a deviation. The paradigm that Maimonides presented in the Guide 
of the Perplexed is a fascinating instance of the immanent religious 
need for an innovative interpretation that balances religious and 
intellectual commitments. The Guide of the Perplexed has by now 
become a legitimate part of the Jewish canon. Hermeneutically, 
however, very little in this essay remains relevant to our generation, 
since Maimonides’ horizons differ from ours. What does remain 
alive in this book is the very legitimacy of reinterpreting tradition.32 
Interpretation and renewed interpretation refl ect the permanent 
dialogue of believers with their tradition. Through this dialogue, 
a “fusion of horizons” emerges between the legacy and the cultural 
value horizons of the person turning to the tradition.33
 This conceptual transformation is an innovation that 
becomes signifi cant for believers who affi rm their religion as 
well as a set of cognitions and insights deeply entrenched within 
a specifi c culture. Individuals who do not wish to renounce their 
religious commitment must embark on this hermeneutic voyage, 
a voyage that endows the statements of religious tradition with 
new meaning. The seeds of this innovation lie within Jewish 
tradition, as does the renewed meeting with the tradition that 
takes place through the horizons of the present and sheds light 
on aspects included in the horizons of the past.34 Can a religious 
commitment based on human autonomy encompass the full 
range of this commitment’s meanings? All the possible answers 
to this question share a common characteristic: the alternative of 
anchoring religious commitment in historical facts is even less 
satisfactory.
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 This renewed interpretation of the Sinai revelation, which 
neutralizes its factual dimension, is compatible with the removal 
of all mythological meanings from Scripture, again pointing to 
the illuminating similarity between Leibowitz and Wittgenstein:
Christianity is not based on historical truth; rather, it offers us 
a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe 
this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, 
rather: believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only 
as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don’t take the same 
attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! Make a quite 
different place in your life for it.--There is nothing paradoxical 
about that!35
 The factual story thus assumes its meaning from the believer’s 
life context. For Wittgenstein, the fact that the “historical nar-
rative” becomes meaningful through faith was not paradoxical. 
Leibowitz, in his distant dialogue with Wittgenstein, argued 
that “this is a logical paradox but not a religious paradox.”36 In 
other words, it is paradoxical that halakhic Judaism, which draws 
its authority from Scripture, is also the one that determines 
the meaning of Scripture. Asa Kasher, however, a prominent 
neo-Leibowitzian thinker, showed that no logical paradox is 
present here,37 and Leibowitz agreed with him,38 thus reaffi rming 
his support for Wittgenstein.
 If we dismiss theology, it appears we must also dismiss God, 
turning it into a meaningless concept. Had Leibowitz endor sed 
such a move, however, the gap between his approach, which 
strives to describe “empirical-historical” Judaism as is, and 
conventional religious language, would have become unbridge-
able. Rather than offering an entirely new “language game,” 
Leibowitz strives to preserve the old “language game” while of-
fer ing a new interpretation when he interprets de-oraita, a central 
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metaphysical concept in Halakhah, within the language game of 
Halakhah rather than as a metaphysical claim. In this light, 
eradicating God from the religious realm becomes inconceivable. 
Leibowitz thus suggests a solution composed of two elements. 
The fi rst, as noted, is to turn God into a transcendent entity of 
which nothing can be said.39 The second is to interpret statements 
about God that are necessary for the perception of religion as 
a normative system as pointing to the relationship between the 
individual and God. Thus, for instance, the statement “God 
commands” means that individuals take upon themselves this 
command as divine: “In refl ecting and speaking about man’s 
standing before God, the believer . . . tries to refer minimally to 
God, who has no image at all, and makes an effort to direct his 
religious consciousness to himself as recognizing his duty to his 
God.”40
 Leibowitz knows that the metaphysical meaning of religious 
language cannot be fully translated according to his suggestions. 
In fact, the statement that God is a necessary entity, which 
Leibowitz endorses, entails a specifi c metaphysical commitment 
requiring God’s very existence and even characterizing his mode 
of existence. Furthermore, the claim that individuals acknowledge 
their obligations toward God makes God, if not the object of this 
knowledge, at least an entity toward which one has obligations.
 Leibowitz disregards most of this metaphysical language by 
resorting to a sharp distinction between two types of faith that 
recurs pervasively throughout his writings: lishmah (for-its-own- 
sake) and lo-lishmah (not for its own sake), a means for realizing 
human ends.41 The religious language that tends to make frequent 
use of metaphysics is idolatrous and not-for-its-own-sake. The 
struggle against idolatry is indeed a crucial element of Leibowitz’s 
thought, essentially implying the eradication of metaphysics from 
the religious realm. Continuing the passage above, Leibowitz 
notes: “The pagan . . . and he who serves God not-lishmah direct 
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their attention to an imaginary notion of their god and to the 
understanding of his attributes and actions. This is the mystical 
approach which is represented in Judaism by the Kabbalah.”42
 This move, which purports to dismiss theology while leaving 
room for a relationship with God, might seem unsatisfactory 
because, as noted, relating to God entails more than a hint of 
ontological commitment. No wonder, then, that Asa Kasher sug-
gested the hermeneutical technique of “denying the elements.”43 
According to this technique, any theological proposition ascri-
bing a certain attribute to God will be transmuted into a new 
proposition in which the subject is “all things in the world.” In 
the new proposition, the attribute ascribed to God is denied in 
regard to the world. Thus, for instance, the proposition “God 
is inevitable” is translated as “every single thing in the world 
is not inevitable.” In this translation of religious language, it is 
forbidden to ascribe absolute value to anything in the world 
since, according to Leibowitz and Kasher, doing so is tantamount 
to idolatry. Despite its elegance, however, this sophisticated 
move is not an interpretation of Leibowitz but goes a step beyond 
him, because faith for Leibowitz is still an intentional act directed 
toward an “object”—God. If religion is reduced to being a war 
against idolatry, prayer and other religious phenomena lose 
all meaning. Prayer and other religious phenomena can still be 
meaningful, however, on the basis of Leibowitz’s perception of 
them as intentional activities addressing God, although this is not 
a simple matter.
 These statements may appear somewhat vague as long as we 
have not considered the positive meaning of the Leibowitzian 
revolution—the perception of religion as a normative system. 
Wittgenstein closes the Tractatus with an evocative statement: 
“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”44 
Leibowitz concurs unquestionably; we must not speak about God 
or about metaphysics. But he transcends the young Wittgenstein 
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when he writes, specifi cally addressing this statement: “This is 
true only so far as philosophical contemplation is concerned . . . but 
does not apply to religion as embodied in the Torah and in the 
commandments. That which cannot be said is said by the religion 
of the Torah and the commandments.”45
 The religion of the Torah and the commandments speaks 
in the language of values rather than of facts, and Leibowitz 
claims that things one is forbidden to say in the epistemic realm 
do have a place within a system of values. This is the essence of 
Leibowitz’s radical positive innovation which, following the term 
coined by Kant regarding his own thought, can be viewed as the 
“Copernican revolution” in Jewish thought.
 In his terse prose, Leibowitz traces the contours of this 
revolution as taking a step beyond the young Wittgenstein. As 
shown below, however, the parallels between the Leibowitzian 
revolution on the one hand, and the late Wittgenstein and the 
philosophy infl uenced by him on the other, are quite striking. The 
current task is a clearer presentation of Leibowitz’s Copernican 
shift.
 The fi rst step in this shift is in the clarifi cation of what we can 
think and say. If we remain within the frame of our conventional 
cognitions, most metaphysical-theological propositions become 
groundless. More precisely, like Wittgenstein before him, Lei-
bowitz argues that these statements are meaningless rather than 
false. This is the critical-negative stage, preparing the second and 
more important shift in Jewish religion—from theory to praxis, 
from metaphysics to Halakhah or, essentially, from the realm of 
facts to the realm of values: “There is no other content to the faith 
in God and the love of God than the assumption of the yoke of the 
Kingdom of heaven, which is the yoke of Torah and Mitzvoth.”46
 These pointed phrases sum up the Leibowitzian revolution: 
Halakhah is the embodiment of faith, and its meaning is the 
understanding that the human obligation is to worship God.
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 In this approach, religious obligations cannot be derived from 
any factual datum found in a socio-historical or anthropological 
context, or from any “religious fact.” Jewish religion is “an 
institutional religion, but not in the sense that it comprises 
institutions . . . The description is intended to refl ect the peculiarity 
of Judaism, for which the institutions of halakhic practice are 
constitutive. Apart from them, Judaism does not exist.47
 If Judaism is constituted by halakhic law, and if this law is 
neither conditioned by nor derived from any outside datum, the 
meaning of the halakhic system is “intrinsic.” In Wittgenstein’s 
terms, religion is an autonomous “language game,” with its own 
rules, open to its participants. Even if the meaning dimension is 
intrinsic, however, it is open to cognitive understanding from the 
outside, since the meaning of the system is the worship of God.
 The link between Leibowitz’s approach to Jewish religion 
and John Searle’s notion of “constitutive rules” is worth noting.48 
Nothing precedes this legal system; rather, the law constitutes 
itself and defi nes a new realm of activity. For Searle, the notion 
of “rules of the game” is an instance of such a system. Thus, chess 
or basketball would not exist were it not for a system of laws that 
defi nes them and determines their purpose.
 The antithesis of a constitutive system of laws is a system 
of regulative rules, of which traffi c laws are a classic example. 
Traffi c is not constituted by the rules of traffi c, and the purpose 
of traffi c laws is determined by the fact that there is traffi c. Since 
the purpose of these laws is given, they can indeed be criticized 
and compared to other legal systems meeting similar needs, 
and even replaced by other laws that might serve this purpose 
better.
 Leibowitz thus claims that Halakhah is a constitutive system. 
Halakhah, therefore, creates an autonomous world of meaning 
or, in Wittgenstein’s terms, a “form of life” or an independent 
“language game,” without refl ecting meanings outside it.
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 If institutionalized Jewish religion is a constitutive system, it 
is not judged by its match to some extrinsic datum but is actually 
coextensive with its intrinsic activity. Jewish religion then, is 
primarily a form of life rather than a metaphysical doctrine. This 
claim is strikingly similar to that found in Wittgenstein’s later 
writings, where he strongly emphasized that religion does not 
compete with our standard consciousness concerning truth claims 
but, instead, offers faith, meaning it is a form of life rather than 
a “doctrine.” In one of his most poignant and deepest religious 
insights, Wittgenstein writes:
I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound 
doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or 
the direction of your life).
 It says that wisdom is all cold; and that you can no more 
use it for setting your life to rights than you can forge iron 
when it is cold.
 The point is that sound doctrine need not take hold of 
you . . . But here you need something to move you and turn you 
in a new direction . . . Once you have been turned round, you 
must stay turned round.
 Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what 
Kierkegaard calls a passion.49
Both Wittgenstein and Leibowitz claim that the contrast between 
theory and faith as a form of life is manifest in the believers’ 
readiness to shape their lives according to faith. Wittgenstein 
speaks of religious faith as “unshakeable belief,” the peculiar faith 
shown not “by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for 
belief, but rather by regulating for all in his life.”50 He then points 
to the essential feature of religious life: the readiness of believers to 
assume risks they would not have taken without faith. Leibowitz 
too describes faith as the individual’s decision to assume the yoke 
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of Torah and the commandments, a decision that neither follows 
from any external context nor can it be inferred from it:
I, however, do not regard religious faith as a conclusion. It 
is rather an evaluative decision that one makes, and, like all 
evaluations, it does not result from any information one has 
acquired, but is a commitment to which one binds himself. In other 
words, faith is not a form of cognition; it is a conative element 
of consciousness.51
 Through this decision, according to Leibowitz, believers 
take no risks regarding their cognitive world, but renounce their 
non-religious values because of their love and fear of God. The 
paradigm of religious life is the sacrifi ce of Isaac, “in which all 
human values capable of being subsumed under the categories of 
human understanding and feeling were set aside before the ‘glory 
of the majesty’ of God.”52
 The comparison with Wittgenstein on this point is revealing 
because, in his later writings, Wittgenstein clarifi es that believers 
do take risks and forsake their standard epistemic world. He sees 
the believer and the atheist at odds over a world picture:
But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At 
certain periods men fi nd reasonable what at other periods they 
found unreasonable. And vice-versa. But is there no objective 
character here? Very intelligent and well-educated people 
believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it 
as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to 
the former.53
 The different language games of the believer and the atheist, 
then, relate to the factual world. The believer offers an unshakable 
world view, antithetical to that of the atheist. The evidence 
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supporting this world view is not, as noted, better than that of the 
atheist, but mirrors precisely the world picture of religion itself. 
Leibowitz, however, does not endorse this view and remains 
loyal on this point to the younger Wittgenstein—whatever is 
groundless, or false, does not change its status within a religious 
world view. Religion does not compete for recognition by 
offering a different factual picture but is rather a system of values, 
which only assumes meaning within a context of values. Hence, 
believers make concessions and assume risks within a world of 
values rather than within a world of facts.
 The question, however, remains open: can religion, defi ned 
as a commitment to a legal system, successfully avoid all 
metaphysical claims while ultimately addressing God as its 
supreme object? Leibowitz seems to follow Wittgenstein here, 
who writes on this point: “The way you use the word ‘God’ does 
not show whom you mean—but rather what you mean.”54 The 
key question concerning God, then, is not his objective character, 
his existence or identity, but the way in which human beings, 
in their language and in their lives, use the concept of God. The 
examination of the uses and the function of the concept of God in 
a particular life context must precede any a priori analysis of it.
 This Wittgenstenian principle wholly coincides with Leibo-
witz’s position. Leibowitz claims that the meaning of the concept 
“God” must be inferred from the concrete form of life espoused 
by Judaism as a religion constituted by Halakhah rather than from 
an isolated conceptual-theological analysis. In Leibowitz’s analysis, 
God functions within religious faith as the supreme concept, 
unifying the system and endowing it with religious signifi cance. 
Neither the divine source of religion nor the believer’s immediate 
experience of the transcendent God, which is impossible for 
Leibowitz to construe, endow the system with religious value; 
rather, the system is made religiously meaningful by the believers’ 
perception of it as concerned with the worship of God.
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 All metaphysical statements must therefore be translated 
into normative language. Of all the propositions that need to 
be clarifi ed within the new value system, the one pertaining to 
the Sinai revelation seems to require it most urgently. As noted, 
Leibowitz does not view the Sinai revelation as pointing to a fact 
or as the metaphysical basis of the religious obligation, but as 
one of the institutions of religion. Religiously, the “raw” fact 
of revelation is meaningless; in religious language, revelation 
expresses the attitude of believers to norms they view as God’s 
command and to which they are committed.
 Generally, the statements in which God is the subject are 
translated into statements where the individual is the subject and 
God is the object. Thus, the proposition “God gave the Torah” 
means that the individual assumes the yoke of the Torah so as 
to worship God, and “God’s command” means the obligation 
compelling the individual to worship God. Leibowitz illustrates 
this technique well regarding the concept “God’s will”:
As a category applicable to man, willing does not refer to 
what already exists, but is rather an aspiration, an inclination, 
an intention towards something that should or ought to be. 
Conversely, “He has done whatsoever has pleased”; we are in 
no position to distinguish His will from given reality. It thus 
follows that in its profound sense, the expression “to do God’s 
will” asserts nothing about God, but is rather an expression of 
the believer’s recognition of his duty to serve God.55
Since religious language is metaphysically overloaded, the act 
of translation will not be seamless. Nor can Leibowitz’s various 
distinctions between different types of religiosity—for-its-
own-sake v. not-for-its-own-sake, demanding v. endowing, and 
so forth—ensure the removal of all metaphysical traces, as the 
above passage, where Leibowitz assumes that will and reality 
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are identical for God, goes to prove: Is this not a metaphysical 
statement?
 Dismissing these traces entirely is indeed impossible, because 
religion is an intentional activity that ultimately addresses God. 
The task of translating a metaphysical language into a value 
language requires from the faithful a religious-critical level-
headed ness, which Leibowitz may view as the believer’s endless 
test. Although believers will always fail at it, they will persist in 
this Sisyphean endeavor: “The project it [Jewish religion] sets for 
man is permanent and endless. No religious attainment may be 
considered fi nal; the project is never completed.”56
 This is one feature distinguishing the levelheaded believer 
from what Leibowitz calls the idolater: whereas the latter rests in 
the serenity of his metaphysical world, the former contends with 
the remnants of metaphysics, powerless to eliminate them.
 These metaphysical remnants, however, neither express 
nor pretend to offer any metaphysical claims apart from the 
normative context, according to Leibowitz. Leibowitz proposes 
what we might call a “value metaphysics,” meaning one that is 
meaningful only within a value context. Within it, God is only the 
commander, and the meaning of this concept is itself determined 
by the value system. God is the commander in the sense that 
believers acknowledge their obligation toward him. This is 
a minimalist metaphysics whose meaning fundamentally lies 
in the interpretation of the religious obligation, which is its sole 
original datum: “The essence of Jewish faith is consistent with no 
embodiment other than the system of halakhic praxis.”57
 Leibowitz, however, is clearly inconsistent in this approach, 
and more than once resorts to classical metaphysics and to the 
claim that God is necessary. This fl ux between classic and value 
metaphysics is important because it points to the diffi culty 
of applying a “value metaphysics” to the lebenswelt of Jewish 
experience.
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 Structurally, Leibowitz’s thought is remarkably similar to 
Kant’s thought. Kant, who removed God from the Critique of Pure 
Reason, returned him in the Critique of Practical Reason, that is, in the 
normative realm. In the Critique of Pure Reason, cognition discovers 
it cannot say anything about God because it is conditioned by 
sensorial raw material in which God has no part. God does have 
a place, however, in the Critique of Practical Reason, which is 
determined by the “needs” of the practical system. Kant argues in 
the Critique of Practical Reason that God guarantees the fi t between 
the moral obligation and the concretization of the supreme 
good in reality. Kant views God’s existence as a “postulate” or 
a demand that must be imposed on the value system; the meaning 
of this system and the obligation it conveys are not conditioned 
by God, but God is “demanded” by the concept of the good as 
such. Similarly, Leibowitz removed God from the metaphysical 
discourse but returned him as the purpose of the value system 
and as its metaphysical postulate. Individuals view their endeavor 
as a religious obligation imposed by God; human autonomy 
compels heteronomy—God’s external command. Without this 
“postulate,” the entire system would become idolatrous.
 The question that remains open concerns the reasons for 
endorsing this system. According to Leibowitz, we cannot explain 
the adoption of any value system, not only one specifi cally 
Jewish, as derived from any external context. Believers become 
what they are only because of a deliberate decision that is 
impossible to justify. Leibowitz engages what could be called 
the “subjectivist digression.” Religion is borne by the individual, 
who decides on its very existence, and its meaning is embodied 
in the believer’s self-relation to his duties. Kierkegaard endorses 
this response when he writes that “religiousness is inwardness, 
that inwardness is the individual’s relation to himself before 
God.”58 Like Leibowitz, Kierkegaard locates religiousness in the 
subject’s inwardness, as a kind of self-relatedness ultimately 
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directed toward God. For Kierkegaard, the subject is involved in 
the process of self-knowledge as related to God. For Leibowitz 
too, the bearer of religion is the individual who decides to adopt 
it, and its meaning is embodied in the believers’ approach to their 
obligations. Unlike Kierkegaard, however, Leibowitz does not 
view religiosity and the norms in which it is embodied as part of 
a believer’s direct address to God. Such an address is, after all, 
impossible. Rather, the norms refl ect a commitment undertaken 
by the believer as an obligation “toward God.” The most salient 
difference between Kierkegaard’s model and Leibowitz’s models 
of the subjective digression refl ects the profound chasm between 
Protestantism and Judaism. Whereas Protestantism views faith 
as an emotional and refl ective relationship with God, Judaism 
is normative and thus conveys this emotional and refl ective 
dimension less successfully. The subjective relationship with God 
is thus shaped by Halakhah, and only by Halakhah.
 Through his comprehensive analysis, Leibowitz concludes 
the revolution he initiated in traditional Jewish thought. Rather 
than relying on truth claims, religiosity expresses the believer’s 
primary decision. Similarly, Judaism as a religion does not make 
any claims about the world but creates a normative system 
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SINCE the dawn of religious thought, theodicy has been a para-
mount problem. The signifi cance of this question is quite obvious: 
if we assume that God is good, and if a good God can do no 
evil, the existence of evil refutes the existence of God. Classic 
philosophical traditions have confronted this question through 
a series of explanations that deny evil its unique character, 
either by denying the reality of evil or by providing teleological 
or causal explanations for its existence. Causal explanations 
show that, even if evil exists, it is justifi ed. God, then, does 
not operate arbitrarily but as a good and rational entity. The 
assumption of God’s goodness also allows for a solution of the 
theodicy problem that rests on the infi nite gap between human 
beings and God, which prevents them from understanding God’s 
actions. Recognition of this epistemic gap enables human beings 
to go on believing in God’s goodness, even if it cannot provide 
an acceptable explanation for the existence of evil.1
 Beyond the differences between the various explanations, all 
assume that not only is the theodicy question legitimate but also 
that failing to solve it constitutes a refutation of God’s existence 
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and results in religious life losing its meaning. Contrary to this 
stance, a widespread approach in contemporary Jewish thought 
casts doubt on both the gravity of this question and on the classic 
approaches to its solution. From a crucial theological question, 
theodicy turns into a kind of litmus test of the believer’s stance in 
the world. The shift from a theological concern to the individual’s 
religious disposition refl ects a wider trend in contemporary 
Jewish philosophy, focusing on religious life rather than on classic 
theological issues.
 Two trends can be discerned in this philosophy—one is 
sharply critical of classic theodicy’s basic assumptions, while 
the other formulates a social-existential critique of it. The fi rst is 
represented by Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Eliezer Goldman and 
the other by Joseph B. Soloveitchik and David Hartman.
The Critique of Classic Theodicy
Goldman and Leibowitz negate the legitimacy of the theodicy 
question outright resting on two mutually complementary 
elements: the fi rst is God’s absolute transcendence, and the 
second is the neutrality of historical events. The assumption of 
God’s transcendence in the work of both these thinkers is not only 
epistemological, confi ned to the claim that God is not amenable 
to human knowledge, but also ontological, claiming an infi nite, 
unbridgeable gap between God and human beings. The latter, 
complementary claim, states that human history is religiously 
neutral. After discussing Leibowitz’s formulation of these claims 
in previous chapters, this chapter will focus mainly on Goldman’s 
articulation of these two assumptions.
 Goldman engages in a critical dialogue with Leibowitz and 
draws a distinction between illusory and non-illusory faith, both 
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of which contend with the fundamental problem of an imperfect 
human reality:
The consciousness of the religious person is generally sensitive 
to fl aws in human reality. Even when the contemplation of 
human reality does not necessarily highlight these fl aws, its 
contrast with the description of divine perfection must evoke 
refl ections about its failings. These fl aws—death, sin, dark 
inclinations, the fl imsy foundations of human knowledge, the 
inevitable confusion between good and evil . . . appear to cast 
doubt on the possibility of any association between humanity 
and its Creator.2
Given these problems, argues Goldman, two opposite “typo-
logical” reactions are possible. One, the “redemptive religiosity 
that Leibowitz calls illusory religion,” assumes that religion pro-
mises to amend the world, bringing release from reality’s fl aws 
and true closeness to God. Goldman then adds: “In its most 
developed forms, this religiosity aspires to liberation from the 
bonds of reality up to its elimination. Religion thus redeems 
human beings from the fundamental fl aws of their reality.”3
 According to Goldman, illusory religiosity has two main mani-
festations—an eschatological view of reality and “the ontological 
perception of reason” (362). The eschatological view assumes 
several modes, “from magic to contemplation” (361), which must 
be addressed because Jewish literature includes several variations 
of what appears to be an eschatological perception such as, for 
instance, the widespread use of the term “redemption” in biblical 
literature. To reject this approach, Goldman argues that the biblical 
concept of redemption “does not relate to man’s fundamental 
conditions of existence, but to specifi c historical conditions. 
This is redemption from political subjugation and at times from 
wicked government” (361–362). Goldman is aware that recourse 
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to miracles involving supernatural elements is a widespread 
characteristic of Jewish literature. His response to them is: “Even 
the descriptions of miracles including an expectation of change in 
the natural order do not redeem man in the sense we are using 
this term here. Hence, eschatological visions do not prove that 
Judaism is a redemptive religion” (362). In other words, even if 
the natural order changes, the real character of human existence 
will not; according to Jewish sources, no “transformation of 
human reality, releasing it from its fl aws,” is to be expected (361).
 Goldman’s analysis, however, seems questionable. To claim 
that Jewish sources do not include transformational perceptions 
of human nature is an exaggeration. Goldman’s critique of 
eschatological outlooks appears to rely on halakhic tradition on 
the one hand, and on an epistemological critique of the assump-
tions underlying the eschatological outlook on the other. The 
latter are my concern in this chapter.
 Both Goldman’s and Leibowitz’s main claim is that God’s 
ontological transcendence precludes claims about changes in 
human reality. This, according to Goldman, is the “non-illusory 
religion”: “In non-illusory religion, the essence of the religious 
stance is the contrast between the Creator and the created reality, 
and the unbridgeable gap between the human and the divine. 
Human reality must be accepted as is, without any illusion of 
escape” (361).
 According to the view both these thinkers share, real history 
is a neutral arena from a religious perspective. In Leibowitz’s 
formulation:
The whole of natural reality is religiously irrelevant—“the 
world pursues its course” . . . God is not revealed in natural 
reality, and the claim of “God’s hand” in a natural event bears 
traces of pantheism or polytheism . . . No meaning should be 
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sought in history that, like nature, is meaningless . . . and no 
religious aura should be attached to the course of history.4
This neutrality is the antithesis of eschatological, illusory religion.
 Another, different mechanism is also part of this type of 
religiosity: “the ontological perception of reason.” Contrary to the 
previous approach, this one does not cope with the incongruity 
between reality’s fl aws and God’s perfection by offering escha-
tological hope. Instead, it attempts to decode the rational cha-
racter of human reality. Whereas eschatology rejects human 
reality, the ontological perception of reason reaffi rms it through 
a rational explanation that mediates between reality and God. 
This perception dismisses the gap between the divine and the 
human and assumes that human beings, through their cognition, 
can understand the rationality of this ostensibly irrational reality. 
Through theodicy, for instance, human beings can understand 
that what appears to be evil is actually good or, at least, is a means 
for attaining the good.
 Goldman’s rejection of this trend fi ts his assumption about 
God’s transcendence. But Goldman, as a critical thinker, is reluc-
tant to rely on this perception to reject another view because such 
a move would lead him to a petitio principii fallacy. His rejection 
is based on his critique of human cognition: “The question of 
human wisdom is not religious but philosophical. Only in light of 
our philosophical perception of wisdom can we adopt a religious 
attitude toward it.”5
 This link between religion and human cognition again points 
to Goldman’s unique position. Though he shares Leibowitz’s 
rejection of a special religious epistemology, he is not a partner 
to Leibowitz’s thesis on compartmentalization.6 Goldman rejects 
the thesis that religion creates a separate, autonomous world. 
Instead, he holds that, after a critical analysis of human cognition, 
CHAPTER FIVE
148
one can again determine a religious stance toward it. Goldman’s 
argument is that an epistemological critique of the ontological 
view of reason could be the catalyst for rejecting the religious 
world. Furthermore:
Many who follow such an epistemology are driven by an anti-
religious motivation. For them, it is part of the ideology that 
ascribes importance only to human values and scientifi c cog-
nition and refuses to acknowledge relevance or “meaning” in 
anything beyond this frame of reference, which human beings 
could sense they have transcended. (363)
This approach, however, is not the necessary conclusion of 
rejecting the ontological view of reason. Another option is that 
the rejection of ontological rationalism constitutes an amendment 
of religion and a removal of illusory elements from Judaism 
(363). The critique of reason, which is religiously neutral, is thus 
an effi cient means for amending religion even if this had not been 
its goal. What, then, is the critique of ontological rationalism?
As is well known, the perception of reason as an ontological 
element of which human reason is part has long been ques-
tioned. Many epistemologies reject it, among them not only 
those known as positivistic or pragmatic but even some of those 
known as idealistic. According to this view, what is known as 
the rational structure of the world is merely the structure of its 
thinking tools, of language and of consciousness, as well as our 
experimental tools. We discover order in the world because of 
the selective way in which we arrange it in our understanding. 
(362–363)
These general statements, formulated in Goldman’s programmatic 
article “On Non-Illusory Faith” published in 1960, appear in far 
greater detail in an obscure critique he had published fi ve years 
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previously entitled “Divine Good and Human Good.”7 This is 
a particularly interesting piece because it focuses precisely on the 
problem of theodicy and, in fascinating ways, applies the general 
insights presented above to a set of claims leading to a negation 
of classical theodicy.
 Goldman’s fi rst critique relates to what might be called “lack 
of moral symmetry.” This argument assumes: “If God planted in 
us specifi c moral feelings, the contents of these feelings apply to 
God as well . . . [According to this claim], a belief in Providence 
is ultimately identical to a belief that the world behaves as it 
should have behaved according to his [the believer in symmetry] 
view” (15).
 But this symmetry, based on the assumption that man is 
created in God’s image, is not logically substantiated and refl ects 
what Goldman calls a type of “primary experiences” (15). These 
experiences refl ect our basic perceptions about existence. The 
fundamental experience of the supporters of moral symmetry is 
manifest in the immanent perception of God: human beings and 
God belong to the same moral community and this is why we can 
judge God’s goodness and providence. Yet, argues Goldman:
By contrast, another religious consciousness is built upon a 
sense of the absolute asymmetry of creation in God’s image. 
God’s seal is imprinted upon us, but even the mere thought 
of attempting to imprint our seal upon God seems a type of 
idolatry. If our day-to-day life as his worshippers is determined 
by the rule “Dismiss your will before His [Avot 2: 4],” I fi nd it 
hard to understand a problematic resting on the assumption 
that God must direct his actions according to our will. (15)
By pointing at different primary experiences, Goldman shows 
that the theodicean discourse cannot be conducted as a rational 
discourse involving decision-making rules; these experiences are 
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not “a subject of theoretical discourse” (15). Endorsing or negating 
the theodicy discourse, then, is no more than a confession about, 
or an explication of, primary religious experiences. Goldman 
thereby dramatically minimizes the role and the meaning of theo-
dicy in religious life, no longer viewing it as its constitutive basis 
and turning it instead into a personal, random matter. Indeed, 
Goldman goes even a step further. He seeks to re-exa mine to what 
extent supporters of the theodicean discourse refl ect a logical 
discourse that is not self-contradictory:
At this point, there is room for showing to what extent we 
succeed in consistently clinging to our primary experiences 
and to what extent they lead us to contradictions. Furthermore, 
it sometimes appears to us that our primary experiences can 
be expressed in a statement that seems a logical conclusion of 
other statements we have accepted. Here too, there is room for 
considering whether these seemingly logical contexts do indeed 
exist. (15)
This move is even more radical than the previous one and, 
through it, Goldman points out not only the contingent and 
episodic nature of the theodicean discourse but also several of its 
fallacies.
The starting assumption of the theodicean discourse is 
God’s characterization as a good God. Since God is perceived as 
morally good, an evil reality is perceived as a contradiction to 
God’s existence. In this discourse, the good is apprehended as 
a “common attribute” of God and humanity, and this partnership 
enables the theodicean discourse. Goldman, however, argues that 
the good is not necessarily a common feature:
When we speak of a red house, a red book, red wine, and so 
forth, the term “red” appears as a common attribute of various 
THE CRITIQUE OF THEODICY: FROM METAPHYSICS TO PRAXIS 
151
objects . . . By contrast, when we speak of a good book, a good 
cobbler, or a good teacher, the attribute leading us to claim 
that a particular one is good is different in each case. The term 
“good” is evaluative. In each of the contexts we use it, we assume 
a criterion that we generally use in that particular context and 
serves us to evaluate objects or actions positively or negatively. 
The use of the term “good” in two different contexts does not 
prove that we are using the same criterion in both cases. (15)
This analysis attests that the shared component of these modes 
of use in the term “good” is merely formal and therefore entirely 
empty: “good” is an expression of judgment and evaluation but 
not necessarily moral judgment and evaluation.8 What, then, 
is the meaning of the term good in regard to God? Is it a moral 
evaluation? Goldman answers: “In the context of metaphysical 
methods used by classic theologians, the term [good] was intended 
as some kind of unique metaphysical perfection in God. Classic 
theology always stresses the metaphorical character of the term 
‘good’ in reference to God” (15). Indeed, the use of the concept 
good in the sense pointed out by Goldman is prominent already 
in Platonic tradition: good is self-containment and independence 
from external elements. Plato formulates this as follows: “The 
good differs from everything else in a certain respect . . . A creature 
that possesses it permanently, completely, and absolutely, has 
never any need of anything else; its satisfaction is perfect.”9
 This analysis, however, does not entirely undermine the theo-
dicean discourse because religious traditions in general, and 
Jewish ones in particular, abound with moral value statements 
about God. Even if Greek tradition and classic theology used 
“good” concerning God as denoting perfection and wholeness, we 
could still claim that religious traditions use “good” concerning 
God in its common moral denotation. To reject this option, 
Goldman engages in a series of moves. First, if we do indeed 
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adhere to the language of Jewish tradition, assigning God only 
the quality of moral goodness would not fi t the tradition itself:
This is a matter of choosing the convenient verses. Other 
descriptions could be cited—“jealous and vengeful” “full of 
wrath” “puts no trust in his servants”—showing an entirely 
different attitude of the Creator to his creatures. A suitable 
choice of biblical verses could even support a description of 
a cruel despot that Christians and liberal critics sometimes wish 
to present as the prophets’ description of God.10
Second, according to Goldman, Jewish tradition rejected “simplis-
tic” theodicy as a response to the problem of “divine justice.” 
Gold man illustrates this view with several examples, such as, for 
instance: “Isaiah ascribes to the Creator the proclamation ‘I make 
peace and create evil,’ which was imperative to eradicate idolatry 
and instill faith in the unity and uniqueness of God” (16). Relating 
to his general stance, Goldman then proceeds to claim: “I think 
this conclusion is unavoidable if we wish to preserve faith in 
God’s uniqueness and, at the same time, arrive at a realistic 
evaluation of man’s fate as a natural creature” (16).
 Nevertheless, Goldman does understand that gross displays 
of evil could threaten religious faith and that the Holocaust, for 
instance, could lead to the negation of God’s existence. Goldman’s 
answer is that this inference from the Holocaust “is one-sided and 
subjective.” Someone with a different “temperament” may not 
conclude from the Holocaust that “God is dead,” but something 
entirely different:
He might be so enthused by the miracle of the establishment 
of the State of Israel that the tragedy of European Jewry might 
sink in his eyes to a third or fourth level, by contrast with the 
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great salvation. Such a person would be amazed of how one 
fails to see the hand of God and his great rescue, so to whose 
temperament should the Creator adapt his qualities? (16)
These considerations void the theodicean discourse from meaning 
and portray it as merely an individual’s confession about his 
world, his expectations, his insights, and his values. The fi t 
between a “religious criterion” and the “criterion of ‘a man of the 
world’” (16) is hard to substantiate.
 Goldman knows that religious tradition includes statements 
that seem to contradict his position, and he contends with them:
How, then, should we understand the end of Genesis 18 and 
Abraham’s claim, “Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?” 
It seems nothing could be added to Maimonides’ explanation 
of the Thirteen Principles. The attempt to understand God’s 
attributes from his actions could even lead to contradictory 
results and meanings. He appears merciful and gracious and 
also vengeful and full of wrath. When the Torah describes his 
qualities, it does so in order to teach us what are the qualities 
we must see as divine in order to adhere to them. For us, this 
is also the meaning of the dialogue between Abraham and his 
God about Sodom. (16)
 This interpretation of the biblical text is highly questionable. 
Goldman is indeed careful in his formulations, since he writes: 
“For us, this is also the meaning of the dialogue . . . ” In other 
words, textual hermeneutics does not disclose the meaning of the 
text but its signifi cance for us.
 Through this view, Goldman hints at a more fundamental 
stance concerning the meaning of the canonical text, which he 
developed in several of his writings. In his programmatic article, 
“Scientifi c Statements and Religious Statements: Several Funda-
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mental Differences,” Goldman draws a distinction be tween reli-
gious and scientifi c statements. He points out, for instance, that 
affi rming a scientifi c statement means affi rming both the lin-
guistic phrase and its contents. Affi rming a religious statement, 
however, means affi rming the statement but not necessarily the 
contents it expresses,11 which may no longer be considered valid 
in light of cultural, historical, and personal changes. A claim that 
believers might affi rm in certain cultural circumstances, could be-
come unacceptable and even false in others. Advocates of the reli-
gious statement will then have to propose another interpretation.
 Goldman reiterates this view of text in a general hermeneutical 
context, not necessarily a religious one:
We are attentive to a text when seeking in it its message to 
us rather than viewing it merely as an object of philological-
historical research. The text expresses a religious idea through 
concepts and metaphors germane to the culture and the envi-
ronment where it was written. This message was transmitted 
in the context of the day-to-day life of its original recipients. 
An attentive interpretation is an attempt to decode the message 
in the concepts of our own lebenswelt.12
This view of the text points to Goldman’s closeness to Rudolf 
Bultmann. Like Bultmann, Goldman recognizes the importance of 
demythologizing the text. Contrary to Bultmann, however, who 
proposes a hermeneutics where myth functions as a window that 
serves to expose the divine message or kerygma, Goldman views 
the hermeneutical process as the application of the text to the 
actual world. Goldman thereby suggests, as noted, an approach 
that balances the concrete and the religious contexts of human life. 
This distance between Goldman and Bultmann is also the distance 
between Goldman and Leibowitz, since Leibowitz interprets 
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Scripture statically, resting on his assumptions of correct and 
incorrect from the perspective of Judaism.13
 Goldman’s approach to theodicy, then, refl ects a combination 
of analytical criticism and religious considerations, an attempt to 
offer an alternative reading of the biblical text, which suggests 
a classical theodicy, without contradicting critical assumptions. 
The very option of an alternative reading suffi ces to dismiss the 
use of the biblical text to support or reject the theodicy discourse.
 Both Goldman and Leibowitz offer an alternative reading 
of classical sources and challenge traditional views, and both 
must therefore contend with the question of whether Jewish 
tradition fosters this alternative reading. Both claim it indeed 
does and, moreover, both claim that the rejection of theodicy 
represents a higher religious stage than its acceptance. Following 
is Goldman’s formulation:
One of the most important aims of religious education must be 
to raise popular religious consciousness to the level endorsed 
by deeper thinkers. This is not impossible. To us, the idea of 
repentance seems obvious, part of every religious Jew’s funda-
mental assumptions. But what efforts did the prophets invest 
until the people came to this understanding! When Isaiah 
says that God will have mercy upon the wicked who forsakes 
His way, he is forced to add: “For my thoughts are not your 
thoughts.” Ezekiel engages in the same debate: “Yet you say, 
The way of the Lord is unfair . . . Is my way unfair? Surely your 
ways are unfair!” Even among the prophets, some did not accept 
the notion of “repents of evil.”14
According to Goldman, raising religious consciousness is tanta-
mount to repentance: it is the amendment of religious life itself. 
Goldman, therefore, seeks in canonical religious sources the de-
mand to change the original disposition, and renouncing the 
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theodicean discourse is a change of this kind. Leibowitz’s formu-
lations on this count are even sharper. In his view, the theodicy 
problem is the believer’s constant test. Passing this test means 
negating theodicy, since affi rming theodicy means putting God to 
the human test. Leibowitz views Job as the paradigm of the be-
liever who gradually changes his religious disposition because he 
understands God’s absolute otherness and the gap that separates 
him from God. Leibowitz returns to this comparison between the 
sacrifi ce of Isaac and the Book of Job in several of his writings.15 
Despite this comparison, however, he points to one important 
difference between Abraham and Job that is relevant to our 
present discussion. Contrary to Abraham, Job undergoes a trans-
for mation process that turns him into a believer: “And if Job was 
a parable, what is the moral? The moral is the return to the sacrifi ce 
of Isaac and to faith for its own sake. Except that, in Job, faith for 
its own sake is a conclusion reached after a huge struggle, while 
Abraham reached a decision to believe in God because of his sheer 
divinity without any discussion, debate, or hesitation.”16
 What is the nature of Job’s struggle? Leibowitz leads us 
through its various the stages and points to its signifi cance. Job 
contends with the suffering and the pain that affl icts him:
The argument rises to a level which becomes both loftier and 
more profound . . . It begins with Job’s cry of protest against 
the iniquity in the governance of the world by its Creator, 
and his urgent demand for justice. Gradually, a new note is 
insinuated, which becomes more and more explicit as the 
argument pro ceeds. Job’s suffering is no longer the focus of his 
protest; rather it is his inability to comprehend the meaning of 
his suffering . . . Job demands that God reveal to him why the 
world is as it is. The inscrutability of the creation, and of human 
fate in general and Job’s in particular, has become a source of 
anguish deeper than the torment of the sense of iniquity.17
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 Job’s friends suggest theodicy as a solution to his problem: 
“The three friends . . . deal with theodicy, that is, with the attempt 
to justify God, saying to him, you are forbidden to cast doubt on 
the fairness of divine judgment. Maybe you were not as righteous 
as you thought . . . and maybe you do not understand divine justice, 
the wisdom embodied in the way God conducts the world.”18
Job rejects their view, not because he understands that 
theodicy is not a legitimate position but because it fails to answer 
his urgent questions.19 At this stage, Job and his friends agree that 
theodicy is a legitimate assumption. Only God’s answer out of 
the whirlwind results in Job’s awaited religious transformation. 
He had so far held that faith means assuming that God works for 
human beings and that, therefore, their circumstances must be 
related to God’s direct action. Now, Job understands that God does 
not work for human beings, and “that he must decide whether to 
commit himself to faith in God and to His service in the world as 
it is, to believe in Him and to serve Him not for his (Job’s) benefi t, 
but because of His divinity.”20 Job now realizes what Abraham 
had realized at the outset: theodicy is not a legitimate assumption, 
because it erodes the foundations of faith.
 When Leibowitz discuses the interpretation that denies theo-
dicy in Job’s story, he generally appears to be insensitive to the 
hermeneutical problematic. The denial of theodicy is, as it were, 
the only meaning of Job’s story. In one place, however, he does 
show awareness of this question and formulates it in terms of 
hermeneutical circularity. Leibowitz juxtaposes Karl Barth’s 
interpretation, which resembles his own, to that of Iris Murdoch, 
which states we must do the good for its own sake and not 
for any ulterior end, an interpretation Leibowitz describes as 
atheistic. Facing these contradictory views, Leibowitz writes: 
“This fact confi rms the rule that interpretation does not follow 
the text; instead, the meaning of the text follows its interpreter.”21 
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Leibowitz is again revealed as close to Bultmann, who also 
assumes that the approach to the biblical text is guided by religious 
presuppositions.22 Bultmann, though, assumes that textual inter-
pretation is existential and the believer’s individual and histo rical 
meaning is therefore signi fi cant. By contrast, Leibowitz perceives 
the believer in ahistorical and a-concrete terms. The believer is all 
believers, and Job’s answer is therefore the answer of all believers: 
theodicy is an illegitimate element in the world.
 Based on this assumption, Leibowitz returns repeatedly 
to the Sodom story. Goldman approaches this text aware of his 
hermeneutical tools, that is, of the interpreter’s disposition as 
conferring meaning upon Abraham’s story in Sodom. By contrast, 
Leibowitz tries to read events differently: “As the advocate of 
Sodom’s defendants, Abraham adduces claims of justice, fairness, 
and compassion, which are human categories about which he 
‘kindly’ concedes to argue with God. But when his faith is put to 
the test—he remains silent.”23
 Beyond these differences, however, both thinkers agree that 
theodicy is a problem of the faithful, not of faith. Indeed, it is the 
faithful’s supreme test: will they believe in God as God, whose 
role is to regulate human life. “Genuine” believers know that evil 
and suffering are not a religious problem but part of the natural 
reality. Even if they fi nd it hard to reach this insight, this is indeed 
the concern of faith and this is the challenge it poses to human 
beings. Changing the believer’s dispositions is thus an expression 
of actual faith.
The Social-Existentialist Critique
Joseph B. Soloveitchik devoted two essays to the theodicy ques-
tion: “Kol Dodi Dofek,”24 and a later one, “A Halakhic Approach to 
Suffering.”25 In “Kol Dodi Dofek,” Soloveitchik argues that evil 
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and suffering can be discussed at two levels of existence: the 
“existence of fate” and the “existence of destiny.” Soloveitchik 
describes a fate existence through a terminology drawing on 
existentialist tradition as one in which individuals perceive them-
selves as objects: “His being is empty, lacking any inwardness, 
any independence, any selfhood.”26 In a destiny existence, people 
will perceive themselves as dynamic, infl uential creatures:
It is an active mode of existence, one wherein man confronts 
the environment into which he was thrown, possessed of 
an understanding of his uniqueness, of his special worth, of 
his freedom, and of his ability to struggle with his external 
circumstances without forfeiting either his independence or 
his selfhood . . . Man is born like an object, dies like an object, 
but possesses the ability to live like a subject, like a creator, 
an innovator, who can impress his own individual seal upon 
his life and can extricate himself from a mechanical type of 
existence and enter into a creative, active mode of being. (54)
 Soloveitchik argues that the question about the existence of 
evil cannot be detached from the individual’s mode of conscious 
existence: consciousness will shape a person’s attitude towards 
suffering and evil. People who perceive their existence in terms 
of fate will contend differently with this question than those who 
perceive their existence in terms of destiny. One who perceives 
existence in terms of fate contends with the problem of evil 
in two stages. The fi rst stage is marked by confusion: “Man 
the object, bound in the chains of an existence of compulsion, 
stands perplexed and confused before that great mystery—
suffering . . . his being, shattered and torn, contradicts itself and 
negates its own value and worth.” (52)
 After the deep psychological upheaval, the sufferer strives 
to fi nd a rational explanation to suffering and evil, to return 
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the shattered psychological harmony. The yearning for a ra-
tional explanation engenders what Soloveitchik terms the 
“metaphysics of evil” (53), which enables the person to reach 
an accommodation with evil through “the denial of the existence 
of evil in the world” (53).
 The link that Soloveitchik traces between the conscious 
disposition and the way of contending with suffering and evil 
is particularly illuminating. People who perceive themselves as 
objects thrown into existence cannot strive for change in existence 
itself, since the object is a fi nal given. Their only course, then, is 
metaphysics, which does not demand action and does not impose 
responsibility because it explains what already is. This analysis 
is thus a conscious critique of the history of our contest with the 
problem of evil. According to this critique, posing the question 
in a classic metaphysical context blurs the character of human 
existence. In existentialist terms, the traditional discussion of 
theodicy is not an authentic human stand.
 But Soloveitchik’s critique is not confi ned to the conscious 
disposition. In his view, the classic approach to evil is based 
on an ethical-social mistake: “the denial of the existence of 
evil.” Prima facie, this claim is exaggerated, since purposeful 
or causal explanations do not question the very existence 
of evil but place it within a broader conceptual framework. 
Only neo-Platonic metaphysical theories denied evil’s very 
existence. This critique requires a clarifi cation of Soloveitchik’s 
argument. In his view, every explanation of evil implies 
a denial of the negative, destructive dimension of evil, since 
the explanation that makes evil understandable incorporates 
it into the rational conceptual framework of the divine good. 
Soloveitchik therefore argues that the fundamental features of 
evil as negation and destruction are denied in the metaphysical 
explanation. Accepting evil means accepting it as a non-reductive 
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datum exposed in reality. This critique originates in a realistic 
orientation toward reality: “Judaism, with its realistic approach 
to man and his place in the world, understood that evil cannot 
be blurred or camoufl aged . . . Evil is an undeniable fact. There is 
evil, there is suffering, there are hellish torments in this world . . . 
It is impossible to over come the hideousness of evil through 
philosophico-speculative thought” (53).
 Contrary to this approach to the problem of evil, Soloveitchik 
presents the concept of destiny. As opposed to the “man of 
fate,” whose own self-perception is as a fi nished object, the 
“man of destiny” diverts the question away from metaphysics. 
A consciousness of destiny enables one to accept evil as is and to 
cope with it:
In the realm of destiny man recognizes the world as it is and 
does not wish to use harmonistic formulas in order to gloss 
over and conceal evil. The man of destiny is highly realistic 
and does not fl inch from confronting evil face to face. His 
approach is an ethico-halakhic one, devoid of the slightest 
speculative-metaphysical coloration . . . In this dimension the 
center of gravity shifts from the causal and teleological aspect 
of evil . . . to its practical aspect . . . We ask neither about the 
cause of evil nor about its purpose, but rather about how it 
might be mended and elevated. How shall a person act in 
a time of trouble? What ought a man to do so that he not perish 
in his affl ictions? (55–56)
 From this perspective, the question of theodicy ceases to be 
legitimate and the ethical question arises instead: what should 
a person do given that evil actually exists? Whereas the answer 
to the former question is metaphysical theory, the answer to 
the latter one is action. Failure to measure up to the challenge 
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posed by evil and the return to metaphysics imply the return 
to a non-authentic consciousness. Diverting the problem of evil 
from metaphysics to ethics refl ects a subjective shift typical 
of contemporary Jewish thought. Through this shift, not God 
but individuals and the concrete reality within which they live 
become the bearers of religious experience and consciousness.27
 This change in Soloveitchik’s thought originates in two 
sources: Hermann Cohen’s legacy and existentialist tradition. 
Cohen vehemently rejects recourse to metaphysics as a way of 
contending with suffering:
The metaphysics of suffering, which considers suffering as 
the fate of mankind, or even more ambiguously, as the fate 
of all living creatures, does not belong to an earnest religion: 
its earnestness has nothing to do with the play of poetry 
and art. Suffering only reaches ethical precision as social 
suffering . . . Only the religion of reason is moral religion, and 
only moral religion is truthful and true religion.28
 Cohen’s discussion of suffering highlights the social dimension 
of suffering as related to reciprocity in human relations. For 
Cohen, true religiosity contends with this social reality and not 
with the metaphysics of suffering. Soloveitchik, who dealt at 
length with Cohen’s philosophy and was infl uenced by it,29 took 
from him the shift from metaphysics to practice and translated 
it into existentialist terminology. The categories of “fate” and 
“destiny” are a translation of the conventional existentialist 
analysis about authentic and unauthentic ways of life. Solovei-
tchik does not eschew Heideggerian terminology, which expresses 
the relationship between the two ways of life. Though thrown 
into existence, we are not denied our freedom.30 In Heidegger’s 
term, the person is a “thrown possibility.” When faced with 
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suffering, confi dence in our existence collapses. In existentialist 
terms, this is the experience of anxiety. Suffering shatters the 
harmony of human existence and forces us to face its anxiety, 
and the reaction should not be a denial of reality but a return to 
contend with it. Finally, contrary to Hermann Cohen, Soloveitchik 
does not formulate the problem of suffering as a social issue 
pivoted on interpersonal relations but as an oppressing personal 
question: “What ought a man to do so that he not perish in his 
affl ictions?”31
 For Leibowitz, the meaning of suffering is a stage in the 
education toward faith but not part of faith itself, which over-
rides the meaning of suffering. Soloveitchik turns the tide: the 
meaning of suffering becomes the heart of the drama in religious 
life. He agrees with Leibowitz’s rejection of metaphysics, but 
he does not agree with the rejection of the question; rather, this 
question will become the catalyst of the shift from metaphysics 
to praxis.
 On closer scrutiny, it appears that Soloveitchik does not 
exhaust this shift. He chooses the practical shift as a default 
option—given the human inability to understand suffering, all 
that is left is to contend with it:
Only if man could grasp the world as a whole would he be able 
to gain a perspective on the essential nature of evil. However, 
as long as man’s apprehension is limited and distorted, as long 
as he perceives only isolated fragments of the cosmic drama 
and the mighty epic of history, he remains unable to penetrate 
into the secret lair of suffering and evil . . . We, alas, view the 
world from its reverse side. We are, therefore, unable to grasp 
the all-encompassing framework of being. And it is only within 
that framework that it is possible to discern the divine plan, the 
essential nature of the divine actions.32
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From this perspective, the shift from metaphysics to praxis refl ects 
the limitations of human cognition rather than the acceptance of 
metaphysics’ fundamental irrelevance. David Hartman formulates 
this critique as follows:
Although Maimonides and Soloveitchik evidently gave up 
hope of making sense of God’s justice, their explanation of 
human history still operates with this model. While Soloveitchik 
does not suppose that we shall ever achieve a full rational 
comprehension of God’s actions in history, he does believe 
that, in principle, were we able to look at the world from God’s 
vantage point, we would understand how all of human suffering 
is compatible with the belief in God as a loving Creator and just 
Lord of History . . . believing in principle that events in history 
are the carriers of God’s will, Soloveitchik looks forward to the 
eschatological moment of unity between nature and history, 
when the God of Creation will be manifestly mediated in His 
full loving justice in historical reality. In the meantime, however, 
the manner in which His justice operates is partly or largely 
inscrutable.33
 This critique, which emphasizes the fact that the shift to 
practice does not entirely replace metaphysics, returns in 
Soloveitchik’s attempt to answer the question he had posed, 
“What ought a man to do so that he not perish in his affl ictions?” 
We would expect a practical answer to this question, pointing to 
the person’s obligation to act in the world, yet his answer is:
The halakhic answer to this question is very simple. Affl ictions 
come to elevate a person, to purify and sanctify his spirit, to 
cleanse and purge it of the dross of superfi ciality and vulgarity, 
to refi ne his soul and to broaden his horizons. In a word, the 
function of suffering is to mend that which is fl awed in 
THE CRITIQUE OF THEODICY: FROM METAPHYSICS TO PRAXIS 
165
an individual’s personality. The Halakhah teaches us that the 
sufferer commits a grave sin if he allows his troubles to go to 
waste and remain without meaning or purpose. Suffering 
occurs in the world in order to contribute something to man, 
in order that atonement be made for him . . . From out of its 
midst the sufferer must arise ennobled and refi ned, clean and 
pure.34
 Soloveitchik offers a teleological answer to this practical 
question. In this world, suffering has a purpose. Indeed, this 
purpose is not part of the purpose of universal or Jewish history 
but part of a series of conditions through which individuals 
amend and refi ne their being. The difference between this re-
sponse and the traditional teleological response ultimately rests 
in the identifi cation of a specifi c purpose for the existence of evil.
 “Kol Dodi Dofek” shows Soloveitchik oscillating between 
metaphysical and practical language. The metaphysical language 
features in the text cited above and in the essay’s general plan, 
intended to point out that Jewish history has a purpose. Contrary 
to traditional teleological approaches claiming that history 
realizes a given purpose, Soloveitchik offers a more complex 
version whereby God provides opportunities, to which human 
responses are expected. These opportunities are hints, as it were, 
of God’s desirable goals. Interpreting and applying these hints 
is incumbent on human beings. In this sense, this approach 
assumes that the teleological movement of history is contingent 
on humanity. History, then, is a synergistic event unfolding as 
a partnership between God and the divine ends on the one hand 
and the human ability to respond to God’s hints on the other. 
Suffering plays a signifi cant role in God’s hints, as an opportunity 
through which God suggests a new possibility. In the context 
of this approach, argues Soloveitchik, the Holocaust is a kind of 
occurrence that produced the State of Israel (69).
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 Contrary to this metaphysical language, the text includes 
many expressions refl ecting the adoption of a practical language. 
This is prominent in Soloveitchik’s analysis of God’s response 
to Job’s suffering. Soloveitchik holds that Job’s suffering is a test 
that will show whether he is still immersed in his egoism or will 
turn his gaze to the other and share in his suffering. Job, argues 
Soloveitchik, passed the test:
In a moment he discovered its plural form, he descried the 
attribute of hesed which sweeps the individual from the private 
to the public domain. He began to live the life of the community, 
to feel its griefs, to mourn over its calamities, and to rejoice in 
its happiness. The affl ictions of Job found their true rectifi cation 
when he extricated himself from his fenced-in confi nes, and the 
divine wrath abated: “And the Lord turned the captivity of Job, 
when he prayed for his friends” (Job 42: 10).35
This is a particularly prominent illustration of this trend because 
it inadvertently combines metaphysical and practical language. 
God’s initiative—a test that Job passes—has a purpose, but this 
purpose is translated into the practical-interpersonal fi eld.
 This opaqueness gradually disappears in Soloveitchik’s second 
essay, where he again contends with the question of suffering and 
evil. In “Kol Dodi Dofek,” as noted, Soloveitchik assumes that 
“Judaism, with its realistic approach to man and his place in the 
world, understood that evil cannot be blurred or camoufl aged” 
(53). Now, Soloveitchik seeks to draw a distinction between two 
different contexts for approaching suffering and evil: “topical 
Halakhah” and “thematic Halakhah.” Topical Halakhah focuses 
on concrete reality. It does not offer a conceptual framework for 
a cognitive interpretation of reality, but a system of positive and 
formalistic attitudes for approaching reality in order to shape it: 
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“The Halakhah does not venture outside of the human world, and 
the human world is a very small world. Whatever is relevant to 
man, to his interests, to his self-fulfi llment and his self-realization 
is relevant and pertinent to the Halakhah. Whatever is irrelevant 
to man is irrelevant to the topical Halakhah.”36 Topical Halakhah 
is not interested in understanding the human creature in meta-
physical terms, as an idea, but rather as an individual entity: “The 
Halakhah insists that nothing, not the idea nor the collective, 
should supplant the single transient and frail individual” (94).
 Contrary to topical Halakhah, the concern of thematic Hala-
khah is the general, conceptual value system. This conceptual 
framework, which Soloveitchik leaves somewhat vague, can be 
understood through its contrast with topical Halakhah. Whereas 
topical Halakhah focuses on concrete existence and relates to 
it through a normative system of duties, thematic Halakhah 
creates a cohesive conceptual system of immanent meaning. This 
system exceeds the concrete and encompasses totality, “thematic 
Halakhah extends into infi nity and eternity” (95). This difference 
between the two models comes to the fore in the attitude to 
suffering. According to Soloveitchik, thematic Halakhah enables 
and affi rms theodicy: “Within the thematic Halakhah, we fi nd 
a theodicy or, to be more precise, a metaphysic of suffering. 
Judaism, at the level of axiology or at the level of transcendental 
reference, did develop a metaphysic of evil, or, I would rather 
say, of suffering, of the passional experience” (95).
 Soloveitchik argues that theodicy developed by drawing 
a distinction between suffering and evil. Suffering is perceived as 
a subjective experience, a kind of feeling, whereas evil describes 
an objective reality (95). This distinction enables to separate 
human suffering from concrete reality. We tend to ascribe 
suffering and pain to the objective existence of evil. Thematic 
Halakhah does not deny suffering, but claims that its source is not 
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any objective evil: “This sharp distinction between evil and pathos 
opened up to the thematic Halakhah new vistas which explained 
suffering. It did so by denying the reality of evil in a twofold way, 
by introducing transcendentalism and universalism” (96).
 Soloveitchik claims that evil is removed in two moves: the 
fi rst, which he called the transcendental principle, is based on the 
expansion of ontological consciousness. If reality begins and ends 
with the concrete experience, the presence of evil undermines 
order and justice. But “evil vanishes as soon as the threshold 
of man’s ontological consciousness is raised from the order of 
the sensible, phenomenal, and transient to a higher order of the 
absolute and eternal” (94). Soloveitchik illustrates this approach 
through several sources. Thus, for instance, he quotes the Talmud: 
“Thus the Holy One brings suffering upon the righteous in the 
world in order that they may inherit the future world . . . (Kiddushin 
40b)” (97). By including the world to come within the concept of 
reality, evil is removed altogether (97).
 Another source that Soloveitchik quotes is the Guide of the 
Perplexed III: 51, where Maimonides contends with the most 
dreadful of all evils—death— by idealizing old age as a reality 
that, together with a decaying body, brings with it a strengthened 
consciousness: “His joy is that knowledge grows greater, and his 
love for the object of his knowledge more intense, and it is in this 
great delight that the soul separates from the body” (98). Thematic 
Halakhah, then, neutralizes the terror of death by glorifying 
the rational element as the basis for the process of the soul’s 
separation from the body. Since reality is not identical to sensorial 
bodily reality but to the rational reality that we approach as we 
approach death, its evil is removed.
 The second principle in disposing of evil is the universa-
listic principle: “Thematic Halakhah maintains the universal 
doctrine of suffering that evil as a universal entity does not exist, 
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that it is nothing but a chimera, just a fi gment of our fantasy. 
Suffering and misery are due to the accidental and contingent 
character of our existence, which is confi ned to a narrow segment 
of being” (98).
 Indeed, not only does suffering refl ect human contingency 
but “sufferings of the individual are ministerial to a higher good 
within a universal order . . . Evil is not an essential part of being if 
the latter is placed in the perspective of totality” (98).
 In “Kol Dodi Dofek,” Soloveitchik rejects these approaches 
by invoking halakhic realism. In “Approach to Suffering,” he 
withdraws from this position because thematic Halakhah, which 
is part of Judaism, contends with suffering and evil by endorsing 
a metaphysical approach, to which theodicy provides the main 
access. Soloveitchik rejects this view through an argument com-
bining existentialist and modernist outlooks, and claims that the-
matic Halakhah cannot console human suffering:
Can such a metaphysic bring solace and comfort to modern 
man who fi nds himself in crisis, facing the monstrosity of evil, 
and to whom existence and absurdity appear to be bound 
up inextricably together? Is there in the transcendental and 
universal message a potential of remedial energy? . . . I can state 
with all candor that I personally have not been successful in my 
attempts to spell out this metaphysic in terms meaningful to the 
distraught individual who fl oats aimlessly in all-encompassing 
blackness . . . I tried but failed, I think, miserably, like the friends 
of Job. (99–100)
 This text represents the radical turnabout in Soloveitchik’s 
position: the criterion for evaluating the metaphysical theory is 
not the measure of its rationality or sophistication, but its ability 
to respond to true human needs. Its acceptance is contingent on 
its therapeutic powers, its “remedial energy.”
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 Soloveitchik’s use of this criterion, however, is problematic. 
This criterion allows him to claim that thematic Halakhah could 
provide an answer, at least in principle. The preliminary condition 
for this is “indomitable faith and a passionate transcendental 
experience.” Thematic Halakhah, then, has lost its comforting 
power only within the confi nes of modern life, where people 
are detached and alienated. This approach not only minimizes 
but entirely cancels out the religious meaning of the alternative 
approach to suffering and evil. On the other hand, Soloveitchik 
identifi es thematic Halakhah (in this text as well as in “Kol Dodi 
Dofek”) with Job’s friends, who offer theodicy as the response to 
Job’s suffering. The problematic of thematic Halakhah, then, is 
not contingent on modern reality, and refl ects the gap between 
Halakhah and the angst of concrete existence. This trend fi ts in 
with the fact that contending with evil in the context of topical 
Halakhah does provide an answer to distress. Since topical 
Halakhah could not possibly be viewed as modern, the human 
distress to which this Halakhah is responding is not an expression 
of detachment and alienation from religious tradition but the 
basic human stance vis-à-vis existence. This ambivalence vis-à-
vis modernity is indeed a permanent component of Soloveitchik’s 
thought.
 Contrary to thematic Halakhah, the attitude of topical Ha-
la khah to evil and suffering is entirely different. The realism 
of “Kol Dodi Dofek,” which was a typical characteristic of 
Judaism, is now confi ned to topical Halakhah: “Realism and 
individualism, ineradicably ingrained in the very essence of the 
topical Halakhah, prevented it from casting off the burden of the 
awareness of evil” (100).
 Topical Halakhah sees concrete reality in all its manifestations 
as the ultimate datum, which cannot be explained through 
a metaphysical theory:
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The topical Halakhah lacked neither the candor nor the courage 
to admit publicly that evil does exist, and it pleaded ignorance 
as to its justifi cation and necessity. The topical Halakhah is 
an open-eyed, tough observer of things and events and, instead 
of indulging in a speculative metaphysic, acknowledged boldly 
both the reality of evil and its irrationality, its absurdity. (100)
 The assumption that evil is absurd eliminates the option of 
contending with it through the “metaphysic of suffering” (102). 
Instead, topical Halakhah develops an “ethic of suffering” (102). 
This ethic is not meant to confer ontological meaning on suffering 
but to develop a human approach toward it. An ethic, contrary 
to a metaphysic, requires that we deliver ourselves to suffering. 
We need not surrender to evil, but we must accept it exists and 
engage in a ceaseless struggle with it.
 In “Kol Dodi Dofek,” the main way of contending with evil is 
through refl ection—we turn inwards and see suffering and evil 
as a voyage of self-improvement, in which suffering redeems and 
refi nes. In the later essay, the contest with suffering unfolds by 
turning outwards to existence itself. Adopting topical Halakhah 
leads to a practical struggle with suffering and evil.
 With great sensitivity, Soloveitchik recognizes that this 
approach to suffering “differs little from the attitude usually 
adopted by modern man toward evil. Modern man . . . is sensitive 
to the disorder and disharmony with which the universe 
is paced, and he is far from indulging in a happy-go-lucky 
contentment . . . Otherwise, he would not work so hard in order to 
fi nd cures for some incurable diseases” (104).
 Topical Halakhah, then, is compatible with the modern stance 
vis-à-vis the world, which refuses to surrender to the conditions 
of reality and constantly strives to amend it and reshape it. In 
this sense, thematic Halakhah is an obstacle to the amendment of 
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reality. A theodicy that reconstructs harmony in theory makes the 
actual struggle against evil redundant.
 Soloveitchik’s outlook on this count resembles that of Camus, 
who also refuses to accept an other-worldly interpretation of the 
question of evil. Rieux, the doctor in The Plague, rejects Tarrou’s 
attempts to explain evil. For Camus, the assumption about 
a metaphysical-transcendent order hinders the struggle against 
evil and leads to passivity. Rieux, who speaks for Camus, states: 
“Mightn’t it be better for God if we refuse to believe in Him, and 
struggle with all our might against death, without raising our 
eyes towards the heaven where He sits in silence?”37
 According to Camus, the struggle against suffering should 
be a driving force for humanity. Rieux claims that metaphysics 
should be rejected in favor of compassion and openness to 
suffering: “For the moment I know this; there are sick people and 
they need curing. Later on, perhaps, they’ll think things over, and 
so shall I.”38 Both Camus and Soloveitchik agree that we contend 
with evil through ethic. They disagree regarding the relationship 
between ethic and the religious stance. Camus holds that an ethic 
placing the suffering human being at its center must dispose of 
God and religion, which hinder practical action. Soloveitchik, by 
contrast, holds that this ethic can be a religious gesture of faith. 
Indeed, human beings should not turn to transcendence, but 
normative action per se is an affi rmation that transcendence is 
present in this world.
 In sum, Soloveitchik offers a complex model for coping with 
suffering and evil. He recognizes evil as a concrete given and, 
therefore, tends to reject theodicy as a way of contending with 
it. Whereas in “Kol Dodi Dofek” he rejects theodicy entirely, 
in “Approach to Suffering” he recognizes the presence of 
a theodicy trend in Jewish tradition. And yet, precisely in his 
attempt to deny the theodicy trend, Soloveitchik fails to displace 
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the struggle against evil and suffering to the socio-political 
arena. The language of “Kol Dodi Dofek” points to personal 
fulfi llment rather than to praxis, contrary to “Approach to 
Suffering,” where Soloveitchik presents a practical blueprint 
for contending with suffering. Hence, whereas in “Kol Dodi 
Dofek” Hermann Cohen’s infl uence translates into existentialist 
language, in “Approach to Suffering” he returns to Cohen’s 
social approach.
 Soloveitchik’s approach to evil and suffering is that of 
a believer, so that the questions related to the religious meaning 
of this approach require further consideration. If the existence of 
evil should indeed be admitted, and if Jewish tradition, or at least 
its main stream, demands the adoption of a practical approach 
toward suffering and evil, what theology could substantiate this 
outlook? The fact that topical Halakhah is part of Jewish tradition 
raises the question: how to understand the fact that the giver of 
the Torah allows a reality of evil and suffering and establishes 
a Halakhah that acknowledges this reality? Soloveitchik’s 
philosophy provides no answer to the contradiction between 
a reality of evil and God’s goodness. Concern with this missing 
theological project is a unique feature of the philosophy of David 
Hartman, Soloveitchik’s student. A hallmark of his philosophical 
endeavor is the removal of the theodicy trend beside the 
substantiation of a theology that enables this removal.
 Hartman’s main innovation is a renewed analysis of the 
religious-psychological role that theodicy had played in religious 
life. Hartman thereby reframes the theodicean discourse. 
A philosopher or a theologian dealing with the problem of 
theodicy is troubled by the contradiction between God’s goodness 
and omnipotence versus the existence of evil in the world. In 




How do we respond to events that can call into question our 
whole identity as God’s relational partners? Can we allow 
ourselves to embrace a personal God, knowing that chaos 
can at any moment invade our reality and arbitrarily nullify 
all our efforts and expectations? Do we have the strength to 
open ourselves to a personal God in a world fi lled with un-
predictable suffering? When her child dies, the question a 
mother faces is less how to explain the logic of Torah’s omni-
potence than whether she has the strength and emotional 
energy to love again.
 From the anthropological perspective on the problem 
of evil, therefore, the prime concern is not so much to defend 
the notions of divine justice and power. It is rather, as in other 
personal relationships, to determine what measure of conti-
nuity, stability, and predictability can enable the relationship 
with God to survive all shocks.39
Hartman’s philosophy, therefore, replaces the question of theodicy, 
which is metaphysical, with the question of existentialism: how 
and whether believers can maintain their religious identity 
given the existence of evil and suffering. This shift follows from 
an understanding of the destructive role of evil and suffering in 
human life. Suffering erodes human confi dence in existence: “One 
of the dimensions of suffering that often makes it unbearable is its 
arbitrariness. Suffering may involve not only physical pain, but 
also the disorienting terror resulting from the sufferer’s belief that 
he is the victim of blind and irrational forces.”40
 In Crisis and Leadership, Hartman holds that a person can 
contend with suffering “if he is convinced of some underlying 
purpose that gives meaning and order to his world.”41 The 
metaphysical explanation of theodicy could meet this need by 
placing “a per son’s immediate experience within a broader 
framework, such as a grand plan or dramatic story spanning all 
of history.”42
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 In this text, Harman lays the foundation for what will become 
a dominant element of his philosophy—the test of theodicy is 
not theoretical but practical. Theodicy cannot provide an absolute 
speculative solution to the problem of evil in the world; its ability 
to provide an answer is contingent upon the particular disposition 
of those who need it. Theodicy, then, has a socio-political rather 
than a metaphysical role. Hartman illustrates this approach with 
an analysis of various solutions that Maimonides proposes for 
suffering and pain. In his view, Maimonides was aware of the 
socio-political role of theodicy. Therefore: “In addressing the 
sufferer, one must be sensitive to the specifi c needs of the person 
in question. Because Maimonides [in the “Epistle to Yemen”] is 
trying to comfort and encourage a suffering community, he uses 
multiple models and suggestions directed at the different types 
of people comprising his audience.”43 This functional perception 
of theodicy enables Hartman to make two moves. The fi rst is 
to explain the existence of a tradition endorsing theodicy in 
Judaism, and the second is to dismiss the metaphysical value of 
this approach and reexamine it. His conclusion is that theodicy 
is a cognitive answer to the problem of evil, whose sole test is the 
measure of its acceptance:
A constant gap between our perception of our relationship to 
a personal God and the reality of the world that we believe He 
created and rules is liable to give rise to repeated frustration. 
The question then is: How long can any attempt to cope with 
the frustration succeed in containing it? How long is it before 
we decide that the relationship no longer exists or that it is not 
worth having? To this question there is no single universal 
answer applicable equally to all human beings.44
Hartman can now argue that the various rabbinic responses 
to suffering, relating to it as “chastenings of love” or calls to 
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repentance,45 can hardly be considered decisive answers to this 
question. In principle, we can hardly predict what response will 
comfort a suffering soul, and this is a matter contingent on the 
difference between human dispositions:
Some fi nd the unpredictable dimensions of reality to be [so] 
overwhelming . . . For them, suffering is bearable if it results 
from the limitations of fi nite human beings, but it becomes 
terrifying and demonic if it is seen as part of the scheme of their 
all-powerful Creator. Others would fi nd life unbearably chaotic 
if they could not believe that suffering, tragedy, and death were 
part of God’s plan for the world feeling that there is meaning 
and order in the world and that God in His wisdom decided 
to terminate the life of their loved ones makes their tragedy 
bearable. (202)
 This approach continues the programmatic line that Solo-
veitchik had set originally, but is expressed more coherently in 
Hartman’s thought. From a pragmatic-empirical vantage point, 
the traditional theological discussion of the problem of evil is 
merely a “disruption,” since human beings do not opt for faith 
(or the alternative) as a function of theological or theodicean 
propositions (201–202). We can handle evil only by shifting the 
center of gravity to a life of actual faith (202). Hartman speaks of 
this displacement as a transition from “philosophical theology” to 
“religious anthropology” (187). The crucial question is not the one 
bearing on theology and theodicy but the religious-existentialist 
question. In this discussion, the key issue is the person’s ability 
to go on believing when faced with evil, not the justifi cation of 
God. In Hartman’s terms, the main question is not theodicy, but 
the modes of response to suffering (16).
 Existentialist faith assumes that, structurally, the relation-
ship with God resembles human interactions (187, 202). Human 
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relation ships are constantly tested and contingent on real events, 
as well as on the baggage borne by each individual. Individuals 
have expectations from God, and relate to God as loving and 
just. The rift of evil casts doubts on the possibility of sustaining 
this view. People do not ask themselves whether God is right, 
but “how can I sustain commitment to a way of life predicated 
on God’s covenantal love and justice?” (188). This question is 
doomed to remain open, since no universal, metaphysical single 
solution can provide answers to human distress.
 For Hartman, the practical-existential shift of the problem of 
evil and suffering is anchored in two mutually related con-
siderations: one is human responsibility and freedom, and the 
other is covenantal theology. The theodicean view of suffering 
could hinder human readiness to act—if suffering, evil and pain 
are justifi ed, why struggle against them?: “If we are to uphold 
the dignity implied by the notion of the covenant, with its full 
respect for ourselves as rational and moral beings, we must reject 
attempts to see all of nature and history as mediating God’s 
personal will” (276). This consideration is based both on the 
primary affi rmation of human rationality and of our value as 
human creatures, and on the appropriate theology. The primary 
affi rmation of human value is embodied in the refusal to adopt 
a disposition of constant guilt. This disposition is imperative for 
the endorsement of a theodicean view—if the God that is the 
cause of suffering and evil is right, human beings are guilty. 
Relentless guilt is a deep injury to a sense of worth, to the 
possibility of experiencing ourselves as free agents allowed to 
operate according to our own understanding (276). This theodicy, 
then, “in no way fi ts what we know about ourselves in reality” 
(276). In sum, a theodicy that justifi es God humiliates human 




 In Hartman’s thought, this incongruence between human 
worthiness and a theodicean viewpoint conveys a deep in-
compatibility between theodicy and covenantal theology. 
Hartman’s philosophical endeavor is an attempt to reframe 
covenantal theology, which allows to present evil and suffer-
ing in religious-existentialist terms rather than in a theodicean 
context.
 Covenantal theology is based on the assumption that God 
and human beings act as partners entering a covenant—on the 
one hand, God as a personality, and on the other, the Jewish 
collec tive. Hartman clarifi es in his analysis the meaning of this 
interpersonal partnership. The God of the covenant is not the 
“Aristotelian God” but a personality, meaning that causality 
categories are irrelevant: as a personality is multifaceted and 
unresponsive to this category, so is God (200).
 Similarly, the human partner also deserves dignity and re-
spect: “the covenant encourages human dignity and initiative” 
(187). The covenant, wherein God enters into a partnership with 
human beings as creatures who are at once limited and free, is 
an affi rmation of human existence in its fi nitude.46
 Covenantal theology is based on a limitation of God’s role 
in the natural and historical world on the one hand, and on the 
imposition of responsibility on human beings on the other. The 
displacement of the burden of responsibility is evident, above all, 
in God’s removal from nature and history:
We do not have to seek a personal manifestation of God in the 
events of nature or of history. Suffering and human tragedy are 
not signs of divine rejection or punishment. God’s providential 
concern is manifested in the guidance provided by the Torah. 
God is present as a personal reality through the hearing of 
mitzvot. (17)
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The meaning of this displacement implies a recognition of hi s-
tory’s and nature’s neutral character. Human beings are sovereign 
agents in history, and historical events are within the realm of 
human responsibility. The world has the regularity of nature, 
in which God never interferes. For Hartman, this approach is 
fully evident in Maimonides’ philosophy, which he analyzes at 
length (232–236). The neutralization of history and of nature is 
a full affi rmation of reality: the only reality is immanent reality. 
It is neither justifi ed by invoking a theodicy nor is it a stage in 
an eschatological outlook:
It does not aim to redeem the creature from creaturely fi ni-
tude, nor does it point to an existence not shot through by 
the problematics of human freedom and temporality . . . the 
God of Sinai does not promise that history will be secure 
against the misuse of human freedom. Failure, uncertainty, 
and unpredictability are permanent features of life under the 
covenant, since human freedom is constitutive of the covenantal 
relationship. (261)
This theological framework clarifi es the depth of the chasm 
between Soloveitchik and Hartman. In “Kol Dodi Dofek,” as 
noted, Soloveitchik yearns for a theodicy. This yearning does 
indeed disappear in his later essay, “Approach to Suffering,” but 
there too he acknowledges the possibility of a theodicean context 
as a plausible approach for contending with evil. Like Leibowitz 
and Goldman, Hartman too utterly rejects the theodicean option, 
and criticizes Soloveitchik because he longs for “the eschatological 
moment of unity between nature and history, when the God of 
Creation will be manifestly mediated in His full loving justice 
in historical reality” (267–268). This criticism does not apply to 
Soloveitchik’s later essay, which was not available to Hartman 
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when writing his critique. But Soloveitchik posits the option of 
thematic Halakhah, which is rejected in Hartman’s covenantal 
theology. In sum, in Hartman’s philosophy, human evil and pain 
are a constant challenge to human responsibility. As members 
of the covenantal community, human beings should not expect 
theodicean explanations or eschatological redemption. They 
should instead struggle against evil, as a way of realizing their 
freedom.
 The common denominator of all the thinkers discussed in this 
chapter is the rejection of theodicy as a metaphysical problem and 
its transformation into a practical question concerned with life 
itself. Goldman and Leibowitz hold that theodicy is the testing 
point for the disposition of the faithful and the way they organize 
their world. By contrast, Soloveitchik and Hartman hold that 
the theodicy problem is a replacement of the genuine problem: 
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THIS chapter returns to the theodicy problem, focusing on its 
application to the Holocaust. Various thinkers have pointed 
to the Holocaust as a theological turning point, requiring a re-
consideration of theological and religious fi elds of meaning on 
the grounds that the exceptional evil exposed in its course cannot 
be approached with conventional standards.
 The claim this chapter attempts to substantiate is that the 
terrifying events of the Holocaust do not constitute a suffi cient 
basis for a theological turnabout. More specifi cally, my thesis 
is that the Holocaust does not demand a transformation in the 
realm of natural theology. In the realm of concrete religious 
life, however, the Holocaust could involve implications for the 
organization of religious meaning. At the basis of this discussion is 
a clear distinction between the theological and the religious fi elds 
although, due to their mutual infl uences, attempts to differentiate 
between religious and theological language do not seem feasible 
to many scholars.
 My assumption here is that these two languages are inde-
pendent and not mutually reducible. This assumption can be sub-
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stantiated through a phenomenological analysis and an analytical 
critique of the status of theological statements in religious lan-
guage. Following Wittgenstein, many philosophers1 have pointed 
out that believers do not need theological statements in order to 
believe. Believers do not found their faith on general theological 
assumptions taken from natural theology. Their faith is primary, 
unconditioned by external justifi cation contexts, and the meaning 
of religious language is constituted from “inside,” through the 
complex of religious practices.
 This distinction warrants the conclusion that relationships in 
the theological fi eld do not necessarily involve implications for 
relationships in the religious fi eld and vice-versa. The discussion 
about the theological and religious problematic of the Holocaust 
thus casts new light on the distinction between the theological and 
the religious fi elds that, although highly signifi cant for religious 
life, it is at times ignored.
First Claim: The Holocaust Is Not 
a Theological Problem
Prima facie, this claim seems unfounded. God’s silence vis-à-vis 
the horrors of the Holocaust poses such a deep problem that many 
concluded “God died” then. In Richard Rubinstein’s formulation: 
“After Auschwitz many Jews did not need Nietzsche to tell them 
that the old God of Jewish patriarchal monotheism was dead 
beyond all hope of resurrection.”2
 Although these formulations refl ect the horror evoked by 
this evil, a distinction is needed between these feelings and the 
possibility of anchoring them in a coherent theological world 
view. A structured argument, termed the “argument from evil,” 
will help to clarify the theological problematic of the Holocaust:
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(1) There is a good God, omnipotent and omniscient.
(2) God’s goodness precludes the existence of evil and suffering.
 Therefore:
(3) Evil and suffering do not exist.
 But:
(4) The factual truth is that evil and suffering do exist.
 Therefore:
(5) God does not exist.3
 Premise (1) is that goodness is one of God’s essential attri-
butes. Without assuming God’s goodness, the entity called “God” 
would be Satan, a wicked creature operating according to its 
own arbitrary will. This perception of God’s goodness is not only 
an analytical claim but a tenet of Greek philosophy from its very 
outset as well as of Judeo-Christian tradition.4
 Premise (2) is based on the claim that evil and suffering are 
the antithesis of the good and thus warranting conclusion (3)—
since God is a good entity, his very existence precludes evil and 
suffering.
 Statement (4) is a factual pronouncement pointing out the 
existence of evil, which contradicts the assertion in statement (3) 
that evil does not exist. This is not a trivial contradiction, since 
statement (3) is a conclusion that follows from the fi rst two 
premises, so that contradicting statement (3) and recognizing 
the existence of evil is thus a negation of God’s existence. The 
conclusion that follows from this argument is that the existence of 
evil not only poses a theological problem but indeed casts doubts 
on God’s very existence.
 This formulation of the problem raises the question of 
whe ther the evil exposed in the Holocaust requires changing 
this argument, or the Holocaust should be viewed as another 
expression of evil that has no effect on it. The analysis of the 
argument shows the latter to be the correct answer, since refuting 
the general claim that evil and suffering do not exist only requires 
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proof about the existence of one case of evil. Theologically, then, 
the evil exposed in the Holocaust is not essentially different 
from other expressions of evil, such as the death of one innocent 
creature. Both events raise the same theological problem and, in 
principle, a solution valid for an isolated event is also valid for 
the Holocaust.
 The extensive literature on the problem of evil in the Holocaust 
shows that the basic modes of argumentation postulated in its 
regard are essentially no different from the classic arguments 
postulated concerning the problem of evil in general. An analysis 
of various models refl ecting the main solutions to the problem of 
evil in the Holocaust will help to illustrate this point. The models 
are: (1) The modifi cation of the God’s goodness concept. (2) The 
causal or teleological model. (3) The model of epistemological 
impairment. (4) The model of freedom as a justifi cation for re-
fraining from intervention. My claim is that these models as well 
as their shortcomings apply to all manifestations of evil.
(1) The Modification of 
the God’s Goodness Concept
The standard assumption implicit in the “argument from evil” is 
that the meaning of the concept “good” ascribed to God is 
identical to the meaning of the concept “good” in human 
language and practice. In human language and practice, wicked 
acts causing pain and evil are the antithesis of the concept of 
good. Similar concepts of good and evil ascribed to God enable 
the “argument from evil.” According to the theory known as 
“divine command morality,” however, morality depends on 
God, who determines good and evil: good is good because God 
wanted it and evil is evil because God stated so. There is no 
autonomous morality.5 Not only do supporters of this thesis have 
an obvious answer to the argument from evil, but they can also 
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argue that this argument rests on a false premise—the autonomy 
of mora lity. Indeed, in the very midst of the Holocaust, Kalonymus 
Shapira, the rabbi of Piaseczno, formulates this thesis clearly in 
his sermons:6
The nations of the world, even the best of them, think that the 
truth is a thing in itself, and that God commanded truth because 
the truth is intrinsically true.  . . . Not so the Jews, who say “You 
God are truth.” He, may He be blessed, is truth, and we have no 
truth beside Him, and all the truth found in the world is there 
only because God wished it and commanded it . . . and stealing 
is forbidden because the God of truth has so commanded.7
 Endorsing this thesis enables R. Shapira to offer a radical 
solution to the argument from evil, by denying the question’s 
very legitimacy: “Not only do we say that this, Heaven forbid, is 
a problem we do not understand and its justifi cation is beyond 
our grasp, but we also say there is no truth and justice at all, 
except for what God commands and does.”8
 This surprising solution to the “argument from evil,” how-
ever, seldom if ever appears in Jewish texts. In fact, R. Shapira 
himself offers other answers in other sermons, based on the third 
and fourth models. The thesis of divine command morality is 
analytically fl awed on several counts,9 and does not provide 
a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil in the Holocaust. But 
if it were an answer to the problem, it could also provide answers 
to the existence of the most “minor” evil—the death of one 
innocent child.
(2) The Causal or Teleological Model
This model assumes a need for amending statement (3) in the ar-
gument, asserting that God’s goodness precludes the possibility 
of evil and suffering. But this statement could be modifi ed to 
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state that God’s goodness precludes the possibility of morally 
unjustifi ed evil and suffering, so that when a suffi cient condition 
for the existence of suffering obtains, God’s existence is not 
refuted.10 The causal or teleological model proposes a suffi cient 
condition for the existence of suffering. Causal explanations 
link the occurrence of suffering at a particular point in time to 
an event or events that preceded it: the present is explained 
through the past. By contrast, teleological explanations justify 
present suffering as a condition for attaining valuable goals in 
the near or distant future.
 The problems of this model concern the relationship between 
evil and worthy purposes: are there causes or purposes that 
justify performance of, or consent to, morally evil deeds? The 
problem with teleological explanations lies in the diffi culty of 
accepting that evil is necessary because of its implication that God 
is not omnipotent, and certain ends can only be attained through 
evil deeds. Nor can causal explanations avoid this problematic: 
are there circumstances in the past that compel the performance 
of moral injustices? If evil is not necessary, then God acts in evil 
ways and is therefore not God. But if no necessary relationship 
exists between the circumstances or the purposes on the one hand 
and evil and suffering on the other, is this not a license to human 
beings to perform similar deeds? Since human beings and God 
belong to a community with identical moral rules, why should 
God be allowed to perform evil deeds forbidden to human 
beings?
 These and other questions are equally applicable to all the 
answers to evil based on causal or teleological models, but they 
are equally relevant to all forms of moral injustice—the killing 
of one innocent child or the murder of millions. In other words, 
the problematic nature of this solution applies to all mani-
festations of evil everywhere, and is not aggravated by the 
Holocaust.
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(3) The Model of Epistemological Impairment
According to this model, even if God and human beings are 
subject to a similar moral order, they are still essentially different. 
Human cognition is limited and unable to grasp all the relevant 
facts and all the pertinent moral considerations. Hence, human 
beings can go on believing in God’s goodness even if they do not 
exactly know how to reconcile it with moral iniquity.
 This model might indeed provide answers to individuals who 
wish to sustain their belief in God’s goodness, on two conditions. 
The fi rst is that the number of instances in which God’s commands 
or God’s deeds appear to be immoral is relatively limited—the 
higher their number, the lower the justifi cation for a continued 
belief in God’s goodness. Second, the model’s assumption is that 
what appears immoral is not really so, only the limitations of the 
human cognition view it as injustice and evil. In truth, however, 
what seems immoral is dismissed in favor of a more important 
moral consideration. If it eventually emerges that some acts are 
patently immoral, the justifi cation for continued belief in God’s 
goodness will be reduced.11
 Although this model is rather widespread in the religious 
literature written in the wake of the Holocaust, its validity in 
this context is in fact rather weak. What moral consideration 
could possibly justify the murder of so many? Even supporters 
of utilitarian theories, who accept as morally justifi ed infl icting 
a certain injury on some people for the sake of others,12 will fi nd 
it hard to endorse this solution regarding the Holocaust. The 
reason is that no relevant results or moral considerations could 
possibly be adduced to make the murder of millions permissible.
 Moreover, the problems that were noted regarding the causal 
or teleological model affect this model as well. Even if human 
beings neither do nor can understand God, they can at least 
understand that God is a benevolent and omnipotent entity, able 
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to attain worthy results in moral ways. A person’s cognition, even 
if limited, still has some value. The model of epistemological 
impairment, then, rests on an unnecessary assumption whereby 
what follows from human epistemological impairment is that 
we do not understand anything, whereas what follows from 
the epistemological impairment is that we cannot understand 
everything, but we do understand something.
 To avoid this entanglement, supporters of the epistemological 
impairment model can endorse the radical claim and argue that 
we do not understand anything. This claim, however, leads 
to a series of problems extensively discussed in the history of 
philosophy. First, if we do not understand anything, how do we 
know that God’s understanding is greater than ours? Second, 
if we do not understand anything, how can we claim that God 
is good given that this claim requires some sort of knowledge, 
both concerning the good and concerning God’s attributes? 
This argument, then, which draws a comparison between 
us and God—and epistemological limitations are a kind of 
comparison—must presume some knowledge of the elements 
compared.
 In the current discussion, the claim of epistemological im-
pairment is committed to the following assumptions: (1) God is 
a good entity that acts rationally; (2) God is an omnipotent entity; 
(3) God’s omnipotence does not contradict his goodness. The 
omnipotent God acts in the best possible way to attain his aims. 
Hence, God will not act to attain his aims in a morally despicable 
way. At most, we do not know God’s reasons. Furthermore, 
supporters of the epistemological impairment model make as-
sumptions about human beings too: (1) Human beings know 
how to use the terms “good” and “evil” correctly. (2) Human 
beings know how to apply their insights and concepts in their 
real judgments. Even if they do not know how to make a correct 
moral judgment in every context, the distinction between good 
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and absolute evil is defi nitely clear in some cases. The evil of the 
Holocaust is a kind of absolute evil, to which the argument of 
human epistemological limitations does not apply.
(4) The Model of Freedom as a Justification 
for Refraining from Intervention
The models we have discussed so far tried to deal with the 
question of evil and suffering in general and in the Holocaust 
in particular resting on an implicit assumption: what appears as 
evil is not, in truth, evil. The current model assumes that evil in 
general and the evil of the Holocaust in particular is indeed evil, 
unjustifi able through any essential argument or by relying on 
the epistemological gap between human beings and God. This 
model, however, claims that the issue of evil should be shifted to 
the concern with an entirely different question: what is the best of 
all possible worlds.
 As Arthur Lovejoy showed in The Great Chain of Being, one 
of the basic intuitions of Western culture concerning the good is 
related to plenitude. In the present context, if God is indeed good, 
no possibility of the good would have remained unrealized. We 
must therefore assume that our world, which was created by 
God, is the best of all possible worlds. But how can we assume 
that this is the best of all possible worlds when it comprises so 
much evil and suffering?
 The answer to this question assumes that a world lacking 
human freedom is worse than a world enjoying human free-
dom, making our world, where human beings do have choice, 
the preferable option. Analytically, the existence of freedom is 
contingent on the presence of contrary options. Barring choice 
between good and evil, the concept of choice is meaningless. 
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Human evil is thus one of the products linked to the very existence 
of human freedom.
 The problem of evil in general and the problem of the 
Holocaust in particular are particularly troublesome, mainly 
because they do not refl ect a natural event linked to the laws of 
nature. The more vexing and embarrassing evil is human evil. 
How can humans, created in God’s image, act iniquitously? This 
evil, however, is evidence of human freedom, since it shows that 
evil is indeed an available option.
 This model is not free of analytical diffi culties,13 but its 
potential problems are not in any way related to the Holocaust or 
to any specifi c historical situation of manifestation of evil.
 My review here has not covered all possible answers to the 
questions of evil in general and the Holocaust in particular, 
but only to some of the basic ones. Theologically, both the 
questions and the answers defy the notion of the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness. Hence, the Holocaust neither does nor can require 
a new theology or a new theological language. A satisfactory 
theological explanation of human evil in general would also 
be an adequate explanation of the Holocaust, and the lack of 
an explanation is not particularly related to the Holocaust. 
What, then, accounts for the vast body of literature written in the 
wake of the Holocaust, partly demanding a radical turnabout of 
theological language?
 One answer is that those who demand such a change are 
indeed wrong, and do not understand that the Holocaust does 
not pose a unique theological problem. The history of philosophy 
points to many instances of mistakes that became entrenched and 
turned into axioms before being recognized as spurious. In this 
sense, the thesis about the “death of God” following the Holocaust 
could be considered a further instance of this type of mistake, and 
if the ontological statement about the “death of God” rests on the 
problematic of the Holocaust, it is groundless.
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Second Claim: The Holocaust is 
a Religious-Existentialist Problem
Formulating the problem of the Holocaust in the language of 
natural theology conceals an entirely different issue: a religious-
existentialist problem. The depth of the distress awakened by 
the Holocaust is not related to the theological question about 
God’s very existence. Instead, it refl ects a disappointed religious 
expectation. Believers expected God to intervene and not remain 
silent vis-à-vis the terror of the Holocaust. Given the intimate 
relationship between God and the faithful, they deserved 
divine intervention. This expectation is not based on theological 
assumptions that follow from God’s goodness, his providence, 
and his omnipotence, but on the organization of life according 
to religiosity per se. The problem of evil in the Holocaust, then, 
is an inner problem of religiosity. Albert Camus indeed stressed 
the “internal” religious character in the problematic of evil: 
“If the rebel blasphemes, it is in the hope of fi nding a new god. 
He staggers under the shock of the fi rst and most profound 
of all religious experiences but it is a disenchanted religious 
experience.”14
 This statement deserves further analysis. Camus holds that 
every child’s death raises the problem of evil, but what awakens 
the metaphysical rebellion and subverts the assumption of 
an ordered world is not “the suffering of a child . . . but the fact 
that the suffering is not justifi ed.”15 With wondrous sensitivity, 
Camus placed the problem of evil in context. This problem is not 
merely factual. We understand that suffering and pain are part of 
life, and perhaps even a vital part of life’s development, but what 
bothers us in suffering is that it cannot be justifi ed.
 Throughout his oeuvre, Camus assumed that justifi cation 
is tied to a wider metaphysical order—when this order is 
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subverted, persistent adherence to old truths is no longer possible. 
Camus assumed that religiosity does ensure such an overall order 
so that, when this order is fl awed, religiosity is also fl awed. For 
Camus, a child’s suffering and displays of evil toward a child 
undermine order and supply grounds for our disappointment 
with religiosity—the greater the expectation, the greater the 
disappointment. He was wrong, however, on several counts. First, 
he assumed only one kind of justifi cation for the existence of evil, 
formulated in general, metaphysical terms. Second, he assumed 
that this justifi cation is part of the organization of meaning within 
religiosity. Third, he adopted an absolutist moral approach, 
which only very few endorse. But Camus’ analysis is important 
because it shows understanding of the link between expectation 
and disappointment, of how foiled expectations intensify the 
problematic of evil, and of how expectations are anchored in 
religious life.
 Phenomenologically, an analysis of religious life and 
the expectations it evokes should not rest on theological as-
sumptions related to God’s image but on an analysis of religious 
practices. These practices assume that God is the “thou” or the 
other to whom petitioners turn in their prayers. This God is 
perceived as savior and comforter, forgiving, compassionate, 
and provident, even when walking through the valley of the 
shadow of death. A broad context of religious action fosters 
this expectation: be it festivals marking the memory of God’s 
intervention in reality and the people’s redemption, or the 
emphasis in the prayer book on God’s concrete and direct 
intervention in the world, answering the individual’s requests 
and longings in prayer: this is a God who revives the dead, 
judges, and heals. The language of prayer and religious practice 
is a language of turning to an entity that is indeed transcendent, 
but is also eminently immanent. Religious practice is a living 
dialogue with a God who has a visage and a personality. The 
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expectation rests on the assumptions developed toward God’s 
personality and visage. The expectation about God’s action and 
direct intervention in the world does not refl ect the believer’s 
subjective viewpoint,16 but surfaces through the very web of 
religious practice.
 This expectation directs the faithful everywhere in their lives, 
so that evil and injustice pose a problem because they contradict 
it. Believers can indeed contain a certain measure of evil and 
injustice on standard theological grounds. As believers, they have 
also been accustomed to live with the dialectical tension between 
an immanent perception of God and divine transcendence. 
They may therefore acknowledge that the expectation of evil’s 
absolute banishment refl ects a view that endorses only the 
immanent dimension of the divinity. Religious practice has 
taught us to balance between the sense of “thou” in God and 
the recognition of his transcendent holiness. The fact that we 
are expected to worship the Creator and renounce autonomy’s 
various dimensions is one of the deepest religious experiences 
of God’s transcendence. As noted, however, all this is limited. 
Even if the measure of the evil is theologically irrelevant, it is 
religiously signifi cant, since extensive evil deals a fatal blow to 
the religious expectation of banishing evil from the world and 
also to religious trust: “Even though I walk through the valley of 
the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me; thy 
rod and thy staff they comfort me” (Psalms 23: 4). The existence 
of fundamental evil cannot be reconciled with the image of 
a personal and comforting God.
 On deeper scrutiny, the difference between the theological 
and the religious perspectives refl ects the basic distinction of 
Judah Halevi and Pascal between “the God of the philosophers” 
and “the God of Abraham.” The theologian’s expectations from 
God differ from those of the religious individual, since each one’s 
God is fundamentally different.
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The Religious Crisis and its Implications 
for Religious Discourse
In light of the proposed analysis, even if the Holocaust need not 
be a theological turning point, it could be a turning point for 
religious discourse, since it threatens to void its basic meaning. 
Religious responses could vary: one typical response is the 
absolute rejection of the god that failed. As noted, even if this 
response is at times formulated in ontological language, stating 
that this entity called God does not exist, its translation into the 
religious realm is different. In the religious realm, the rejection 
of God or the “death of God” means the rejection of religion 
and of the God represented in religious language—the God 
as companion, as a ‘thou” who turns to human beings and 
participates in the voyage of history and of existence.
 Another typical, opposite, response could be to view the 
Holocaust as a religious test. A clear distinction separates 
theological justifi cations of the Holocaust in terms of a test and 
the perception of the Holocaust as a religious test. In theological 
terms, the test category functions as a justifi cation of divine action. 
In religious terms, however, the test category is an existentialist 
category applying to human ways of being.
 Kierkegaard, who developed the concept of “spiritual test” 
(anfaegtelse), excelled at describing the existentialist meaning 
of the religious test.17 This test is the moment at which human 
beings confront the entire range of their relationship with God—
they are tested, not God. As human beings, we struggle with our-
selves about the nature of the religious demand and its meaning, 
and our response reveals, above all, something about our own 
character. We may come out of it stronger or weaker, but we will 
never go back to be what we were.
 Contending with the Holocaust in the context of a test category 
does not result in an existentialist transformation. At best, we 
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now know something we had not known before. By contrast, the 
perception of the Holocaust as a religious test refl ects the attitude 
of believers to the situation in which they fi nds themselves. 
The Holocaust becomes the decisive dimension in the contest 
of individuals with their existence, their faith in God, and their 
attitude to God. One instance of such attempts is the work of Emil 
Fackenheim.
 Fackenheim holds that Auschwitz compels the Jew; it has, in 
his terms, a “commanding voice.” The command, from a religious 
perspective, is precisely the non-renunciation of faith even if 
the believer must fi nd a dialectical balance between “continuing 
to hear the voice of Sinai as he hears the voice of Auschwitz,”18 
that is between faith and defi ance. According to Fackenheim, the 
meaning of religious faith after the Holocaust is witnessing: “We 
are here, exist, survive, endure, witness to God and man even if 
abandoned by God and man.”19
 This religious stance means that “they [Jews] are forbidden to 
despair of the God of Israel.”20 These statements are not part of the 
natural theological discourse; they do not explain or justify evil. 
They refl ect a religious decision to sustain faith despite religious 
obstacles, as a kind of persistent testimony of faith.
 The central question facing believers endorsing these views 
is not how to justify God given the horrors of the Holocaust, but 
how to continue a life of faith given evil. The problem of evil is 
not one that has God as its object, but a problem expressing the 
believers’ refl ections about themselves as believers.
 Like all arguments, metaphysical arguments too are either 
true or false. The span of theological-metaphysical options is not 
confi ned to the context of logical inferences from the argument 
itself but extends to the critique of its assumptions, given that the 
assumptions of the metaphysical argument, like all assumptions, 
do not involve necessity. Once these assumptions have been 
stated, however, options shrink: either the conclusion is correct 
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and the argument is true, or the inference is not necessary, and 
the argument is false.
 In this sense, the theological approach to the question of evil 
in the Holocaust somehow returns to the classic question about 
evil and is therefore not particularly interesting. By contrast, the 
religious reactions to evil in the Holocaust are a fascinating subject 
because they reveal compelling aspects of religious life from 
two perspectives. First, they expose the implicit assumptions of 
religious practice concerning God, assumptions that substantiate 
the believer’s expectations from God. Second, the reactions teach 
us much about the way in which believers interpret their own 
religious world to themselves. They expose the fact that, within 
a given religious practice, more than one reaction is possible to 
a disturbance as dramatic as the Holocaust for the organization 
of meaning in religious life. The various reactions, as shown, 
could extend from an absolute rejection of the religious world 
to the reinterpretation of this world in a way that dismisses the 
metaphysical yearning as the constitutive element of religious life.
 Is liberation from the metaphysical yearning indeed possible? 
Can we draw such a sharp separation between natural theological 
aspects and interpretations of religious life? This is not an easy 
endeavor. The tendency to shift from religious to theological 
language evident in many theological discussions about the 
Holocaust will attest to this. In this sense, the philosophical 
perspective offers a kind of correction, enabling to refocus the 
diffi culties and the fi elds of meaning at work in the religious or 
theological discourses, which are particularly relevant to the 
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FEW ideas have boosted human thought and imagination as that 
of tikkun olam (repairing the world). Reformers have been leaving 
their mark since the dawn of human history, some crowned with 
a halo of sanctity and some condemned for their evil deeds. Prima 
facie, tikkun olam is a sublime notion expressing key features of 
human existence. The leading one is freedom. The amendment 
of reality necessarily assumes the ability to transcend factuality 
and be free to shape the world. Tikkun olam attests also to human 
creativity—we envisage how the world should be. Human beings 
are free creatures, capable of transcending their actual being and 
pursuing the possible, anticipated through imagination.
 The fate of the tikkun olam idea, however, resembles that 
of many other sublime notions that are part of the general 
consensus—too little is invested in a critical effort that rigorously 
examines their nature. What do we intend when we speak of 
repairing the world? Is this a substantive idea, or do its inherent 
drawbacks deprive it of any justifi cation? These are the central 
questions of this chapter.
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 My starting point is a distinction between two different and 
unrelated meanings of the concept of tikkun olam: (1) Tikkun olam 
as a utopian idea. (2) Tikkun olam as a concrete historical process 
unfolding in a concrete society. My central claim is that the fi rst 
meaning of the concept is extremely problematic. We can still 
endorse the second meaning, however, because the concrete 
process of amending the world does not depend on the idea that 
directs it. The fi rst step in the understanding of these claims and 
their implications, then, is to clarify the fi rst meaning of tikkun 
olam.
Tikkun Olam as a Utopian Idea
According to this meaning of the term, tikkun olam is the 
realization of a specifi c idea that outlines the ideal vision. This 
perception assumes a contrast between real and ideal—the ideal 
negates actual reality and proposes to replace it with a utopian 
idea of the organization of the world. A critical discussion of all 
the aspects related to utopian thought exceeds the scope of this 
chapter,1 and the following discussion will be confi ned to specifi c 
aspects necessary for clarifying the meaning of tikkun olam.
 Martin Buber defi nes utopia as “something not actually 
present but only represented. The utopian picture is a picture 
of what ‘should be.’ What is at work here is the longing for that 
rightness.”2 Implicit in this defi nition is an essential characteristic 
of utopian thought, which Karl Mannheim analyzes in detail in 
his celebrated work Ideology and Utopia. Mannheim emphasizes 
that utopia works in human thought in two complementary and 
opposite directions. First, human thought transcends the reality 
in which the utopia is born, rejects it, and offers an alternative 
model of existence in its place. In Buber’s terms, utopia places 
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what “should be,” which is opposed to what is. Second, uto-
pian thought strives to return to reality in order to rebuild it. 
Mannheim rightfully emphasizes that transcendence alone is not 
utopia. Transcendence becomes a constitutive element of utopia 
only if joined by a passion to shape reality in light of the idea.3
 What are the structural elements present in every utopia?4 
First, the idea of repairing the world rests on the notion of a perfect 
world. This perfection is related to the relationship between the 
components of the world on the one hand, and to the standing 
of each component on the other. The ideal world is an ordered 
world whose components are in perfect mutual harmony, while 
each one is also perfect in itself. In Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s terms, 
the ideal world is the best of all possible worlds, which utopia 
counterposes to the real and imperfect one.
 Second, since this world is ideal, it is harmonious—because 
it is more perfect than a non-harmonious world—and total — 
because it leaves no room for other options. Legitimizing another 
alternative as worthy means that the assumed perfection is 
not absolute because other and no less perfect options are also 
available.5
 Finally, if the ideal world is perfect we must also conclude 
it is static and immutable, because change is an expression of 
imperfection and disharmony. This perfect world should therefore 
be characterized as one without progress or development.
 Given this description of the ideal world, is it at all within 
human grasp? Some utopians have indeed assumed that utopia 
is synonymous with what, in principle, is unattainable. This is 
how Herbert Marcuse relates to the concept of utopia: “Utopia 
is a historical concept. It refers to projects for social change that 
are considered impossible.”6 Marcuse, therefore, holds that 
the present reality refl ects the “end of utopia” because it has 
now become possible to realize options that had previously 
CHAPTER SEVEN
210
seemed unattainable. This approach to utopia, however, appears 
unsubstantiated. At most, it refl ects, as Mannheim claims, the 
vantage point typical of those affi rming the status quo.7
 Various answers have been offered to the question of how this 
ideal world might be reached and, in this context, a distinction 
must be drawn between different versions of utopian and 
eschatological thought. Utopian thought assumes that progress 
toward the ideal world is a human endeavor unfolding within the 
confi nes of human time and history. By contrast, eschatological 
thought assumes that tikkun olam is God’s endeavor and will occur 
at another place and another time, outside history.8 Eschatological 
time seeks to establish a divine kingdom on earth, and thereby 
disregards the concreteness of human reality. According to 
Mannheim, this disregard is what excludes eschatological thought 
from the category of utopia.9 Irrespective of whether Mannheim 
is correct, to the extent that the concern is to repair the world, the 
eschatological option must be excluded on the grounds that it 
does not seek to amend reality but to change it entirely. It speaks 
of a re-creation of reality involving cosmological implications.10
 This schematic description enables us to summarize the idea 
of tikkun olam as postulating the idea of a perfect world, toward 
which we should strive from within empirical reality. Although 
ostensibly a noble and worthy cause, a more critical appraisal will 
show this to be a problematic idea.
Problems in the Utopian Idea 
of Tikkun Olam
The epistemological problem. This meaning of tikkun olam, as 
noted, seeks the realization of a perfect, harmonious, total, and 
static world. The specifi c content of this world is the concern of the 
TIKKUN OLAM: BETWEEN UTOPIAN IDEA AND SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROCESS
211
different theories offering various ideal options. Precisely at this 
point, however, a signifi cant epistemological problem emerges: 
a perfect world is not necessarily a rational idea. Karl Popper, who 
deals with a critique of utopia in several of his works, formulates 
this claim as follows: utopia sets goals to be achieved, but “it is 
impossible to determine ends scientifi cally. There is no scientifi c 
way of choosing between two ends . . . No decision about aims can 
be established by purely rational or scientifi c means.”11
 The utopian idea derives from a specifi c life context, from 
a particular culture that sets ideals and expectations. Finley 
postulates this as a guiding methodological principle in the study 
of utopias:
Utopian ideas and fantasies, like all ideas and fantasies, grow out 
of the society to which they are a response. Neither the ancient 
world nor the modern world is an unchanging entity, and any 
analysis of Utopian thinking which neglects social changes in 
the course of the history of either antiquity or modern times is 
likely at some point to go badly wrong.12
The seemingly inevitable conclusion is that the utopian idea will 
be valid only for members of the specifi c culture who formulated 
it. Both structurally and in historical-realist terms, however, 
tikkun olam as a utopian idea transcends the specifi c context 
within which it was born. The ideal world of one culture and 
one society is presented as “the” ideal world for the other, for 
every other, even one wholeheartedly opposed to this particular 
version of tikkun olam. The utopian idea of tikkun olam, then, has 
metaphysical pretensions and claims universal validity. Its modes 
of justifi cation transcend the social-historical context that sustains 
it and the criticism of local circumstances, so that its justifi cation 
is unrelated to this background.
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 As for how this pretention is substantiated, the supporters of 
this ideal metaphysical world will probably claim it is validated 
by the truth of the utopia’s constitutive idea. But how can this 
truth be determined outside the cultural-social-historical context 
within which this perfect world was born? An ideal world is 
always judged within a specifi c cultural narrative and we have 
no critical way of turning it into a meta-narrative. In other words, 
the notion of an ideal world is always within a petitio principii 
circularity and, therefore, merely conveys the beliefs of members 
of a particular society.
 If this conclusion is correct, believers in an ideal world face 
a paradox: the notion of an ideal world rests on the assumption 
that the longed for world is perfect, harmonious, total, static, 
and universally valid. Epistemologically, however, the only 
claim that believers in an ideal world can substantiate is that 
this world is perfect for them and might therefore be imperfect 
for others.
The empirical-existential problem. The idea of tikkun olam takes 
a negative view of concrete reality, which it defi nes as fl awed and 
lacking. But such a sweeping perception of the empirical world 
is surely a superfi cial and shallow view of human reality, which 
is by nature a far more complex amalgam of lights and shadows, 
ambiguously mixing good and evil.13 It is to this evil, negative 
reality, that the notion of tikkun olam counterposes its idea of 
a utopian world.
 Indeed, the meaning of the term “utopia” in Greek is “no 
place” (ou topia). Utopia transcends the familiar space and the 
known concrete world, but does so in order to enter a positive 
reality, as suggested by the link between the term utopia and 
the good place (eu topia).14 In other words, the perfect reality 
does prevail somewhere in the world, but outside the fami-
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liar space. Thomas More’s Utopia,15 a paradigm of this literary 
genre, expressed this ambiguity when indicating that utopia is 
the name of a “new island,”16 separated from land by a channel. 
The term, then, denotes a new and different place that is not 
part of reality. This issue is recurrently emphasized through 
several aspects of More’s work: the precise name of the city 
is Amaurot, [from amauroton meaning “made dark or dim”]17; 
the people residing in the city are the Achorians [from a- 
(“without”) plus choros (“place, country”: “the People without 
a Country,”18 and the Polylerites, [from polus “much” plus 
“leros” (“nonsense”): “the People of Much Nonsense.”19 Utopia, 
then, is a place beyond all places, a reality that is not part of 
the world.20 Yet, this is precisely the chink in the armor of the 
utopian idea: it traces a perfect, static, and unrealistic picture of 
the world.21
 Moreover, the utopian idea assumes the existence of a uni-
form and simple ideal suited to all human beings.22 As Berlin 
shows, this assumption is necessarily committed to the claim “that 
men have a certain fi xed, inalterable nature, certain universal, 
common, immutable goals. Once these goals are realised, human 
nature is wholly fulfi lled.”23
 But human creatures are by nature complex. The utopian idea 
disregards the unique character of individuals and of societies, 
failing to take into account that human beings are cultural 
creatures constituted by the historical and social contexts of their 
lives. The utopian idea is founded on a cultural “veil of igno-
rance” and is therefore unable to trace the contours of an ideal 
world that is real; the amendment it suggests is founded on the 
negation of human life’s historical-cultural character.24 Berlin, 
who endorses this criticism, concludes from it that the utopian 
idea of tikkun olam is “logically incoherent.”25 If the critique is 
correct, then, we must assume that the expression “the perfect 
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society” is a family name for various real societies fi tting this 
category. Each one is perfect, in that it realizes the ideals of 
the good, but it thereby denies the idea of a “single perfect 
society.”26
 The existentialist implication of tikkun olam as a utopian 
idea is no less problematic. Even if amending the world is not 
synonymous with the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth, 
the idea does divert us from the present to the future. The present 
is negated for the sake of another future. The future-oriented 
utopian idea has nothing to say about the present, which it seeks 
to amend by transcending it altogether and thereby denying it as 
one of the foundations of human existence. Denying the present 
is also denying the past that has been brought into the present, 
that is, denying the temporal, historical character of human 
existence.
 Erich Fromm calls this hope for the future passive hope, and 
describes its implications as follows:
Time and the future become the central category of this kind of 
hope. Nothing is expected to happen in the now but only in the 
next moment, the next day, the next year, and in another world 
if it is too absurd to believe that hope can be realized in this 
world. Behind this belief is the idolatry of “Future,” “History,” 
and “Posterity.”27
According to the utopian idea of tikkun olam, the purpose of 
the individual’s life in the present is to engage in the constant 
nullifi cation of his own existence for the sake of another existence. 
The real world in which the individual lives until the longed for 
future is realized is entirely meaningless. Is this not a return to 
Freud’s death drive?
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 Finally, this idea assumes the possibility of absolute meta-
morphosis from one way of life to another. Although some indi-
viduals are indeed capable of such drastic conversion, the main 
course for human change and progress is far more moderate and 
constantly takes into account the surrounding reality that the 
utopian idea seeks to deny.28
The moral problems. Since people do not agree on the defi nition 
of the ideal, and since believers in the notion of an ideal world are 
sure that this is the only worthy and meaningful one, recourse 
to mechanisms of direct or indirect coercion and violence is ine-
vitable.29 As a result of social and cultural changes, the notion 
of what is ideal will also change. The utopian approach to the 
amendment of the world, however, ignores these changes, since 
it sets the idea as an a priori purpose. One way of avoiding this 
contradiction is to resort to violent power against the social-
ideological changes opposed to the implementation of the 
utopian ideal.30 Human history indeed shows that great ideas of 
tikkun olam have ended, more than once, in dreadful bloodshed; 
what began as a struggle against evil that offered ideas for 
a better world ended up in a worse world than the one it came to 
oppose.31
 The uniformity and the simplicity of the idea of a perfect 
world is also harmful to human individuality. The harm is 
moral, because people’s dignity is rooted in their individuality as 
expressed in human variance and differentiation.32 An idea that is 
a priori valid, then, violates human dignity.
 Prima facie, this criticism could be valid only if we assume 
a pluralistic world view supporting the existence of many 
alternative forms of the good, but this is not so. A moral monist 
claiming that every moral question has only one valid answer 
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could still acknowledge that people have different cultural, social, 
and religious goals and values.
 Finally, the utopian idea assumes that sacrifi cing humanity’s 
present well being for the sake of its future is morally justifi ed. 
In Kantian terms, however, this view breaches a fundamental 
moral duty by making human beings simply means for the 
advancement of future ends.
 Supporters of tikkun olam as a utopian idea could claim 
that no reform is possible without it. We can change and 
reform reality precisely because of an idea of perfection that 
guides our critique of the current reality. According to Ernst 
Bloch, perfect utopia plays a dual role: it provides a criterion 
for judging the present and it supplies society with a dream to 
strive for.33
 This pervasive idea, however, conceals a logical fallacy, since 
reform could also be driven by the idea of mitigating suffering, 
poverty, or distress. Implicit in the suggestion that we need utopia 
is the idea that suffering, misery, poverty, or any other social ill 
cannot be recognized without an ideal of perfection, but this is 
an unnecessary assumption. The recognition that suffering and 
distress are intolerable follows from a negative reality rather than 
from an idea of perfection.34
 Many thinkers have indeed drawn a distinction between real 
social criticism and speculative thought nurtured by fanciful 
ideas. A particularly sharp articulation of the distinction between 
social critique and tikkun olam through the utopian idea appears 
in the Frankfurt school. Max Horkheimer offers the following 
formulation: “The dialectical [critical] theory does not formulate 
its critique solely through the idea . . . It does not judge according 
to what is over and beyond its era, but from it.”35 Horkheimer 
rejects philosophical speculation and, with it, also utopia. He 
claims that “utopia skips over time,”36 and holds “it was a mistake 
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to transcend the present and, because of a message about absolute 
perfection, fail to discern the possibilities latent in reality.”37 
Marcuse summarizes this perception of a critical theory of society 
as follows:
Up to now, it has been one of the principal tenets of the critical 
theory of society . . . to refrain from what might be reasonably 
called utopian speculation. Social theory is supposed to ana-
lyze existing societies in the light of their own functions and 
capabilities and to identify demonstrable tendencies (if any) 
which might lead beyond the existing state of affairs.38
Marcuse, who emphasizes the signifi cance of negative critical 
thought about the present, holds this negative thought can become 
positive by discovering the options suppressed and denied in the 
present.39
 Popper draws a similar distinction between utopia and social 
reform. Utopia imagines the ideal of the good society toward 
which it strives. The supreme concept of the utopian ideal is 
happiness and the perfect good. By contrast, social reform 
contends with a given reality of suffering and misery, and strives 
to amend it and reduce it as far as possible. Utopia focuses on 
what is not—on the future, whereas social reform focuses on the 
possible, that is, on the present.40
 Criticism, change, or social progress, then, need not draw 
their contents from any absolute idea. We do not need to know 
what is the absolute good to identify an injustice and we do 
not need to know what is perfect happiness to identify human 
suffering. Quite the contrary, this criticism is particularly 
valuable because it returns to reality, examines the unfair and 




Tikkun Olam as a Socio-Historical Process
A socio-cultural criticism more concerned with achieving reform 
in a particular society rather than with reforming the entire 
world is the sense covered by the second meaning of the concept, 
pointing to tikkun olam as a socio-historical process. This meaning 
of tikkun olam emerges against the backdrop of the fi rst deno-
tation, discussed above. Whereas tikkun olam as a utopian idea lies 
in the future, tikkun olam as a process is rooted in the present, in 
human reality. Whereas tikkun olam as an idea is a simple, uniform 
notion, tikkun olam as a process rests on the complexity of human 
reality. This process rests on a fragmented, local, and concrete 
perspective rather than on a total scheme.41
 Tikkun olam as a utopian idea assumes a monistic world 
view, whereas tikkun olam as a process rooted in empirical reality 
is pluralistic, just like reality. This process, as noted, does not 
strive for an absolute change in complex human reality but seeks 
to disclose various possibilities latent in the social conditions 
of human existence. Hence, it is a family name for diverse 
phenomena, whose contents are not necessarily related. All 
societies and cultures engage or might engage in a struggle for 
reform whose contents are not dictated by a common idea.
 The common denominator uniting all the manifestations of 
tikkun olam as a process is the sober understanding that empirical 
reality is the ultimate human reality, and cannot be transcended 
to shift into an absolutely good, united, and harmonious world. 
In this perception, human efforts are constant and infi nite. Every 
social and cultural reality involves aspects that can be criticized, 
and new possibilities will invariably emerge. Tikkun olam as 
a process is, in Marcuse’s terminology, “the end of utopia,” 
constantly evolving out of existence rather than by virtue of 
an idea beyond history.
TIKKUN OLAM: BETWEEN UTOPIAN IDEA AND SOCIO-HISTORICAL PROCESS
219
 What epistemic instrument will serve to reveal reality’s latent 
potentialities? According to Paul Ricoeur, utopia plays this critical 
role. In his view, “social imagination” or “cultural imagination” is 
in a key position, both as a deconstructive element that criticizes 
the extant social order and as a constructive element representing 
alternative options for the organization of social life.42 Utopia or, 
more precisely, “the utopian mood” or the “utopian spirit,”43 fi ll 
the important role of social imagination: “From this ‘no place,’ 
an exterior glance is cast on our reality, which suddenly looks 
strange, nothing more being taken for granted. The fi eld of the 
possible is now opened beyond that of the actual, a fi eld for 
alternative ways of living.”44
 Ricoeur assigns to utopia an entirely different role from 
the one it had played in classic utopian literature. According 
to Ricoeur, utopia denotes a refl ective, critical process that 
precludes the unbridled sway of factuality.45 Utopian thought 
presents alternative options of social order, of human relations, 
government, religion, and power, contrary to the classic 
utopias that pointed to a defi ned goal, a specifi c and mandatory 
conceptual content that all human beings must realize to attain 
a good existence. Ricoeur compares the role of utopia to the 
role of the “free variation” in Husserl’s perception.46 Just as for 
Husserl the free variation is what enabled refl ection to attain 
liberation from the random factual datum by viewing it merely as 
one possibility among others, so also utopia.
 This perception of utopia as a critical instrument is immune 
to the problems burdening classic utopias, and its orientation 
is concrete and empirical. At the same time, the key questions 
are: Do we need utopia, even as a mood or as critical thought, 
in order to be released from the coercing power of factuality? Is 
utopia identical to social imagination? Does utopia function like 
Husserl’s free variation? My attempt to answer these questions 
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will be guided by a renewed analysis of the relationship between 
Husserl’s free variation and utopia. Epistemically, the free 
variation operates regarding a specifi c predicate of the object, 
such as color or shape. Through the free variation, we learn not 
to identify a given object with a specifi c color, since the variation 
enables us to think of another color as its predicate. Continued 
operation of the variation leads us not only to discover the 
available options but also, and mainly, to discover the “essence” 
(the idos), from which the free variation offers no release. This 
refl ective process is thus a dual course: it discovers the possible as 
well as the essential. By contrast, utopia discovers the “possible” 
through the absolute denial and estrangement of factuality rather 
than as a variation of the same object. The process analogous 
to free variation is the discovery, through imagination, of the 
possibilities latent in a given social order rather than the absolute 
estrangement from it. Absolute estrangement points to distance 
and hence to utopia’s irrelevance to concrete life.
 This critique will be enriched by the adoption of Kierkegaard’s 
distinction between imagination and fantasy.47 Imagination is 
a refl ective process that enables us to transcend factuality to the 
potential option latent within it. Although imagination is not 
entirely free from the given factuality, it does enable us not to see 
its concrete manifestation as the sole option. Fantasy, however, 
unlike imagination, is a process through which concrete existence 
detaches itself entirely from its real character. According to 
this distinction, utopian thought is a turn to fantasy, resting on 
complete liberation from empirical reality. Its constructive role in 
a process of social reform, which can occur by allowing imagina-
tion to reveal latent options, is thus hard to detect. Reform, then, 
cannot draw on utopia, even in the version Ricoeur describes.
 What will justify the social reform process? What will lead 
people to act to amend the world? Believers in the need for 
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a utopian idea as a condition of tikkun olam assume, as noted, 
that without an absolute, perfect idea we have no justifi cation for 
concrete action in the world and no way of motivating individuals 
to engage in it. This assumption, however, is mistaken on both 
counts. Concerning the justifi cation, the suffering and distress 
that are the lot of so many impose an obligation of action on 
individual and societies that is far stronger than that derived 
from the utopian idea. The utopian idea of tikkun olam relates to 
humanity in general but ignores concrete individuals living in dire 
circumstances. It also justifi es, as noted, acts involving the sacrifi ce 
of individuals in the present for the sake of others’ happiness 
in the future, thus affi rming and demanding immoral, harmful 
deeds. By contrast, focusing on the diffi cult circumstances of 
individuals in the present discovers the suffering other, and this 
pain suffi ces to compel us into action. It is the other that imposes 
a moral obligation on us.48 The real suffering of individuals or 
societies is an urgent moral task, and is indeed what creates the 
realm of the ethical: “Whoever explains poverty as the suffering 
of mankind, creates ethics.”49
 Human suffering is not only a decisive justifi cation for concrete 
action but involves an element that motivates action. The need to 
fi nd motivation for action in a metaphysical idea rather than in 
actual reality means that we seek “to make a Philosopher of man 
before making a man of him.”50 But the main factor motivating 
human action is compassion, care, and a sense of responsibility 
for the surrounding reality.51
 Fromm describes this situation of human solidarity as resur-
rection:
Resurrection in its new [non-religious] meaning . . . is not the 
creation of another reality after the reality of this life, but the 
transformation of this reality in the direction of greater aliveness. 
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Man and society are resurrected every moment in the act of 
hope and of faith in the here and now; every act of love, of 
awareness, of compassion is resurrection . . . Every moment we 
give an answer. This answer lies not in what we say or think, 
but in what we are, how we act, where we are moving.52
This return to a human reality perspective also implies the 
development of an ongoing critical discourse. Believers in 
an absolute idea, in a truth that guides their lives can, at best, 
persuade the other or, if not, use violence in order to guide non-
believers to the truth. But those who need to reform reality from 
within and have no recourse to absolute instruments require 
a continuous dialogue and the human commonality that will 
enable it. Buber resorted to strong terms to describe this reality:
The real living together of man with man can only thrive 
where people have the real things of their common life in 
common; where they can experience, discuss and administer 
them together; where real fellowships and real work Guilds 
exist . . . We must be quite unromantic, and, living wholly in 
the present, out of the recalcitrant material of our own day in 
history, fashion a true community.53
 This is a humble perception of tikkun olam, involving no 
Promethean idea of absolute rebellion for the sake of another 
world and hence none of the hubris typical of such a rebellion. 
But does not this humbleness turn tikkun olam into a random, local 
event? How can we fi ght for reform in the other’s world when 
such amendments are called for? The struggle against evidence 
of evil in the other’s world rests on the principle of human 
solidarity, on the ability to develop a true dialogue of compassion 
with other human beings. The limits of his reform, however, are 
determined by our concrete shared humanity: amending the 
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other’s world so that it may fi t mine entails harm, paternalism, 
and contempt. Repair must be limited by what is common to all 
human beings—suffering and deprivation on the one hand, and 
aid to develop the other’s immanent options on the other.
 Tikkun olam as a process is now widening beyond the borders 
of a given community and culture, just as human solidarity is 
widening from a limited to an increasingly wider notion of “we.”54 
But even if this broader defi nition were to include everyone in the 
entire world, the utopian idea of tikkun olam could never replace 
the process of tikkun olam.
Tikkun Olam and Jewish Tradition
Ostensibly, tikkun olam as a utopian idea defi nitely fi ts Jewish 
tradition, from its early days and until the Zionist era. Many 
scholars have indeed pointed to Jewish prophecy as one of the 
foundations of utopian discourse.55 The term tikkun olam that 
appears in Jewish sources implies a whole and harmonious 
reality. Thus, for instance, the Aleinu prayer reads: “to repair the 
world in the kingdom of the Almighty.” Maimonides defi nes in 
similar terms the test of the one destined to become the messianic 
king: “He will repair the entire world to serve God together.”56 
Tikkun olam as a utopian idea acquires new strength in the Zionist 
era, when the utopian literary genre fi rst appears in Jewish 
tradition.57
 A view of tikkun olam as a real socio-historical process, howe-
ver, is also clearly evident in Jewish tradition, as a constitutive 
element of the halakhic ethos. The system of commandments is, 
above all, a vote of confi dence in empirical reality as it is—if 
concrete reality were negative, what would be the value of 
observing the commandments within it? Paulinian Christianity 
CHAPTER SEVEN
224
negated the commandments precisely because it negated current 
reality and material life, setting up as a goal the heavenly kingdom 
that is not in this world. It viewed the Torah as legitimizing 
carnal life and as luring us to it. The Torah therefore could not 
be the perfect expression of faith, which is an internal, spiritual 
matter.58 By contrast, the basic halakhic ethos is one of molding 
and repairing the present world. The halakhic endeavor is inner-
worldly and is not meant to attain a different, ideal reality.
 The halakhic ethos does not ascribe decisive weight to 
messianism and to redemption beyond this world, as Maimonides 
clarifi es when he utterly rejects any concern with the details of 
redemption and messianism:
Said the Rabbis: The sole difference between the present and 
the Messianic days is delivery from servitude to foreign powers 
(B. San 91b).  . . . But no one is in a position to know the details 
of this and similar things until they have come to pass. They 
are not explicitly stated by the Prophets. Nor have the Rabbis 
any tradition with regard to these matters. They are guided 
solely by what the scriptural texts seem to imply. Hence there 
is a divergence of opinion on the subject. But be that as it may, 
neither the exact sequence of those events nor the details thereof 
constitute religious dogmas. No one should ever occupy him self 
with the legendary themes or spend much time on midrashic 
statements bearing on this and like subjects. He should not 
deem them of prime importance, since they lead neither to the 
fear of God nor to the love of Him.59
 Maimonides, then, views the messianic idea as a marginal 
question that is not included in the principles of faith because it 
has no religious implications: it leads neither to love nor to fear.60
 Gershom Scholem insightfully notes that halakhic tradition 
is the core of the “conservative forces” that strive to preserve 
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existence as is and shape it within a halakhic context.61 Scholem 
rightfully points to the dialectical and confl icting attitude of 
halakhic tradition toward messianic utopias:
On the one hand, Messianic utopianism presents itself as 
the completion and perfection of Halakhah. It is to perfect 
what cannot yet fi nd expression in the Halakhah as the 
law of an unredeemed world. Thus, for example, only in 
Messianic times will all those parts of the law which are not 
realizable under the conditions of the exile become capable 
of fulfi llment . . . The law as such can be fulfi lled in its total 
plenitude only in a redeemed world. But there is doubtless 
another side to the matter as well. For apocalypticism and its 
inherent mythology tore open a window on a world which 
the Halakhah rather preferred to leave shrouded in the mists 
of uncertainty. The vision of Messianic renewal and freedom 
was by its nature inclined to produce the question of what 
it would do to the status of Torah and of the Halakhah which 
was dependent on it.62
Despite this basic tension, we cannot ignore that the primary 
vector of the halakhic ethos is not toward the redeemed 
world. Furthermore, a decisive part of the laws that cannot be 
observed in exile can be observed in the Land of Israel, even in 
an unredeemed reality. In order to observe these laws, no overall, 
sweeping reorganization of reality is required. Settlement in the 
Land of Israel or sovereignty will suffi ce to enable observance of 
most of the missing laws. The assertion of Samuel, the Babylonian 
amora, fi ts the halakhic ethos that adheres to concrete reality: “The 
only difference between this era and messianic days is [Israel’s] 
subjection to the nations” (BT Berakhot 32b).
 Scholem seeks to emphasize the messianic—utopian in his 
terms—dimension of Jewish tradition, and claims that Maimo-
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nides’ stance, as cited above, does not truly refl ect it: “crucial 
parts of these theses have no legitimate basis whatever in the 
biblical and talmudic sources and are rather indebted to the 
philosophical traditions of Greece.”63 But even if Maimonides’ 
position concerning messianism does not derive deductively from 
a specifi c halakhic text, it does successfully convey the halakhic 
ethos affi rming concrete reality while also stressing the obligation 
of its perpetual reform.
 The meaning of the term tikkun olam that appears in halakhic 
literature expresses the practical, non-utopian ethos of halakhic 
tradition, contrary to its meaning in the Aleinu prayer. The olam 
in this halakhic concept denotes the actual social reality within 
which human beings function, and the tikkun relates to the 
amendment of distortions or injustices in this context; tikkun olam 
is not the repair of the entire cosmos. In halakhic literature, tikkun 
olam denotes a concrete action meant to correct a specifi c wrong, 
not a comprehensive reorganization of reality by placing another, 
perfect world as an alternative to it. The act of correction reaffi rms 
the concrete, routine social order; the act of correcting a specifi c 
wrong relates to one or another aspect of life that is reaffi rmed 
through the limited character of the act of amendment, not to the 
whole of life.64
 In modern Jewish thought, the non-utopian trend is indeed 
distinctively evident in the work of thinkers who shifted from 
speculative theory to halakhic praxis and are at the focus of this 
book. When embracing the meaning of the halakhic ethos, these 
thinkers also embrace the assumption that concrete reality is 
the only one available to us, and the purpose of observing the 
commandment is to amend this reality.
 The fi rst of these thinkers is Leibowitz, who takes this view of 
reality as his starting assumption: “The fi rst mark of the religion 
of Halakhah is its realism. It perceives man as he is in reality and 
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confronts him with this reality—with the actual conditions of 
his existence rather than the ‘vision’ of another existence.”65 The 
“anti-illusory,” “anti-visionary” character of Halakhah precludes, 
according to Leibowitz, “fl ight” to another, perfect reality.66 This 
understanding determines the way Halakhah contends with 
reality. Halakhah deals with the complex of questions raised by 
reality through the halakhic norm, not through theodicy.67
 Leibowitz, as noted, rejects both the theodicean and the 
eschatological attempts to cope with reality by fi nding its meaning 
beyond it. The faithful live in this world without hope of fi nding 
redemption in another, better one. The concept of redemption 
undergoes a metamorphosis: it no longer denotes an occurrence 
in the world but a change in our being. The redeemed are those 
who transcend the shackles of natural givenness and concretize 
their freedom through the halakhic act per se: “Religion conceived 
as Torah and commandments redeems man from the shackles of 
nature. This is not redemption in the Christian sense, whereby 
a person is redeemed by virtue of his consciousness of being 
redeemed, but actual redemption, release from the bonds of 
natural, meaningless causality.”68
 Freedom is embodied in the endless, Sisyphean task incumbent 
on human beings to fulfi ll their halakhic obligations within the 
natural world. Believers struggle with reality and transcend it 
by observing the commandments. This is therefore an immanent 
transcendence because it does not imply detachment from natural 
reality and, therefore, “the project it sets for man is permanent 
and endless. No religious attainment may be considered fi nal; the 
project is never completed.”69
 A similar approach is also suggested by Eliezer Goldman, 
when he analyzes the typology that differentiates “illusory reli-
gion” from “non-illusory religion.” Illusory religion “holds that 
religion provides a chance for the transformation of human 
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reality, releasing it from its fl aws and allowing genuine closeness 
to God.”70 By contrast, non-illusory religion acknowledges
that human reality must be accepted as is and without illusions 
that we will be able to extricate ourselves from it. It is from and 
within this reality that God must be worshipped, “for that is 
the whole duty of man” [Ecclesiastes 12:13]. This worship offers 
man the only possible option for attachment to his Creator, 
without fostering any false beliefs in its ability to eliminate the 
basic conditions of a created reality and redeem us from its 
fl aws.71
The rejection of utopianism and the adherence to concrete reality 
do not ensure the development of a tikkun olam ethos or the 
shaping of an “ethic of suffering.” Leibowitz indeed held that the 
only meaning of the religious obligation is to worship God, and 
set up a sharp dichotomy between “demanding” and “endowing” 
religions.72 Whereas the former places the worship of God at the 
center, the latter places human needs. From the perspective of 
the demanding religion, human redemption neither is nor can 
be embodied in a utopian world or an eschatological event. The 
purpose of religious life is to worship God, not to repair reality. 
Hence, human redemption is embodied in the heroic effort to 
fulfi ll the religious obligation in this world. In a way, redemption 
is a kind of release from the illusion that the role of religion is 
to respond to human demands. Simply, then, redemption is the 
transparency of religious life.73 In sum, Leibowitz neither did nor 
could have linked the rejection of utopia to the process of tikkun 
olam, since religiosity is absolute transcendence from the world 
within the world.
 In his balanced way, Goldman offers an approach more closely 
attuned to halakhic practice. In several articles that examine the 
relationship between religion, Halakhah, and morality,74 Goldman 
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points to the decisive role of meta-halakhic norms in Halakhah.75 
These norms express the values and the ideology of “halakhic 
man,” directing his halakhic decisions. In this way, Goldman 
points to the connection between Halakhah as a religious system 
and the real world within which it functions, although he did not 
develop an explicit view of tikkun olam as a process or an “ethic of 
suffering.”
 Contrary to Leibowitz and Goldman, Soloveitchik and David 
Hartman point to the link between Halakhah and processes of 
social reform. Soloveitchik’s distinction between topical and 
thematic Halakhah, discussed in detail in Chapter Five, and 
Hartman’s theological structuring of a non-utopian view of ha-
lakhic tradition, are explicit responses to this challenge, which 
Hartman sums up as follows: “The covenant does not suggest 
any promise of resolution for the fi nite human condition. Rather, 
it teaches the community how to be responsible for its social and 
political existence even within the uncertain and possibly tragic 
conditions of history and even though many events are beyond 
human control.”76
 In sum, for Halakhah as the mainstream Jewish tradition, the 
constitutive assumption of its meaning structure is a critical, non-
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